The Powder Keg of Late Joseon Korea

The final years of 19th-century Korea witnessed a geopolitical tug-of-war that would define East Asia’s future. By 1898, King Gojong’s Joseon Dynasty had become a battleground for imperial ambitions, with Russia and Japan vying for influence following the shocking 1895 assassination of Queen Min by Japanese agents. This brutal event had pushed Gojong into Russia’s orbit, leading to the establishment of Russian military advisors and financial controllers in Seoul – arrangements that would soon spark a nationalist backlash.

Russian Minister Aleksey Shpeyer, who had positioned himself as Korea’s protector against Japan, found his assumptions crumbling when Seoul’s streets erupted with anti-Russian sentiment. The Independence Association (독립협회), a reformist group advocating Korean sovereignty, mobilized thousands in protests that would force a dramatic reconfiguration of great power politics on the peninsula.

The Russian Reckoning: March 1898 Turning Points

The crisis reached its climax in early March 1898 when Shpeyer, shaken by the scale of public opposition, made two fateful decisions. On March 3, he urgently cabled St. Petersburg questioning whether Russia should continue supporting the Korean government. The next day, in a remarkable policy reversal, he proposed to Japanese acting minister Katō that Korea was “incurably ill” and required “radical treatment” through Russo-Japanese “joint protection” – effectively abandoning his previous advocacy for Korean independence.

King Gojong, still reliant on Russian support, confided to Shpeyer that anti-Russian factions were threatening his life unless he severed ties with Russia. Though the Russian diplomat suggested another royal refuge at the legation (echoing Gojong’s 1896 flight), St. Petersburg rejected the idea. Instead, on March 7, Shpeyer delivered an ultimatum to Korea’s foreign minister: clarify within 24 hours whether the government desired continued Russian assistance. This marked the decisive rupture in Russo-Korean relations.

The People’s Voice: The March 10 “Manmin Gongdonghoe”

As Gojong hesitated, the Independence Association organized a watershed event on March 10 – the “Manmin Gongdonghoe” (만민공동회) mass rally at Jongno, Seoul’s central thoroughfare. Eight thousand citizens gathered to hear speakers denounce foreign advisors as “a disgrace to twenty million countrymen.” The assembly resolved to demand the immediate removal of all foreign advisors, presenting Korea’s government with an unprecedented challenge from civil society.

Facing dual pressure from Russian ultimatums and popular protests, the Korean cabinet finally responded on March 12 with carefully worded diplomacy: while thanking Russia for past assistance, they declared future military and financial matters would be handled “primarily by Koreans” without foreign advisors – effectively requesting Russian withdrawal.

The Great Power Chessboard: The Nishi-Rosen Protocol

Russia’s subsequent retreat from Korea triggered frenzied diplomatic maneuvering. On March 19, Japanese Foreign Minister Nishi proposed the “Man-Kan kokan ron” (Manchuria-Korea exchange theory), offering to recognize Russian dominance in Manchuria in exchange for Japanese primacy in Korea. Russian Foreign Minister Muravyov countered with a proposal preserving both powers’ rights to future Korean intervention.

After tense negotiations, the April 25 Nishi-Rosen Protocol emerged as a temporary compromise:
1. Mutual recognition of Korean sovereignty
2. Prior consultation before sending military/financial advisors
3. Russian acknowledgment of Japan’s commercial predominance

Though framed as protecting Korean independence, the agreement’s true significance lay in formalizing Russia’s withdrawal while keeping Japan’s ambitions in check. As Russian military attaché Janzhul noted, it merely postponed rather than resolved the Korean question.

Aftermath: Turmoil and Authoritarian Backlash

The Russian departure left Korea politically unstable. New Russian envoy Matyunin reported treasury exhaustion, unpaid officials, and looming famine. By July, Gojong privately regretted expelling Russian advisors, alleging Japanese manipulation of the Independence Association.

Tensions escalated dramatically on September 11 with an attempted poisoning of Gojong and the crown prince – an event blamed on pro-Russian translator Kim Hong-rok, whose public execution further inflamed anti-Russian sentiment.

The Independence Association’s October push for parliamentary reforms through the Jungchuwon (중추원) advisory council triggered conservative backlash. Gojong ultimately crushed the movement in December through a coalition with traditional merchants (보부상), arresting reform leaders and reasserting royal authority.

The New Order: 1899 Power Reshuffle

The crisis prompted both Russia and Japan to replace their Seoul envoys in 1899. Russia dispatched the ambitious Pavlov from Beijing, while Japan sent seasoned diplomat Hayashi Gonsuke, who carried explicit instructions to block Russian naval bases at strategic locations like Chinhae Bay.

Legacy of the 1898 Crisis

This pivotal year demonstrated Korea’s precarious position between modernization and imperialism. The Independence Association’s mobilization marked Korea’s first mass nationalist movement, while great power negotiations established patterns that would culminate in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War. Ultimately, the events revealed the hollowness of “independence” rhetoric when sandwiched between expansionist empires – a dilemma that would haunt Korea until its 1910 annexation.

The 1898 crisis also exposed tensions within Korea’s reform movements, as progressive ideals clashed with traditional power structures. Though temporarily suppressed, the democratic impulses awakened by the Independence Association would resurface in later Korean independence struggles, making this a foundational moment in Korea’s journey toward modern nationhood.