The Strategic Legacy of the Qin Northern Army

The Qin dynasty’s military machine reached its zenith under the leadership of generals like Wang Li, grandson of the legendary conqueror Wang Jian. In 209 BCE, as rebellions erupted across the former Warring States, Wang Li’s Northern Army executed a pincer movement strikingly similar to his grandfather’s 228 BCE Zhao campaign: one column advanced from Taiyuan toward Jingxing Pass to threaten Zhao from the north, while another marched east through Henei Commandery along the Yellow River to pressure Handan from the south. This dual-axis strategy aimed to crush the Zhao capital Xindu between hammer and anvil.

Historical records reveal crucial differences between the two campaigns. Where Wang Jian faced a fractured Zhao state, Wang Li contended with a coalition bolstered by Qi and Yan reinforcements. The northern thrust stalled at Jingxing’s formidable defenses, while southern forces found themselves blocked at the Zhang River by Zhao-Qi joint forces. For five critical months (March-August 209 BCE), this stalemate persisted across the Yellow River’s northern theater, demonstrating how rebel coordination had evolved since the Qin unification wars.

The Theater Shifts: From Stalemate to Crisis

The strategic equation transformed dramatically in August 209 BCE when Xiang Liang’s Chu forces crushed the Qin army under Zhang Han at Dong’e. As Zhang Han retreated to Puyang, constructing moats from Yellow River waters to fortify his position, Wang Li made a fateful decision. Secretly withdrawing from the Zhang River front, his Northern Army combined with reinforcements from Hedong and Henei to cross the Yellow River and reinforce Zhang Han. This merger of Qin’s two principal field armies proved devastating.

The reinforced Qin army executed a lightning strike on Dingtao, annihilating Xiang Liang’s Chu forces in October 209 BCE. Contemporary military analysts note three hallmarks of Zhang Han’s tactics that reappeared here:
1. Deceptive weakness preceding sudden concentrated attacks
2. Relentless focus on supply lines (demonstrated earlier at Ao Granary)
3. Mastery of “besiege to strike relief forces” – a tactic previously employed against Wei

The Siege of Julu and Coalition Politics

With southern rebels temporarily neutralized, the combined Qin armies turned northward, crushing Zhao-Qi forces and capturing Handan in late 209 BCE. Zhang Han’s systematic demolition of Handan’s walls and forced population transfers reflected Qin’s institutional memory of urban rebellions. As Zhao’s court retreated to Julu, the stage was set for history’s most consequential siege.

Wang Li’s Northern Army encircled Julu while Zhang Han secured supply lines from Ao Granary. This classic “iron ring” strategy aimed to either:
– Destroy coalition relief armies in pitched battle
– Starve Julu into submission if allies failed to intervene

Meanwhile, the Chu political landscape shifted dramatically after Xiang Liang’s death. King Huai II moved the capital to Pengcheng, consolidating control by:
– Merging Lü Chen and Xiang Yu’s armies under royal command
– Appointing Chen Ying as Pillar of State for civil administration
– Granting Xiang Yu the title “Duke of Lu” while stripping his field command

The Contradictions of the “King Huai Covenant”

In late 209 BCE, the Chu court formulated its famous strategic blueprint:
1. Restoration of pre-Qin states under their original royal houses
2. Collective action against Qin with Chu leadership
3. Promise of Qin’s throne to whoever first captured Guanzhong

This covenant exposed fatal tensions. While nominally promoting aristocratic restoration, it simultaneously incentivized warlords like Xiang Yu and Liu Bang through the Qin kingship promise. The court’s decision to:
– Send Liu Bang westward (despite Xiang Yu’s requests)
– Appoint Song Yi to lead the Julu relief force with Xiang Yu as deputy

Reflected deep distrust of Xiang Yu’s ambitions. Song Yi’s 46-day halt at Anyang and his infamous “let tigers and bulls exhaust each other” strategy became the final provocation.

The Turning Tide: Military Revolt and Strategic Reversal

Xiang Yu’s dramatic coup in December 209 BCE – killing Song Yi and assuming command – marked the rebellion’s turning point. His subsequent actions:
– Destroying cooking vessels and sinking boats at the Zhang River
– Nine victorious battles against Wang Li’s forces
– Decisive victory at Julu in January 208 BCE

Shattered Qin’s northern army and reversed the war’s momentum. The defeat’s psychological impact proved irreparable; within months, Zhang Han surrendered at Julu, and Liu Bang breached the Qin heartland.

Enduring Lessons from the Qin Collapse

The Julu campaign illustrates three timeless military-political dynamics:
1. The perils of overextension – Qin’s simultaneous southern and northern campaigns stretched logistics
2. Coalition warfare’s complexities – rebel coordination ultimately overcame Qin’s professional armies
3. The “besiege to strike relief” tactic’s double-edged nature – brilliant against Wei, disastrous at Julu

Modern analysts still debate whether Wang Li’s river crossing to reinforce Zhang Han constituted strategic overreach or inevitable response to crisis. What remains undisputed is Julu’s legacy as the graveyard of Qin’s field armies and the birthplace of Han dynasty’s founding mythology. The echoes of these events would reverberate through two millennia of Chinese warfare, from the An Lushan Rebellion to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom’s coalition battles.