The Unfolding Drama of the French Armistice

In the summer of 1940, as German forces consolidated their occupation of France, two consequential visitors arrived at the author’s headquarters in Besançon. The first was General Ritter von Epp, Chief of Staff of the 19th Infantry Regiment, an old hunting companion from the Spessart Mountains. Their extended conversation—touching on the French armistice and impending operations against Britain—offered rare intellectual respite amid the relentless pace of war. The second visitor, Dr. Todt, Minister of Armaments and War Production, arrived to discuss tank development with frontline commanders on July 5. These encounters framed a pivotal moment when Germany’s strategic choices could have reshaped the war’s trajectory.

Strategic Dilemmas After the Fall of France

While Hitler and the German public celebrated France’s surrender, the author harbored reservations. The armistice presented two stark options: either dismantle France entirely by seizing its fleet, colonies, and sovereignty, or negotiate a cooperative partnership preserving French autonomy in exchange for collaboration against Britain. Between these extremes lay nuanced possibilities, all aimed at securing Germany’s strategic position. The author argued that any solution must prioritize ending the war favorably—including with Britain—through diplomatic channels before resorting to force.

Hitler’s Reichstag peace overtures, however, seemed unlikely to sway Churchill’s Britain. The aborted Operation Sea Lion invasion plan revealed Germany’s unpreparedness: inadequate naval assets, insufficient air superiority, and the Royal Navy’s dominance made cross-Channel operations untenable. The author noted wryly that Germany had neither the desire nor preparation for protracted war with the West—a reality underscored when autumn storms doomed Sea Lion in September 1940.

The Mediterranean Gambit: A Lost Opportunity

The author proposed an alternative strategy: a rapid thrust to the Rhône delta, seizing French Mediterranean ports alongside Italian forces, followed by landings in North Africa. Capturing Malta via elite paratroopers could strangle British supply lines. With British forces in Egypt overstretched and Malta’s air defenses weak, deploying 4–6 German divisions to Africa might have delivered decisive advantages before British reinforcements arrived.

This vision foundered on Hitler’s distrust of Italy and his continental mindset, which underestimated the Mediterranean’s strategic value. Not until 1950 did the author learn that von Epp had pitched the plan to Hitler—only to be rebuffed. The consequences became clear in 1941–42 as Rommel’s Afrika Korps arrived too late to reverse Italian defeats.

Innovations and Industrial Realities

The Western Campaign spurred tactical innovations, including submerged Tauchpanzer III/IV tanks tested for Sea Lion and later used crossing the Bug River in 1941. Yet industrial constraints loomed: Hitler’s demand for 800–1,000 monthly tanks collided with the Army Ordnance Office’s sobering cost projections (20 billion Reichsmarks, 100,000 skilled workers). Compromises like upgunning Panzer IIIs with shorter 50mm L42 cannons—instead of the ordered L60—sparked Hitler’s enduring fury upon discovering the substitution in 1941.

Reorganization and Diminished Strength

Post-France, Hitler doubled Panzer divisions—but halved each division’s tanks, creating a paper increase in units without proportional combat power. Motorized infantry expansions strained vehicle supplies, forcing reliance on inferior captured French tanks. As the author oversaw training, he lamented the High Command’s disinterest in his insights about armored warfare or broader strategy.

The Shadow of the Eastern Front

Molotov’s November 1940 Berlin visit crystallized Germany’s next catastrophe: the looming war with the USSR. The author’s Mediterranean strategy—aimed at knocking Britain out first—was now eclipsed by Hitler’s eastern obsession.

Legacy of a Forked Path

The Besançon conversations reveal a road not taken: a Mediterranean-centric strategy might have prolonged British isolation, delayed American entry, and avoided the two-front war that doomed Nazi Germany. Instead, Hitler’s choices reflected both ideological fixation and operational myopia—a cautionary tale about the perils of strategic overreach.