The Birth of a Controversial System

When Zhu Yuanzhang established the Ming Dynasty in 1368, he faced a precarious situation. The remnants of the Yuan Dynasty still posed significant military threats, with historical records describing their forces as “no less than a million archers” controlling vast territories. Simultaneously, Zhu’s own generals—hardened by years of civil war—commanded substantial private armies that could challenge central authority.

Drawing lessons from history—particularly the Han Dynasty’s separatist rebellions and the Yuan’s collapse due to warlordism—the Hongwu Emperor devised a unique solution: reviving the ancient feudal system (分封制) exclusively for his male descendants. Between 1370-1391, he enfeoffed all 24 sons and one grandson as regional princes, declaring this was “not favoritism but following ancient sage kings’ systems for lasting stability.” Unlike Han founder Liu Bang who appointed unrelated nobles, Zhu Yuanzhang insisted only imperial clansmen could hold these positions.

The Princes’ Power Structure

These Ming princes occupied strategic locations across the empire, particularly along the northern frontier where nine “Border Princes” guarded against Mongol incursions. Each maintained substantial military forces—typically 3,000-19,000 troops, with frontier princes enjoying even larger armies. They held authority to:
– Construct fortifications
– Oversee military production
– Approve troop deployments
– Conduct border campaigns

The most powerful was Zhu Di, Prince of Yan, stationed at Beijing (then called Beiping). Controlling this former Yuan capital gave him unparalleled resources to cultivate his power base. Contemporary observers noted these semi-autonomous principalities resembled “greater in power than Yuan provincial governments,” creating inherent tensions with Zhu Yuanzhang’s centralizing reforms.

The Fatal Flaws

Despite warnings—like scholar Ye Boju’s memorial comparing it to the Han’s Seven Kingdoms Rebellion—the emperor dismissed concerns. When Ye predicted inevitable conflict, Zhu Yuanzhang imprisoned him to death, silencing dissent.

The system’s contradictions became glaring after 1392 when Crown Prince Zhu Biao died. Though favoring Zhu Di, succession rules forced the emperor to appoint Zhu Biao’s son Zhu Yunwen (later Jianwen Emperor). This created a precarious dynamic where the young emperor faced powerful uncles—especially after Zhu Yuanzhang’s 1398 death.

The Jianwen Reforms and Their Downfall

Zhu Yunwen’s brief reign (1398-1402) marked a dramatic shift from his grandfather’s harsh policies. His “Jianwen New Policies” included:
– Reducing excessive Jiangnan land taxes
– Repealing bans on southerners in finance ministries
– Halving national land rents in 1399
– Reforming judicial systems to reduce executions
– Elevating civil officials over military leaders

These measures won support from Confucian scholars but alienated military elites. Most fatally, his attempts to weaken the princes through gradual demotions (“削藩”) provoked Zhu Di’s rebellion under the banner of “Qingjunce” (removing evil advisors)—a justification borrowed from Hongwu’s own regulations.

The Jingnan Campaign and Its Aftermath

The ensuing civil war (1399-1402) revealed Jianwen’s fatal weaknesses. Despite numerical superiority, his government lacked experienced commanders after Zhu Yuanzhang’s purges. Key mistakes included:
– Appointing incompetent aristocrat Li Jinglong to lead armies
– Failing to secure logistical bases
– Underestimating Zhu Di’s tactical brilliance

When Yan troops reached Nanjing in 1402, defectors opened the gates. Jianwen’s mysterious disappearance in palace fires spawned enduring legends—from monastic exile to overseas escape—that haunted Yongle’s reign.

Yongle’s Paradox: Destroying What Enabled His Rise

Having seized power through feudal institutions, Zhu Di systematically dismantled them:

### The Bloody Transition
– Executed Jianwen loyalists through horrific methods like Fang Xiaoru’s “Ten Family Extermination” (873 deaths) and Jing Qing’s “Vinegar Strike” (indiscriminate neighborhood purges)
– Purged historical records, erasing Jianwen’s reign until 1595

### Strategic Demotions
– Gradually stripped princes of military powers through legal pretexts
– Forced surrenders of private armies (e.g., Zhou Prince Zhu Su’s voluntary disarmament)
– Relocated powerful princes inland (e.g., Ning Prince Zhu Quan to Nanchang)

By 1420, new “Princely Restrictions” (藩禁) permanently neutered the system:
1. Princes forbidden from commanding troops
2. No interference in local governance
3. Prohibited from leaving fiefdoms without permission

Historical Legacy

The Ming feudal experiment demonstrated the impossibility of reconciling centralized bureaucracy with militarized aristocracy. While temporarily solving frontier defense needs, it nearly destroyed the dynasty within its first generation. Yongle’s eventual success came through:
– Transforming Beijing into a new capital
– Creating alternative military structures (e.g., Emperor’s Personal Armies)
– Establishing surveillance mechanisms like the Eastern Depot

Yet the system’s collapse left lasting impacts—from the 16th-century financial strain of supporting idle imperial clansmen to the cultural memory of Jianwen’s “benevolent rule” that later reformers would idealize. The Yongle Emperor’s paradoxical achievement was using feudal means to destroy feudalism itself, completing his father’s centralizing vision through ruthless pragmatism.