The Gathering Storm: Prelude to Conflict

The winter of 1904 found East Asia balanced on a knife’s edge. For nearly a decade, tensions had been building between the expanding Russian Empire and the rapidly modernizing Japanese state over influence in Korea and Manchuria. By February, the diplomatic dance had reached its final measures.

In Tokyo, subtle but unmistakable signs pointed toward imminent conflict. Newspapers on February 6 carried cryptic notices about the prohibition of foreign coded telegrams from Japan and Korean ports like Busan, Incheon, and Seoul. Behind palace walls, ministers made urgent visits to the emperor while the Navy Ministry and General Staff held emergency meetings. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun published detailed listings of Russian warships in Asian waters, particularly noting the cruiser Varyag and gunboat Koreets at Incheon.

Meanwhile, Russian military attaché Rusin managed to send one final, three-word coded message to Port Arthur: “General mobilization Rusin.” This terse dispatch would be Russia’s last warning before the storm broke.

The First Moves: Japan’s Naval Deployment

As dawn broke on February 6, the Japanese Third Fleet’s Seventh Squadron, commanded by Rear Admiral Hosoya, began executing carefully laid plans from their position at Takeshiki Port on Tsushima Island. Having arrived on January 19, they now received orders to swiftly occupy Chinhae Bay – a strategically vital anchorage near Busan.

The operation unfolded with precision:
– At 4:00 AM, Vice Admiral Kataoka issued the occupation order
– By 5:00 AM, the gunboat Saiyen received special instructions to capture any Russian vessels
– By 6:30 AM, the main squadron sortied from Takeshiki in two columns

Simultaneously, from Sasebo Naval Base, Admiral Togo Heihachiro led the Combined Fleet’s main elements toward their objectives:
– 9:00 AM: Third Squadron departed
– 11:00 AM: Second Squadron followed
– Noon: First Squadron sailed
Their orders were clear: “Proceed immediately and first destroy the Russian fleet in the Yellow Sea.”

The Capture of Chinhae Bay: Securing Strategic Advantage

Chinhae Bay’s importance to Japanese strategy cannot be overstated. Naval planners had long identified this deep-water anchorage west of Busan as essential for controlling the Korea Strait and maintaining communications between Japan and Korea. By evening on February 6, Japanese vessels had secured the bay, immediately beginning to lay dummy mines and establish temporary signal stations.

The operation included several calculated moves:
– Occupation of Korean telegraph offices to control information flow
– Capture of Russian merchant vessels like the Mukden and Ekaterinoslav
– Establishment of communications lines from Tsushima through Geoje Island to Masanpo

These actions, while militarily prudent, constituted clear violations of Korean sovereignty – a fact often overlooked in traditional accounts of the war’s opening.

Diplomatic Theater: The Severing of Relations

As naval maneuvers unfolded, Tokyo delivered its diplomatic coup de grâce. At 4:00 PM Tokyo time (9:00 AM in St. Petersburg), Foreign Minister Komura summoned Russian Minister Rosen to formally announce the severing of diplomatic relations. The carefully staged presentation included two separate notes:

1. A declaration suspending negotiations and reserving Japan’s right to independent action
2. A formal notice of diplomatic rupture, citing Russia’s refusal of Japan’s “just and moderate proposals”

This two-part approach created deliberate confusion in Russian circles. While clearly signaling Japan’s intent to act, the separation of the notes allowed room for misinterpretation – particularly Rosen’s private hope, expressed in a personal letter to Foreign Minister Lamsdorf, that the break might be temporary.

The Russian Response: Confusion and Complacency

The Russian reaction to these developments revealed critical weaknesses in their strategic posture. Despite clear warnings, key figures remained astonishingly complacent:

– In St. Petersburg, Lamsdorf failed to communicate the full gravity of Japan’s “independent action” reservation to the Tsar or military commanders
– At Port Arthur, Viceroy Alexeiev continued to believe war might be avoided, delaying defensive preparations
– Naval officers in Port Arthur’s outer roadstead neglected to deploy torpedo nets, despite warnings from forward-thinkers like Admiral Makarov

This institutional paralysis would have devastating consequences in the coming hours.

The First Shots: Naval Engagements Begin

By February 8, the conflict entered its active phase with two nearly simultaneous naval actions:

1. The Battle of Chemulpo (Incheon):
– Japanese forces under Rear Admiral Uryu trapped Russian ships Varyag and Koreets in port
– After an unsuccessful breakout attempt, both Russian vessels were scuttled
– Simultaneously, Japanese troops began landing at Incheon

2. The Night Attack on Port Arthur:
– Under cover of darkness, Japanese destroyers launched a daring torpedo attack
– The battleships Retvizan and Tsesarevich, plus cruiser Pallada, suffered critical damage
– Russia’s Pacific squadron was crippled before firing a single shot in anger

The Fog of War: Information Control and Perception

Both sides engaged in intensive information management during these critical days:

– Japan strictly controlled telegraph communications from Korea
– Russian newspapers initially downplayed the diplomatic rupture
– Critical warnings from forward observers were ignored or suppressed

This manipulation created dangerous misperceptions, particularly among Russian leadership who continued to believe Japan’s actions would be limited to Korea.

The Strategic Implications

These opening moves established patterns that would define the entire conflict:

1. Japanese Initiative: Japan’s coordinated diplomatic and military strikes demonstrated superior planning and execution
2. Russian Reactivity: Russia’s fragmented command structure and delayed responses left them perpetually behind events
3. Korean Vulnerability: Korea’s nominal neutrality was violated by both sides, highlighting its status as a pawn rather than player

The Human Dimension

Behind the strategic maneuvers, individual stories revealed the war’s personal impact:

– Russian officers celebrating a name day party as torpedoes approached
– Japanese telegraph operators meticulously cutting Russian communications
– Korean officials torn between protest and pragmatism as foreign troops landed

These vignettes remind us that history is ultimately the sum of human decisions and experiences.

Legacy and Lessons

The opening week of the Russo-Japanese War established several enduring historical truths:

1. The Value of Preparation: Japan’s years of careful planning yielded decisive early advantages
2. The Danger of Complacency: Russia’s underestimation of Japan proved catastrophic
3. The Nature of Modern War: The conflict blurred lines between diplomacy, information warfare, and military action

As the first major conflict of the 20th century, these events previewed the complex, total wars that would soon engulf the world. The lessons learned – and ignored – in February 1904 would echo through the coming century of global conflict.