The Fragile State of Southern Ming Resistance

By 1648, the Southern Ming dynasty’s struggle against the Qing conquest had entered its most precarious phase. Following the fall of Beijing in 1644, Ming loyalists established successive regimes in southern China, with the Yongli Emperor’s court in Guangxi becoming the last major bastion of resistance. The military situation was dire: Qing forces under commanders like Kong Youde had overrun much of Hunan province in 1647, scattering Ming defenses and forcing commanders like He Tengjiao to retreat to Guangxi.

This strategic retreat created an unexpected opportunity when Qing high command temporarily withdrew their main forces from Hunan to address threats elsewhere. Southern Ming leaders recognized this as their best chance to regain territory and establish a stable base for further operations. The stage was set for what historians would later call the 1648 Hunan Campaign – a dramatic but ultimately squandered opportunity that could have altered the course of the Ming-Qing transition.

The Spring Offensive: Southern Ming Forces Regroup

The campaign began in earnest on April 18, 1648 (the fifth year of the Shunzhi reign, second year of Yongli), when Ming commander Du Yinsi coordinated a multi-pronged assault from Jiuxi Wei (near modern-day Cili County) and Yongding Wei (present-day Zhangjiajie). Leading generals Ma Jinzhong and Wang Jincai spearheaded the attack on Changde, capturing the strategically vital city by April 24.

This initial success triggered a domino effect across western and southern Hunan. Wang Jincai’s forces advanced to Chenzhou (modern Yuanling), while Ming loyalists reclaimed over a dozen counties including Luxi, Qianyang, Ningyuan, and Xintian within weeks. The speed of these victories stunned Qing authorities. Provincial governor Xian Jin’s panicked reports to Beijing described how:

“The rebel momentum grows daily stronger. Not only has Changde prefecture fallen, but commoners across Hunan and Hubei now wrap their heads in white cloth (a Ming loyalist symbol), capture Qing officials, seize government seals, and block all communication routes. The situation grows extremely worrisome.”

Even Qing officials began defecting, most notably Dai Guoshi, the Qing circuit intendant for Chenzhou and Changde, who surrendered Yuanzhou (modern Zhijiang) to the Ming cause.

The Battle for Yongzhou and Strategic Expansion

As summer approached, Ming forces under He Tengjiao launched a critical siege against Yongzhou (modern Lingling) on July 17. This four-month campaign culminated in a major victory on November 1, with Ming troops killing Qing governor Li Maozu and general Yu Shizhong. The fall of Yongzhou sent shockwaves through Qing defenses, causing officials in Hengzhou (modern Hengyang) to abandon their positions without resistance and retreat to Xiangxiang and Changsha.

These victories demonstrated the potential for a complete Ming reconquest of Hunan. However, problems in Ming command structure began surfacing. Apart from Ma Jinzhong’s disciplined troops, most Ming units operated independently with weak coordination. Recognizing this limitation, Du Yinsi made a fateful decision to reinforce the campaign with the formidable Zhongzhen Battalion – a veteran peasant rebel force that had previously fought under Li Zicheng before joining the Ming resistance.

The Zhongzhen Battalion Enters the Fray

The Zhongzhen Battalion, led by Li Chixin (Li Guo, also known as Li Jin) and Gao Bizheng (Gao Yigong), represented the most battle-hardened troops in the Southern Ming arsenal. After their 1646 defeat at Jingzhou against Qing prince Lekdehun, they had regrouped in the mountainous border region between Hubei and Sichuan.

Their intervention proved decisive. Crossing the Yangtze in April 1647, they captured Yiling in Hubei by July before marching into Hunan. By October 21, 1648, they had defeated Qing reinforcements at Yiyang, then launched a lightning campaign that reclaimed Xiangtan, Xiangyin, and Hengshan within days. Their November 3 victory at Xiangtan against 10,000 Qing troops marked the campaign’s high watermark.

Most dramatically, Li Chixin’s forces besieged Changsha on November 11 with overwhelming force. Contemporary accounts describe arrows falling “like rain” and cannonballs “large as chicken eggs” devastating the defenders. Qing governor Xian Jin and general Xu Yong clung desperately to the city with just 3,000 troops. When Xu Yong was struck down by one of Li Chixin’s arrows, Changsha’s fall seemed inevitable.

The Missed Opportunity: Command Rivalry Undermines Victory

At this pivotal moment, the campaign collapsed due to internal Ming rivalries. He Tengjiao, jealous that Du Yinsi’s forces would claim the glory for taking Changsha, invoked his superior authority to redirect the Zhongzhen Battalion eastward toward Jiangxi – ostensibly to relieve besieged Nanchang, but transparently to claim Changsha for himself.

Du Yinsi reluctantly complied on November 16, lifting the siege just as victory was assured. He Tengjiao’s replacement forces proved inadequate, allowing Qing defenders to reinforce Changsha. The strategic consequences were catastrophic:

– A unified Hunan under Ming control could have provided a secure base for operations northward and eastward
– The Zhongzhen Battalion’s momentum was wasted in an unnecessary redeployment
– Qing forces regained the initiative, eventually retaking most of Hunan by 1649

Contemporary observers like Wang Fu recognized this as a turning point. As he lamented: “Had they taken Changsha, the entire province would have been secured, creating a stable rear area from which to rescue Jiangxi and take Yuezhou – the entire military situation would have transformed.”

Legacy and Historical Assessment

The 1648 campaign remains one of the great “what if” moments of the Ming-Qing transition. Its failure stemmed not from battlefield defeats, but from the Southern Ming’s chronic inability to unify its command structure. The rivalry between He Tengjiao and Du Yinsi mirrored larger factional divides that ultimately doomed the resistance.

Modern historians debate whether a successful Hunan campaign could have prolonged Southern Ming resistance. While Qing numerical and logistical superiority might still have prevailed, the episode demonstrates how personality conflicts and poor coordination squandered one of the Ming loyalists’ best strategic opportunities during their decades-long struggle against the Qing conquest.

The campaign also highlights the complex alliances between former peasant rebels and Ming loyalists – a cooperation that, as shown by the Zhongzhen Battalion’s effectiveness, might have changed outcomes if fully embraced by the Ming establishment. In the end, the 1648 Hunan campaign stands as both a testament to Ming resilience and a cautionary tale about the costs of disunity in times of crisis.