The Fractured Resistance: Southern Ming’s Precarious Position

By 1653, the Southern Ming resistance against the Qing conquest had reached a critical juncture. Following decisive victories at Guilin and Hengzhou, military commander Li Dingguo found himself constrained not by Qing forces, but by his supposed ally Sun Kewang. This internal strife typified the Southern Ming’s greatest weakness—endless factionalism that persistently undermined their anti-Qing efforts.

Sun Kewang, jealous of Li’s battlefield successes, actively worked to limit Li’s influence, even plotting against his life. Faced with this untenable situation, Li made a strategic pivot: abandoning cooperation with Sun in the southwest, he would instead march east into Guangdong. This move accomplished two objectives—it removed him from Sun’s sphere of influence in Guizhou and western Hunan, while potentially allowing coordination with two other anti-Qing forces: Zheng Chenggong’s fleet based in Xiamen and local Guangdong resistance groups.

A Strategic Masterstroke: Li’s Vision for Guangdong

Li Dingguo’s strategic brilliance shone in his analysis of the broader conflict. Recognizing that joint operations with Sun Kewang to reclaim central China were impossible, he devised an alternative path to revive the Ming cause. His plan was audacious yet logical:

1. Link forces with Zheng Chenggong’s naval power
2. First secure Guangdong as a base
3. Then advance through Fujian, Jiangxi, Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces

Had this succeeded, Southern Ming forces would have controlled all of southern China, creating a strong position from which to push northward. However, the plan’s viability hinged entirely on Zheng Chenggong’s cooperation—a factor that would prove disastrously unreliable.

The March to Zhaoqing: Initial Successes

In February 1653, Li’s forces set out from Guangxi’s He County, capturing the strategic Wuzhou before entering Guangdong. By March:

– 14th: Took Kaijian and Deqingzhou
– 25th: Arrived at Zhaoqing’s walls
– 26th: Launched a three-pronged assault while securing surrounding counties

Li’s advance electrified Guangdong’s resistance. Local forces mobilized across the region:

– Guangxi partisans attacked Luoding
– 200+ rebel ships sailed toward Jiujiangkou
– Chaozhou’s garrison commander Hao Shangjiu defected back to the Ming

Hao’s rebellion particularly threatened Qing control. The former Qing general, dissatisfied with demotion, declared for the Ming on March 22nd, capturing Qing officials and styling himself the “New Marquis of Tai.” His revolt opened a second front that should have complemented Li’s offensive.

The Siege Unravels: Missed Opportunities

Li’s siege tactics at Zhaoqing showed both innovation and adaptability:

1. Initial ladder assaults failed against stubborn Qing defense
2. Shifted to tunneling operations under earthwork protections
3. Qing defenders counter-mined with a defensive trench

Despite Li’s tactical flexibility, two critical failures doomed the campaign:

1. Zheng Chenggong’s Betrayal: The Fujian-based warlord, despite prior agreements, never sent promised reinforcements. His inaction stemmed from self-interest—fearing loss of autonomy if Ming forces reunited.
2. Communication Breakdown: Qing cavalry intercepted Li’s messengers to Hao Shangjiu at Mumiantou Crossing, preventing coordinated action.

Qing commander Shang Kexi exploited these failures. Recognizing Zhaoqing’s natural defenses could hold, he:

– Blocked Li-Hao communications
– Offered lavish rewards (50 taels per soldier) to break Li’s siegeworks
– Used specialized long pikes to counter Li’s cloth-armored troops

By early April, Li’s position became untenable. With no support arriving and Qing reinforcements approaching, he withdrew to Guangxi—a tactical retreat that preserved his army but ended the campaign.

Aftermath: The Cost of Disunity

The campaign’s failure had cascading consequences:

1. Hao Shangjiu’s Last Stand: Abandoned by both Li and Zheng, Hao held Chaozhou until September when Qing forces massacred the population after capture.
2. Zheng’s Hollow Gestures: His token relief force arrived too late, revealing his priorities lay in Fujian, not Ming restoration.
3. Strategic Opportunity Lost: This represented the last realistic chance for Southern Ming forces to unite against the Qing.

Legacy: A What-If of Chinese History

Historians still debate whether Li’s Guangdong strategy could have changed China’s trajectory. The campaign demonstrated:

– Li’s Strategic Genius: His plan leveraged geography and potential alliances effectively
– Southern Ming’s Fatal Flaw: Without unity, even brilliant commanders couldn’t overcome the Qing
– Zheng Chenggong’s Complex Legacy: His later Taiwan conquest contrasts with his earlier reluctance to support mainland operations

The Zhaoqing campaign remains one of history’s great “might-have-beens”—a moment when coordinated action might have rewritten the Qing conquest narrative. Instead, it became a tragic case study in how factionalism dooms resistance movements. Li Dingguo, though defeated, earned his place among China’s most capable military minds, his vision for Guangdong remaining a tantalizing glimpse of what could have been.