The Collapse of Collective Security in Europe

By the late 1930s, Soviet efforts to establish a European collective security system against Nazi Germany had repeatedly failed. The Munich Agreement of 1938—where Britain and France acquiesced to Hitler’s dismemberment of Czechoslovakia—excluded the USSR from major European negotiations, leaving Stalin deeply suspicious of Western intentions. The Soviet Union, committed since 1933 to a policy of cooperation with Western democracies through the League of Nations, now faced isolation. With fascist aggression escalating, Moscow adopted a dual-track approach: pursuing an anti-German alliance with Britain and France while cautiously exploring rapprochement with Berlin.

Stalin’s Warning and Germany’s Overtures

On March 10, 1939, Stalin delivered a pivotal speech at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party, condemning Western appeasement policies that sought to redirect Nazi expansion eastward. He outlined Soviet priorities: maintaining peace while avoiding entanglement in conflicts orchestrated by “war provocateurs.” Berlin took note. German Ambassador Friedrich-Werner von der Schulenburg reported Stalin’s sharper criticism of Britain than of Germany, signaling potential diplomatic flexibility.

Secret contacts between Germany and the USSR began post-Munich but progressed slowly. By April, Hermann Göring floated the idea of improving relations to Mussolini, while Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov insisted any economic talks required a “political foundation.” A May 20 meeting between Molotov and Schulenburg stalled, but Germany’s anxiety over potential Anglo-French-Soviet military cooperation soon intensified its overtures.

The Summer of Secret Negotiations

On July 26, German diplomat Karl Schnurre dined with Soviet representatives in Berlin, bluntly contrasting British “empty promises” with Germany’s offer: neutrality and mutual benefits. Days later, German State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker proposed dividing Eastern Europe into spheres of influence—a clear invitation to partition Poland and the Baltic states.

Meanwhile, Anglo-French-Soviet military talks floundered over Poland’s refusal to allow Red Army passage. Moscow grew skeptical of Western commitment, while Hitler—facing a September 1 deadline to invade Poland—pressed for urgency. On August 14, Ribbentrop proposed flying to Moscow, offering concessions Stalin could not ignore: a non-aggression pact, influence over Japan, and joint dominance in Eastern Europe.

The Pact and Its Hidden Protocol

On August 23, 1939, Ribbentrop and Molotov signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, a ten-year non-aggression treaty with devastating secret clauses:
– The Baltics: Lithuania fell to Germany; Estonia, Latvia, and Finland to the USSR.
– Poland: Divided along the Narew, Vistula, and San Rivers.
– Bessarabia: Recognized as Soviet territory.

The agreement bought Stalin time to rearm and secure borders but abandoned ideological principles. For Hitler, it guaranteed a one-front war.

Immediate Consequences and Historical Reckoning

The pact shocked global communists and undermined Soviet moral authority. While it temporarily shielded the USSR from war, Hitler’s subsequent invasion of Poland on September 1—unopposed by Stalin—triggered World War II. The USSR’s 1941 betrayal by Germany exposed the pact’s fragility.

Historians debate Stalin’s miscalculation: Was avoiding immediate conflict worth empowering Nazi aggression? The pact remains a stark lesson in realpolitik’s ethical costs—a momentary strategic win that ultimately demanded catastrophic sacrifices.