The Turning Tide in the Pacific Theater

By 1944, World War II’s Pacific theater had undergone a dramatic transformation. After relentless American assaults, Japan’s outer defensive perimeter had completely collapsed. The Marianas campaign proved particularly devastating, with U.S. forces capturing Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in quick succession – shattering key links in Japan’s inner defensive chain. These victories fundamentally altered the strategic balance, giving America undisputed initiative while leaving Japanese defenses in disarray.

The fall of Saipan represented more than territorial loss – it breached Japan’s defensive gates at a time when war resources neared exhaustion. Imperial forces could no longer match Allied naval or air capabilities. Yet Japanese commanders refused surrender, instead developing desperate contingency plans known as the “Core Circle” and “Contact Circle” defense schemes.

Japan’s Last-Ditch Defense Strategies

Facing imminent catastrophe, Japanese strategists debated four options:

The first proposed an all-out immediate决战 (decisive battle), disregarding post-1945 consequences. The second allocated 70% of remaining resources for a决战 while reserving 30% for homeland defense. The third split forces evenly between resisting the Philippine invasion and defending Japan. The final option advocated complete withdrawal to fortify the homeland for prolonged resistance.

On July 21, 1944, Imperial Headquarters adopted the second approach – committing 70% of remaining strength to cripple Allied morale and force negotiated peace. In reality, all options represented varying degrees of futile resistance against overwhelming Allied superiority.

The Japanese plan designated four operational zones: Philippines (Sho-1), Taiwan (Sho-2), Home Islands (Sho-3), and Northern territories (Sho-4). Sho-1 and Sho-2 preparations were ordered by August’s end, with Sho-3 and Sho-4 ready by October.

The Allied Debate: Philippines or Taiwan?

As American forces prepared their next move, a strategic disagreement emerged between General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz. Navy leaders including Admiral King and Nimitz favored bypassing Luzon to seize Taiwan and Xiamen – effectively corking Japan’s supply lines between homeland and southern resources. This “bottleneck strategy” would combine naval blockade with intensified homeland bombing.

MacArthur vehemently opposed this plan. On July 7, during President Roosevelt’s Hawaii conference, the general insisted liberating the Philippines remained America’s moral obligation. His impassioned arguments prevailed, and the decision was made to strike first at Leyte Gulf – establishing airbases before advancing on Luzon.

Prelude to Battle: Neutralizing Taiwan

By August 1944, Admiral William Halsey assumed command of the Third Fleet, tasked with supporting the Leyte landings. In September, his carrier groups began massive raids on Japanese airbases across the Philippines, Taiwan, and Ryukyu Islands. These strikes revealed surprising weakness in central Philippine defenses, prompting Halsey to recommend accelerating the Leyte timetable. The Joint Chiefs approved, setting D-Day for October 20.

Halsey recognized Taiwan’s strategic threat – its proximity to Leyte and concentration of land-based aircraft could jeopardize the entire operation. On October 12, Task Force 38 commander Marc Mitscher launched over 400 aircraft against Taiwan from just 90 miles offshore. Despite fierce resistance, American pilots achieved total air supremacy in what Japanese commander Vice Admiral Fukudome Shigeru later described as “a one-sided slaughter.” Over three days, U.S. forces destroyed nearly 1,200 Japanese aircraft at a cost of only 89 planes – eliminating Taiwan as a threat to the Leyte operation.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf Unfolds

On October 17, American forces captured Suluan and Dinagat islands east of Leyte. Two days later, Japanese forces initiated Sho-1 operations as MacArthur’s troops stormed Leyte’s beaches on October 20. The Seventh Fleet’s 420-ship armada began unloading 213,500 tons of materiel into the cramped beachhead.

American naval power appeared overwhelming – 12 fleet carriers, 18 escort carriers, 12 battleships, 20 cruisers and 104 destroyers concentrated near Leyte. However, divided command between Halsey’s Third Fleet (reporting to Nimitz) and Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet (under MacArthur) created dangerous coordination gaps.

The Clash at Sibuyan Sea

Japanese plans hinged on Admiral Ozawa’s decoy carrier group luring Halsey north while Admiral Kurita’s Center Force penetrated San Bernardino Strait to attack Leyte’s vulnerable transports. On October 23, American submarines Darter and Dace ambushed Kurita’s fleet in Palawan Passage, sinking heavy cruisers Atago (Kurita’s flagship) and Maya while crippling Takao.

The following day, Kurita’s battered fleet entered the Sibuyan Sea where five waves of American aircraft focused their fury on super-battleship Musashi. Despite her legendary armor (410mm thick), the 72,000-ton behemoth absorbed 19 torpedoes and 17 bombs before capsizing at 19:35, taking nearly 1,000 crewmen with her. Though heavily damaged, Kurita’s remaining forces still posed a grave threat.

The Decoy That Worked Too Well

Meanwhile, Ozawa’s Northern Force – intentionally understrength with only 108 aircraft – finally succeeded in attracting Halsey’s attention on October 24. When Ozawa launched a 60-plane strike against Task Force 38’s northern elements, Halsey took the bait completely. Despite light damage (only escort carrier Princeton was lost), Halsey committed his entire Third Fleet to pursue Ozawa’s carriers, leaving San Bernardino Strait unguarded.

This fateful decision would set the stage for history’s last great battleship duel off Samar the following day – but that’s another chapter in this epic naval saga. The preliminary battles had already demonstrated Allied dominance in the Pacific, paving the way for MacArthur’s dramatic return to the Philippines and the eventual collapse of Japanese resistance.