The Stage Is Set: Waldheim’s Bid for an Unprecedented Third Term

The year 1981 marked a pivotal moment in United Nations history that would test the organization’s power dynamics and redefine diplomatic norms. At the center stood Kurt Waldheim, the Austrian diplomat completing his second five-year term as UN Secretary-General. Having first assumed office in 1972, Waldheim had navigated numerous international crises with notable competence – from the Munich Olympics massacre to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. His administrative skills had resolved a $65 million UN budget crisis, earning him widespread respect among member states.

As the election season approached, Waldheim contemplated an unprecedented third term that would make him the longest-serving Secretary-General in UN history. His confidence stemmed from three key factors: his relatively young age of 63, his solid performance record, and crucially, the backing of both Cold War superpowers – the United States and Soviet Union. In the UN’s history, no candidate endorsed by both Washington and Moscow had ever been blocked.

The UN selection process required candidates to secure at least 9 affirmative votes from the 15-member Security Council (including all five permanent members) with no vetoes from permanent members. Waldheim’s path seemed clear until one permanent member unexpectedly prepared to challenge the status quo – the People’s Republic of China.

China’s Surprising Opposition: Principles Over Personal Ties

On the surface, China had every reason to support Waldheim. The Austrian diplomat had been among the first Western leaders to advocate for Beijing’s UN seat over Taipei’s, stating in 1971: “It became increasingly untenable that a government controlling just 16 million people on China’s periphery should speak for a quarter of humanity.” As Austria’s UN ambassador, Waldheim had warmly welcomed China’s return to the world body that same year.

Waldheim became the first UN Secretary-General to visit China in 1972, meeting Premier Zhou Enlai. He returned in 1977 for discussions with Chairman Hua Guofeng and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping. Though popular myths exaggerate Waldheim’s gestures toward China (like the apocryphal story about special UN flags for Zhou’s death), the relationship appeared strong.

China’s opposition stemmed not from personal grievances but from a fundamental principle: the need for greater developing world representation. Of the UN’s four secretaries-general since 1945, three had come from Western Europe (Norway’s Trygve Lie, Sweden’s Dag Hammarskjöld, and Waldheim). Only Burma’s U Thant broke the pattern after Hammarskjöld’s death. With 157 member states by 1981 – two-thirds from non-aligned nations and one-third from Africa – this imbalance became increasingly untenable.

China found its ideal candidate in Salim Ahmed Salim, Tanzania’s 39-year-old foreign minister. A former ambassador to China who famously danced with joy when Beijing regained its UN seat in 1971, Salim enjoyed strong African support after being unanimously nominated by the Organization of African Unity. His candidacy represented a chance to shift global power dynamics.

The Diplomatic Showdown: Sixteen Rounds of Unprecedented Vetoes

The Security Council convened on October 27, 1981, beginning what would become the most protracted Secretary-General election in UN history. The first ballot revealed the emerging deadlock: Salim received 11 votes, Waldheim 10, but both were vetoed – China rejecting Waldheim, America blocking Salim.

Over the next three weeks, the Council conducted 16 separate votes through November 17, with China and America vetoing each other’s candidate every single time. As rounds progressed, U.S. lobbying reduced Salim’s support (bottoming at 6 votes), while Waldheim consistently maintained 10-11 votes – all rendered meaningless by China’s unwavering vetoes.

The diplomatic theater captivated the UN. Soviet neutrality surprised many, given Moscow’s purported African alliances, while China’s steadfastness boosted its standing across the developing world. Tanzanian delegates greeted Chinese colleagues with Swahili cheers: “Salim! China! Rafiki (friend)!” Yet pressure mounted as some nations accused China of obstructionism, speculating Beijing would eventually relent as it had in previous elections.

China dispelled these notions emphatically. Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Gang declared during a Nigeria visit: “China firmly supports the candidate from Third World countries!” Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping instructed China’s UN delegation with a four-word directive: “Veto to the end.”

Breaking the Deadlock: A New Era for Global Representation

The impasse finally broke when Waldheim, recognizing China’s principled stand rather than personal opposition, withdrew on December 3. Salim followed suit five days later, acknowledging America’s unyielding position. This cleared the path for nine new candidates exclusively from developing nations.

On December 11, Peru’s Javier Pérez de Cuéllar emerged as compromise choice – the second developing-world Secretary-General in UN history. During his inauguration, de Cuéllar emphasized: “I shall never forget that I come from a developing country.” China approved the selection, while America abstained rather than veto.

When de Cuéllar visited China in August 1982, Deng Xiaoping articulated Beijing’s foreign policy philosophy: “China understands its responsibilities as a permanent Security Council member. People trust us for two things: adhering to principles and keeping our word. We don’t play political games.” He outlined China’s three pillars: opposing hegemony, maintaining world peace, and strengthening Third World solidarity.

The Larger Strategic Context: Taiwan, America, and China’s Assertiveness

The 1981 confrontation occurred against a tense geopolitical backdrop. Newly elected U.S. President Ronald Reagan had campaigned on stronger Taiwan ties, including arms sales, straining Sino-American relations. That January, Deng had warned through intermediary Anna Chan Chennault that China would never compromise on Taiwan, regardless of diplomatic consequences.

China’s UN veto marathon served multiple purposes: advancing developing-world representation while demonstrating Beijing’s willingness to challenge American dominance. The timing proved fortuitous – one day after Waldheim’s withdrawal, U.S.-China talks on Taiwan arms sales commenced in Beijing. These culminated in the August 1982 U.S.-China Communiqué, where America made significant concessions, establishing one of three foundational documents guiding bilateral relations. Reagan’s presidency ultimately became one of the most stable periods in Sino-American ties.

Legacy of the 1981 Veto Marathon: Principles and Power in Diplomacy

The 16-veto episode established several enduring diplomatic precedents. First, it cemented the tradition of rotating UN leadership between developed and developing nations. Subsequent secretaries-general have alternated between these blocs – Egypt’s Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996), Ghana’s Kofi Annan (1997-2006), South Korea’s Ban Ki-moon (2007-2016), and Portugal’s António Guterres (2017-present).

Second, it demonstrated China’s willingness to wield its Security Council veto power assertively when core principles were at stake. While China has employed the veto sparingly compared to other permanent members, the 1981 case showed its determination on issues of representation and developing-world solidarity.

Third, the episode highlighted the complex interplay between multilateral diplomacy and bilateral relations. China’s UN stance reinforced its broader foreign policy objectives regarding Taiwan and U.S. relations, proving that international organizations could serve as platforms for advancing national interests.

Ultimately, the 1981 Secretary-General election transformed from a bureaucratic process into a defining moment of post-colonial diplomacy. It showcased how newly empowered developing nations could reshape international institutions, while reminding established powers that diplomatic influence must evolve with global realities. As Deng Xiaoping observed, credibility in international affairs stems from consistent principles matched with practical strength – a lesson as relevant today as during those sixteen historic votes.