A Monarch Between Two Worlds

Born in 1852—the same year as Japan’s Emperor Meiji—King Gojong of Korea’s Joseon Dynasty ascended the throne at just twelve years old. His father, the Daewongun, ruled as regent, consolidating power while maintaining Korea’s isolationist policies. When Gojong assumed personal rule in 1873 at age 21, his reign became a microcosm of East Asia’s turbulent transition into the modern era. His queen, from the influential Min clan, played a controversial role in court politics, though modern historians like Lee Tae-jin challenge the stereotype of Gojong as a weak ruler dominated by his consort.

This period marked Korea’s precarious position as Qing China’s traditional tributary state while facing encroachment from Meiji Japan and Western powers. Gojong’s attempts at reform and sovereignty would define his reign—and Korea’s trajectory toward colonization.

The Great Power Chessboard

By the 1880s, Korea had become a battleground for imperial ambitions. The 1882 Imo Mutiny and 1884 Gapsin Coup saw rival factions alternately install and remove the Daewongun, with Chinese and Japanese troops intervening under the pretext of restoring order. These events shattered royal authority, leaving Gojong searching for alternatives.

In May 1884—months before the Gapsin Coup—Gojong made a fateful decision: he secretly reached out to Russia. His envoy Kim Gwang-hoon met with Russian border official Matyunin, emphasizing strained Qing relations and seeking treaty negotiations. This marked Korea’s first overture to St. Petersburg, a desperate bid for autonomy amidst the Sino-Japanese rivalry.

The German Advisor’s Gambit

Enter Paul Georg von Möllendorff, the German advisor recommended by China. By July 1884, Möllendorff was advocating for Russian protection, proposing either:
– A tripartite guarantee (Russia-China-Japan) making Korea a neutral state like Belgium
– Direct Russian protectorate status akin to Bulgaria

His discussions with Russian diplomats revealed shifting strategies. While British officials considered making Korea a protectorate (even occupying Geomun Island), Möllendorff increasingly favored exclusive Russian patronage—a position that aligned with Gojong’s fears of Japanese expansion.

The Secret 1884-85 Negotiations

Following the December 1884 Gapsin Coup’s collapse, Möllendorff escalated contacts. Through Russian consuls, he conveyed Gojong’s plea for warships at Incheon and protectorate status. St. Petersburg hesitated; Foreign Minister Nikolay Giers weighed the risks of confronting Britain and Japan against potential gains.

Key moments unfolded:
– December 1884: Russian diplomat Karl Weber arrived in Seoul
– January 1885: Gojong hinted to Weber about preferring Russian ties over U.S. relations
– February 1885: Separate Korean envoys approached Russian Colonel V.P. Benyovszky requesting protection from Japan

Meanwhile, the April 1885 Tianjin Convention between China and Japan formalized their right to intervene in Korea—without consulting Seoul. Britain’s April 26 occupation of Geomun Island further heightened tensions, prompting Russia to reconsider passivity.

The Military Instructor Debacle

In May 1885, Russia dispatched Weber again with instructions to offer military instructors—a soft power approach. However, Gojong vacillated under Qing pressure. By June:
– Weber demanded exclusive Russian military influence
– Korean officials, loyal to China, resisted
– Gojong ultimately rejected the instructors in July

The failed mission exposed Gojong’s indecision and Möllendorff’s overreach. China had him dismissed, while Russia retreated from active involvement.

The Neutrality Alternative

Young reformists like Yu Kil-chun proposed neutrality in December 1885—a vision recognizing Qing suzerainty while seeking multilateral guarantees. This contrasted sharply with Gojong’s secret Russian gambits, revealing elite divisions over Korea’s survival strategy.

A Legacy of Precarious Sovereignty

Gojong’s Russian overtures demonstrated:
1. The limits of Korean agency in the imperialist era
2. The dangers of over-reliance on any single power
3. The structural weaknesses of the Joseon state

His inability to consolidate either Russian backing or domestic consensus foreshadowed Korea’s 1910 annexation. Yet these events also reveal Gojong not as a passive figure, but as a ruler attempting—however imperfectly—to navigate an impossible geopolitical landscape. The late 19th century scramble for Korea remains a case study in how smaller nations become collateral in great power rivalries, with lessons that resonate in modern international relations.