The Origins of Japan’s “Cage Policy” in North China

By late 1939, Japanese forces in North China had developed a sophisticated strategy to suppress guerrilla resistance. As described in reports from the Jizhong Military District, the enemy constructed an elaborate network of roads flanked by deep trenches and high embankments – some elevated five feet above ground with eight-foot-deep ditches on either side. This system effectively partitioned communist base areas into isolated pockets, preventing mutual support between resistance forces.

Military strategist Liu Bocheng likened this to a “cage policy,” where railways served as pillars, roads as nets, and strongpoints as locks to imprison anti-Japanese forces. The Eighth Route Army leadership recognized the grave threat this posed – if fully implemented, it would create extreme difficulties for maintaining guerrilla warfare. By early 1940, Japanese forces had fortified hundreds of miles with this system, particularly along the critical Zhengding-Taiyuan (Zhengtai) Railway that connected Hebei and Shanxi provinces.

Planning the Counteroffensive

Facing this strategic challenge, Eighth Route Army commanders Zhu De and Peng Dehuai began preparations for a massive coordinated assault on Japanese transportation networks. Originally planned for April 1940, the operation was delayed due to conflicts with Nationalist forces during the First Anti-Communist Campaign.

The strategic context was complex. After capturing Wuhan in 1938, Japan shifted to political inducements to complement military pressure on Chiang Kai-shek’s government. Meanwhile, Nationalist-Communist tensions escalated following the December 1939 Incident in Shanxi, where Yan Xishan’s forces attacked communist-led units. Against this backdrop, the Eighth Route Army needed to demonstrate its anti-Japanese credentials while breaking the enemy’s stranglehold on North China.

Launching the Hundred Regiments Offensive

On August 20, 1940, the offensive commenced with coordinated attacks across North China. When reports indicated participation from over 100 regiments, Peng Dehuai declared: “Whether it’s 100 or more, let’s call it the Hundred Regiments Offensive.” The name stuck and became a propaganda triumph.

The campaign unfolded in three phases:
1) August-September: Widespread sabotage of railways and roads
2) September-October: Attacks on Japanese strongpoints
3) October-December: Countering enemy reprisals

Five future Marshals of the People’s Liberation Army participated – Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Liu Bocheng, He Long, and Nie Rongzhen – demonstrating the operation’s significance.

The Battle for the Zhengtai Railway

The 240-kilometer Zhengtai Railway, traversing the Taihang Mountains through strategic passes like Niangzi Guan, became a primary target. Nie Rongzhen’s Jin-Cha-Ji Military District forces focused on the eastern section, achieving notable successes:

– The 5th Regiment captured Niangzi Pass on August 20 after three hours of fighting, raising the communist flag over this strategic gateway for the first time in three years of occupation.
– Central Column troops under Yang Chengwu destroyed the Jingxing coal mines, a vital resource for Japanese industry, causing an estimated 100 million yen in damage and six months of production loss.
– Right Wing forces severed communications between Niangzi Pass and Luanliu, completely isolating Japanese garrisons.

Liu Bocheng’s 129th Division attacked the western sector, with the 16th Regiment taking Lujiazhuang Station and the 14th Regiment holding Shinao Mountain for six days against 600 Japanese troops supported by aircraft and chemical weapons.

Expanding the Campaign

In September, operations expanded with the Liao-Ling and Yu-Liao campaigns:

– At Dongtuanbao, the 3rd Regiment annihilated a Japanese training unit of 130 elite officers after several days of intense combat, with surviving soldiers choosing self-immolation over surrender.
– The 129th Division employed innovative tactics at Yuci, tunneling under the Japanese strongpoint and detonating explosives before assaulting the breached defenses on September 25.
– He Long’s 120th Division disrupted the Datong-Puzhou Railway, preventing Japanese reinforcements.

Strategic Impact and Legacy

The Hundred Regiments Offensive achieved remarkable results:
– 910 km of railways and 3,000 km of roads damaged
– 260+ Japanese strongpoints destroyed
– 20,000+ enemy casualties (Japanese claimed 4,000)
– Major coal mines and industrial facilities disabled

Militarily, it demonstrated the Eighth Route Army’s capacity for large-scale operations while exposing vulnerabilities in Japanese occupation tactics. Politically, it bolstered Chinese morale during a period of growing defeatism and Nationalist-Communist tensions.

However, the offensive also prompted severe Japanese reprisals in 1941-42 through the “Three Alls” policy (Kill All, Burn All, Loot All), leading to some criticism of the campaign’s long-term consequences. Yet its psychological impact was undeniable – proving Japanese forces could be challenged and inspiring continued resistance during the war’s darkest hours.

As Mao Zedong cabled Peng Dehuai: “The Hundred Regiments Offensive is tremendously exciting. Can we organize one or two more such campaigns?” While subsequent operations never matched its scale, the campaign remains a landmark in China’s War of Resistance, exemplifying both the strengths and limitations of communist guerrilla warfare against a technologically superior occupier.