A Patchwork of Territories: The Origins of Brandenburg-Prussia

The story of Brandenburg-Prussia’s remarkable ascent begins with its improbable geography. Unlike its great rival, the Habsburg Monarchy, which possessed relatively contiguous domains, Brandenburg’s territories resembled a scattered jigsaw puzzle across northern Europe. From Kleve near the Dutch border in the west to Tilsit (now Sovetsk in Russia) on the Memel River in the east, these disparate holdings stretched over 1,000 kilometers with little natural cohesion.

This territorial fragmentation created fundamental challenges for governance. As late as 1650, the Brandenburg Estates could refuse funding for electoral policies in neighboring East Pomerania by declaring it a “foreign country.” The Electorate lacked both the religious diversity of the Habsburg lands and their imperial prestige, ranking below other major German princes like Saxony, the Palatinate, and Bavaria in resources and influence.

The Great Elector’s Pragmatic Revolution

Frederick William, known to history as the “Great Elector” (r. 1640-1688), transformed this unpromising situation through pragmatic state-building rather than grand design. His reign marked a turning point where Brandenburg-Prussia began its improbable rise.

The Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) had demonstrated the dangers of weakness in Central Europe’s unforgiving political landscape. Frederick William’s predecessor Georg Wilhelm had learned this painfully when his plea for neutrality to Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus received the cutting reply that in the existential struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism, neutrality was not an option.

Determined never to be prey again, Frederick William built military power – which required revenue – which in turn meant overcoming the resistance of provincial estates. His first modest army of 7,800 men (1643-44) provided crucial leverage during the war’s final phase. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) rewarded these efforts with territorial gains, including East Pomerania and several secularized bishoprics, though the coveted western Pomerania and Oder estuary remained out of reach.

The Mechanics of Centralization

Frederick William’s success rested on a self-reinforcing cycle: more troops enabled greater tax extraction, which funded larger armies. The Empire’s 1654 decision recognizing princes’ right to tax for military needs provided legal cover, while international instability made the Emperor reluctant to challenge these “illegal” taxes.

The Great Elector’s methods blended negotiation with coercion. While generally preferring compromise, he showed ruthless determination against stubborn resistance, as when dealing with Königsberg’s defiant leader Hieronymus Roth in 1662 (“interrogate him tomorrow, sentence him the next day, execute him on Tuesday or Wednesday”) or the unfortunate Count Christian Ludwig von Kalckstein, who was kidnapped from Warsaw and secretly executed.

By 1688, Frederick William had achieved his three main goals: a centralized administration, a fiscal system, and a standing army – all imposed on reluctant estates. His success contrasted sharply with contemporary failures like England’s Stuart monarchs, owing to Brandenburg’s weaker estates (impoverished by war) and the lasting trauma of foreign armies marauding through German lands.

The Social Bargain: Nobles, Peasants, and the State

The Junker nobility’s acquiescence to growing state power rested on a crucial social compromise. While peasant taxes quadrupled and towns bore new excises, the 1653 Rezess formally recognized noble landlords’ rights over serfs. As historian Edgar Melton observed, “the victory of Hohenzollern absolutism went hand in hand with the growth of noble power and activity at local and provincial levels.”

This evolving alliance saw nobles maintain local dominance while cooperating with central authority. County commissioners (Landräte) became crucial intermediaries – initially independent-minded (one 1660 complaint called them “true neighbors of the Poles” for their disobedience), but gradually brought under princely control while still representing noble interests.

The Kingdom is Born: Frederick I’s Cultural State

Frederick I (r. 1688-1713) has suffered by comparison with his illustrious father and son, but his reign achieved two transformative developments. First, he cultivated Brandenburg as a Kulturstaat, founding the University of Halle (1694), an Academy of Arts (1697), and the Berlin Academy of Sciences (1700) under Gottfried Leibniz’s leadership.

More dramatically, in 1701 he elevated Brandenburg to the Kingdom in Prussia – a necessary response to Saxony’s Augustus becoming King of Poland (1697) and Hanover’s imminent British crown. Emperor Leopold I’s desperate need for allies led to recognition of this self-coronation, marked by extravagant ceremonies (30,000 horses transported the court to Königsberg) and diamond-encrusted regalia.

While Leibniz praised the nominal transformation and Frederick the Great later mocked his grandfather’s creation as “a hermaphrodite rather than a proper kingdom,” the royal title granted Prussia new international standing. As “King in Prussia” (not “of Prussia,” since West Prussia remained Polish), the Hohenzollerns now sat at Europe’s top table – if not at its head.

The Soldier King’s Administrative Revolution

Frederick William I (r. 1713-1740) transformed this royal prestige into real power. Doubling the army to 81,000 men (funded domestically with 8.7 million thalers in reserves), he created what Hans Rosenberg called “the most remarkable administrative reformer the Hohenzollerns ever produced” – albeit one whose piety coexisted with shocking brutality.

His administrative reforms merged domain management and taxation into the General Directory (1723), with four departments handling regional and specialized matters. Though seemingly archaic to modern eyes, this marked Prussia’s evolution from provincial collection to unified state. The King’s scrawled marginalia (in his unique French-German-Latin mix) directed policy, creating a distinctive “cabinet government” style later emulated by his successors.

Professional bureaucracy advanced through examined probationary training (from 1723) and new cameralism chairs at Halle and Frankfurt universities (1727). As Betty Behrens noted, despite inevitable corruption, Prussia developed “a single organization with a clear chain of command” whose members often attained remarkable expertise.

Frederick the Great’s Enlightened Absolutism

Frederick II’s reign (1740-1786) saw Prussia’s military and diplomatic triumphs, but surprisingly little institutional change. The General Directory gained new departments (Silesia in 1746), but Frederick essentially maintained his father’s system while reversing anti-noble measures.

His 1752 Political Testament declared nobles “the most splendid jewels in his crown” – a belief reflected in policies protecting noble estates from commoner purchase (1750, 1762) and providing post-Seven Years’ War aid like mortgage loans. By Frederick’s death, 90% of officers were nobles, fulfilling his 1763 decree that “nobility can only be earned by the sword.”

Frederick’s famous self-description as “first servant of the state” reflected an exhausting work ethic (dawn-to-dusk document review) that set expectations for Prussia’s elite. Yet this personal diligence also created bottlenecks – as state grew, his micromanagement bred inefficiency, while secretaries gained unaccountable influence.

Conclusion: The Prussian Paradox

Brandenburg-Prussia’s rise from fragmented electorate to European power involved several paradoxes: centralization coexisting with noble privilege, military strength built on economic weakness, and Enlightenment ideals serving authoritarian structures. Unlike Western European states where parliaments checked monarchs, Prussia’s estates were gradually subdued while nobles retained local power through bureaucratic roles.

This distinctive path created a state capable of punching far above its demographic weight, but one whose social conservatism and militarism carried long-term consequences. The Hohenzollern formula – absolute monarchy tempered by bureaucratic professionalism and noble partnership – would influence German statecraft for centuries, for better and worse.