The Rise of War Fever in Japanese Media

In the summer of 1903, Japan’s media landscape underwent a dramatic shift as newspapers abandoned earlier calls for restraint and embraced increasingly belligerent rhetoric against Russia. The Yorozu Chōhō, a leading Tokyo daily, exemplified this transformation. On July 7, the paper had published an anti-war editorial under the pen name “A Common Soldier,” authored by pacifist intellectuals like Uchimura Kanzō, Kōtoku Shūsui, and Sakai Toshihiko. Yet by July 29, the same newspaper ran a fiery commentary titled A Warning to Russia, marking its first explicit call for war.

The editorial declared that Russia’s refusal to withdraw troops from Manchuria—despite prior agreements—justified immediate Japanese action. It argued that any further Russian military buildup should be treated as a direct provocation. This abrupt reversal mirrored a broader trend. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, another influential paper, escalated its stance on July 31 with an even sharper editorial, Rumors of a Russo-Japanese War, warning that Russia’s arrogance made conflict inevitable.

The Mobilization of Hardline Factions

The media’s hardening tone galvanized Japan’s political factions. On July 23, hardliners from the Progressive Party, the former Kokumin Dōmei (National Alliance), and the Aikoku Tō (Patriotic Party) formed a joint committee. Led by figures like Shibata Kamon and Shiba Shirō, they organized the “Foreign Policy Hardliners’ Rally,” held on August 9 at Tokyo’s Kanda Kinkikan Hall. Over 500 attendees—reportedly packing the venue—heard speeches condemning Russia’s repeated violations of treaties, from the Triple Intervention (1895) to its occupation of Manchuria.

The rally’s manifesto framed resistance as a national duty: “Russia’s southward expansion threatens East Asian peace. Our government must act decisively.” A resolution demanded Russia’s immediate withdrawal and urged Japan to secure Manchuria’s “open door.” The gathering culminated in the creation of the Tai-Ro Dōshikai (Anti-Russian Society), which petitioned Prime Minister Katsura Tarō on August 11. Though Katsura downplayed their concerns publicly, the group’s pressure reflected growing public impatience.

Media Flip-Flops and Imperialist Undercurrents

The Yorozu Chōhō’s ideological whiplash continued into August. After briefly publishing anti-war pieces like The Spirit of Resolving the Manchurian Question (August 25), it reversed course again on August 28 with Abandon or Annex?, an editorial advocating outright imperialism over Korean independence. Meanwhile, the Tokyo Asahi tempered its hawkishness with a veneer of diplomacy, urging Russia to “reflect” while asserting Japan’s right to intervene.

This media volatility mirrored divisions within Japan’s elite. While some, like the Anti-Russian Society, pushed for confrontation, others feared the costs of war. Yet the press increasingly framed aggression as a test of national resolve—a narrative that marginalized dissent.

Russia’s Delusions and Diplomatic Missteps

As Japan’s war fever mounted, Russia’s leadership remained distracted. Tsar Nicholas II spent late July and early August 1903 engrossed in the canonization of Seraphim of Sarov, a mystic saint, rather than addressing the crisis. Meanwhile, his advisors—divided between hawks like Alexander Bezobrazov and cautious moderates like War Minister Alexei Kuropatkin—submitted conflicting reports.

Bezobrazov, advocating a hardline stance, warned that Russia’s military weakness in Manchuria invited Japanese attack. He proposed consolidating power under a Far Eastern viceroy, a role tailor-made for Admiral Yevgeni Alekseyev. Kuropatkin, however, dismissed such fears, insisting Russia’s forces could repel Japan. His August 6 memo assured Nicholas that even if Port Arthur (Lüshun) were besieged, reinforcements would arrive in time—a fatal miscalculation.

On August 12, Nicholas bypassed his ministers entirely, unilaterally establishing the Viceroyalty of the Far East. The decree shocked officials like Finance Minister Sergei Witte and Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamsdorf, who learned of it via the Government Gazette. Alekseyev himself, unaware of his appointment until August 18, reluctantly accepted. The move centralized authority but deepened bureaucratic chaos, leaving Russia unprepared for the coming storm.

The Inevitability of Conflict

By late 1903, both nations were locked in a spiral of mutual distrust. Japan’s media and public opinion, once divided, now overwhelmingly framed war as a patriotic necessity. Russia, meanwhile, vacillated between overconfidence and disarray. When negotiations over Manchuria and Korea collapsed in early 1904, the Russo-Japanese War became unavoidable.

The press had played a decisive role. Editorials like A Warning to Russia and the Anti-Russian Society’s rallies transformed diplomatic friction into a national crusade. In Russia, Nicholas’s detachment and Bezobrazov’s scheming ensured a incoherent response. The conflict that erupted in February 1904 would shatter imperial pretensions on both sides—but its roots lay in the war of words waged in newspapers and meeting halls months earlier.

Legacy: Media, Nationalism, and the Fog of War

The Russo-Japanese War marked a turning point in modern warfare, not just militarily but in the role of media and public opinion. Japan’s press demonstrated how nationalist fervor could shape policy, while Russia’s missteps highlighted the dangers of autocratic disengagement. Today, as great-power tensions again dominate headlines, the lessons of 1903–04 remain stark: when diplomacy cedes ground to jingoism, the road to war shortens.