The Grand Strategic Gamble

In late August 1812, as Napoleon’s main force pushed deeper into central Russia, the flanks of his Grande Armée began to unravel. This revealed the fatal overextension of French forces across a 1,000-kilometer front. In the north, Marshal MacDonald—a descendant of Scottish Jacobite exiles—commanded 32,500 men (two-thirds Prussian) tasked with securing Riga. Meanwhile in the south, Austrian and Saxon troops faced General Alexander Tormasov’s Third Army near Ukraine’s border.

Napoleon’s central advance had already stretched 500km beyond Smolensk, severing reliable connections to East Prussian and Polish supply bases. As disease and attrition took their toll, the Emperor’s forces grew dangerously thin.

The Siege That Never Was: Riga’s Miraculous Survival

Riga—the largest city in Russia’s Baltic provinces—should have fallen easily. Its neglected fortifications, maintained by municipal funds rather than the state until 1810, were obsolete. Governor Magnus von Essen’s 19,000 defenders—mostly poorly trained reservists—prepared for siege by:
– Requiring households to stock 4 months of supplies
– Burning 750 suburban buildings (17 million rubles in damage) to create firing lines

Yet MacDonald lacked the manpower to fully encircle Riga’s 50km perimeter. Russian gunboats controlled the Dvina River while the Royal Navy harassed French coastal supply lines. The arrival of 21,000 veteran Finnish troops under Fabian von Steinheil in September decisively tipped the northern balance.

The Southern Front: A Strategic Diversion

While Tormasov’s Third Army initially outnumbered Reynier’s Saxons 45,000 to 19,000, his victory at Kobrin on July 27 proved fleeting. Austrian commander Schwarzenberg’s intervention forced Russian withdrawal to the Styr River—but at the cost of diverting 30,000 Austrians from Napoleon’s main effort.

This set the stage for Admiral Chichagov’s Danube Army (50,000 veterans) to unite with Tormasov in September, threatening Napoleon’s rear just as he entered Moscow.

The Bloody Stalemate at Polotsk

On the critical northern approach to St. Petersburg, General Wittgenstein’s First Army (23,000 men) outmaneuvered Marshal Oudinot’s larger force through:
– Masterful use of light cavalry raids
– Superior skirmishing tactics honed in Finland’s forests
– Decisive victory at Klyastitsy (July 30-August 1)

Though reinforced by Saint-Cyr’s Bavarians, French forces became bogged down in attritional warfare around Polotsk—exactly the scenario Napoleon needed to avoid.

The Human Dimension of War

Behind these maneuvers lay staggering human costs:
– Prussian troops under von Gräwert fought to restore their military honor
– Russian militia burned their own homes in scorched-earth tactics
– Wittgenstein’s staff—including future strategist Carl von Clausewitz—operated in polyglot tension

As Clausewitz later reflected, the Russian retreat displayed “admirable perseverance and military demeanor”—qualities that would ultimately undo Napoleon’s invasion.

Legacy: The Fatal Overextension

By September 1812:
– Napoleon’s northern flank was collapsing after Steinheil’s arrival
– The southern front now faced Chichagov’s hardened veterans
– The central advance had reached Moscow—but at unsustainable cost

This three-front crisis marked the turning point where the Emperor’s strategic gamble became a death march. The stage was set for history’s most disastrous retreat.

The 1812 campaign endures as a masterclass in the perils of imperial overreach—where even genius could not overcome the arithmetic of distance, climate, and national will.