The Decline of Rural Dominance in Modern Society

The most striking difference between the modern world and the old regime lies in the relative importance of agriculture and rural life. In early 21st century England, fewer than 400,000 people—just 1.7% of the workforce—were engaged in farming. Most rural residents now commute daily to urban jobs, adopting city lifestyles while consuming food produced elsewhere, often imported from overseas. This stands in stark contrast to 1700, when approximately 80% of England’s population lived in rural areas, with over two-thirds working directly on the land. Agriculture then served multiple crucial functions: feeding the nation, supplying industrial raw materials (wool, leather, tallow, madder, hops), providing seasonal urban employment, and generating capital for manufacturing. Outside major cities like London and Bristol, most “towns” functioned primarily as service centers for local agricultural economies. If this was true in one of Europe’s most commercialized economies, agriculture’s dominance in the more thoroughly rural regions of Eastern and Central Europe was even more pronounced. Despite early signs of shifting economic power balances, rural life maintained its supremacy from 1660 through 1815.

The Ancient Roots of Agricultural Society

Humanity’s agricultural dominance extends back to our earliest history, though organized cultivation emerged relatively recently. Homo sapiens existed for ten times longer than civilization (twenty times if including Neanderthals). Around 10,000 BCE, crop cultivation and animal domestication began supplementing subsistence hunting and gathering—a revolutionary development that enabled surplus production and made civilization possible. This marked humanity’s first major step toward dominating and utilizing our planet.

Early farmers faced a fundamental challenge that remains relevant today: while systematic cultivation increased yields, it rapidly depleted soil fertility. To maintain productivity, cultivators either had to move to new land or implement fallow periods. The solutions to this challenge shaped European agriculture between 1660-1815, varying significantly based on population density and land availability.

In sparsely populated regions with abundant land, extensive farming methods prevailed. In Finland’s vast forests, farmers practiced slash-and-burn agriculture on a four-year cycle: debarking trees in year one, burning them in year two, allowing ash fertilization in year three, and sowing in year four. This yielded impressive 10:1 to 20:1 returns (harvest compared to seed sown)—modest by modern East Anglian wheat yields of 80:1, but remarkable for the 18th century. However, this “swidden” agriculture, also practiced in Sweden and northern Russia, caused massive deforestation and required abandoning exhausted plots for decades. Similar methods in Russia’s southern steppes saw crops planted on natural grasslands until declining yields forced abandonment.

Intensive Farming Systems in Densely Populated Regions

More densely settled areas developed sophisticated fallow systems. Across much of Europe, arable land was divided into rotating sections—either two-field (alternating cultivation and fallow annually) or three-field systems (two years cultivation, one fallow). This meant 33-50% of land lay unproductive at any time. Northern France’s fertile grain regions adopted three-field systems: winter wheat/rye, spring barley/oats, then fallow. Less favorable southern areas used two-field systems, while poor soils in mountainous regions like Auvergne required extended fallow periods. Similar patterns prevailed across Iberia and Scandinavia, where soil conditions generally favored two-field systems despite occasional three-field experiments.

With significant land always fallow, productivity remained low, requiring high proportions of the population to work the land. Agricultural stagnation stemmed partly from ignorance—farmers lacked understanding of nitrogen cycles until its 1770 discovery. However, 18th century farmers observed manure’s fertilizing effects. Animals return most nitrogen consumed through waste (along with phosphorus and potassium), but with only 4.5kg nitrogen per long ton of manure, massive quantities were needed. Synthetic fertilizers wouldn’t emerge until the 19th century. As Sir Humphry Davy noted in his 1813 “Elements of Agricultural Chemistry,” agricultural science remained in its infancy.

Without industrial fertilizers, farmers relied on animal (or human) waste, trapped in a “vicious cycle of fallow”: low productivity necessitated dedicating most land to crops, leaving little pasture for livestock, which limited manure production, perpetuating the need for fallow. Breaking this cycle became agriculture’s central challenge.

The Agricultural Revolution: Breaking the Fallow Cycle

Northwestern Europe began overcoming fallow limitations before 1700 through innovative crop rotations. German “Besömmerung” (summer sowing) involved planting fallow fields with nitrogen-fixing crops like peas, vetches, potatoes, sainfoin, buckwheat, and especially clover and root crops (turnips, swedes, fodder beets). Clover proved particularly valuable as winter livestock feed, enabling larger herds and more manure. Root crops and hay supported stall-feeding, concentrating manure for optimal use. This not only stopped the vicious cycle but reversed it.

The logical next step—eliminating fallow entirely—emerged first in 14th century Flanders as an exception. By 1700, England’s Norfolk four-course rotation (winter wheat, turnips, spring barley with clover/ryegrass, then grazing/hay) was spreading from its namesake county. Maintaining nitrogen balance required careful alternation between grain and livestock. While Low Countries pioneers led this revolution, English writers like Richard Bradley (1726) proudly claimed agricultural superiority.

Evidence confirms fallow elimination across Europe: Brandenburg’s innovative Major Joachim Friedrich von Kleist doubled his estate’s value with new rotations; Thuringia’s Christian Reichardt developed an 18-year grain-vegetable rotation needing neither fallow nor frequent fertilization; even Alpine Italy’s Po Valley and Spain’s Valencia showed advanced systems by the late 18th century.

Resistance to Agricultural Innovation

Progressive agriculturists like Arthur Young grew exasperated by traditional methods. Young admired French agriculture’s diversity but lamented wasted potential: “Some rich districts have soil as good as possible, and leaving it fallow is a sin.” He condemned Brittany’s “barbarous rotations” and Lorraine’s “miserable routine” of three-field systems. Young’s detailed surveys of eastern England (1771) documented revolutionary changes in Norfolk agriculture driven by seven factors: enclosure, marling (clay-lime fertilizer), new rotations, turnips, clover/ryegrass, long leases, and large farm consolidation.

However, overcoming agricultural inertia proved complex. Even knowledgeable farmers faced structural barriers, particularly communal farming regulations. In France’s open-field systems, “vaine pâture” (common grazing rights) and collective decision-making created institutionalized conservatism. An innovator planting turnips on fallow land would find his fences torn down by neighbors exercising grazing rights. Reform required not just knowledge and courage, but official support.

Critics like Henri-Louis Duhamel du Monceau condemned common grazing as “barbarous” and “Gothic,” praising England’s example. Yet France’s 1840 agricultural census still showed 27% fallow land and only 6% artificial pasture. Despite initiatives like Comte de Bourdeilles’ 1759-63 proposal to exempt 20% of land from common grazing, France never implemented national legislation, constrained by views that communal rights constituted property and concerns for vulnerable peasants.

Enclosure and Agricultural Progress

Where traditional systems were dismantled, productivity soared. England’s parliamentary enclosure movement (over 4,000 acts between 1750-1810, enclosing 20% of England and Wales) demonstrated how strong institutional tools could transform agriculture. Unlike France’s absolutist regime, England’s parliamentary system empowered landowning interests to enforce enclosure acts through local magistrates. While early enclosures dated to 1604, economic conditions limited progress until the 1720s, when rising rents (sometimes 40% increases) made enclosure attractive. The late 18th century saw an enclosure flood as agricultural prices rose relative to manufactures, enriching landowners like the Earl of Leicester, whose rents doubled between 1776-1816.

Prussia took a different approach, with the crown owning 25-33% of farmland. Frederick the Great actively promoted enclosure through 1769 decrees. Similar rationalization spread across northern Europe—Sweden’s 1749 Field Consolidation Act, Danish agricultural committees’ enclosure laws (1757 onwards), and Austrian Netherlands’ partitioning orders (1757-74). These reforms enabled the productivity breakthroughs that defined agricultural revolution.

New World Crops Transform European Agriculture

Breaking the fallow cycle dramatically increased grain yields—the cultivator’s dream, as grain meant bread, Europe’s staple food. However, many regions couldn’t support grains, forcing alternatives. Arthur Young noted many French ate little rye and no wheat, relying instead on ancient foods like chestnuts (“bread trees”) in Limousin and Languedoc, where they sustained populations that grain couldn’t.

New crops arrived in sequence. Maize (“Indian corn”), introduced post-Columbus, offered high yields (40:1) and deep roots that reduced topsoil depletion. By 1800 it dominated northern Italy, southwest France, Iberia, and reached the Black Sea—accounting for 15-20% of harvests in Toulouse and Lombardy. However, maize thrived only in warm climates, required intensive labor, and caused pellagra due to poor protein quality.

Rice, limited by environmental needs, remained confined mainly to northern Italy, sustaining rice exports at the cost of endemic malaria.

The potato, arriving from South America in 1565 but slow to gain acceptance, became revolutionary. Easy to grow, high-yielding (10.5 times wheat’s yield per acre), and nutritious, potatoes resisted bad weather and famine—John Forster praised them in 1664 as “simple, reliable insurance against shortage.” Despite initial resistance (French feared potatoes caused leprosy; Neapolitans refused famine relief potatoes; Prussian peasants claimed “even dogs won’t eat them”), by 1815 potatoes significantly impacted diets across Britain, Low Countries, Germany, and Scandinavia.

Ireland led potato adoption, with “lazy bed” techniques supporting families on one acre. By 1809-11, Irish per capita consumption reached 2.5kg daily. English observers noted this “astonishing” dependence, with critic William Cobbett condemning potatoes as “vile roots” symbolizing slavery.

The Burden of Serfdom and Feudal Obligations

Peasant reluctance to innovate often stemmed from knowing lords would claim most surplus. Modern taxation seems burdensome but transparent compared to old regime exactions, which flowed to three beneficiaries: state, lords, and church.

In Eastern Europe, serfdom imposed especially harsh conditions. East of the Elbe, lords controlled three land types: directly worked (with forced labor), rented (for cash/sharecropping), and subject to feudal dues. Beyond honorific privileges (church seating, dovecotes), lords enjoyed hunting rights, transfer taxes (1/8-1/2 of sale prices in France), milling/brewing monopolies, and preemptive purchase rights. Some demands were bizarrely specific—Hungarian peasants paid special dues when lords took communion, married, or needed Turkish ransom.

Most oppressive were labor obligations (robot), particularly east of the Elbe where serfs couldn’t leave, marry, or choose occupations without permission, while providing unpaid manorial labor. In Brandenburg’s Neumark, 3-6 days weekly robot was normal. This “manorial economy” (Gutswirtschaft) contrasted with Western “landed economy” (Grundwirtschaft) based on cash/kind rents.

Enlightenment Challenges to Serfdom

Growing Enlightenment sentiment condemned serfdom as both inhumane and economically inefficient. Reform attempts, often half-hearted, suggested the system was dying—except in Russia, where it strengthened. Peter the Great’s 1705 conscription and 1719 soul tax (podushnaia podat) entrenched serfdom, with Catherine the Great’s reign (1762-96) marking its “golden age”—only six lords were ever punished for abusing serfs.

Alexander Radishchev’s 1790 “Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow” vividly exposed serfdom’s horrors, leading to his exile. Foreign observers were particularly shocked by Russian serfdom’s severity—serfs were sold individually (despite 1649 prohibitions), with prices ranging from 50 rubles for kitchen help to 500 for “pretty girls.” Serf orchestras and theaters (like the Sheremetevs’ Kuskovo estate with its 8,000 km² and ~1 million serfs) demonstrated the system’s cultural distortions.

Economically, serfdom’s impact was ambiguous. While stifling in Germany and Austria (Joseph II’s 1781 reforms freed serfs to enter urban manufacturing), Russian serfs were sometimes forced into industry—Peter the Great assigned 54,000 serfs to metallurgy alone. By mid-18th century, serf-driven Russia surpassed Sweden as Europe’s top iron producer.

Agriculturally, serfdom clearly hindered progress. Compelled labor was inefficient—as Radishchev observed: “What we do under compulsion we do carelessly, lazily, and badly.” Hungarian Count Zichy Károly lamented his fertile estate’s poor returns due to “weak draft animals, miserable plows, and peasant carts.” Progressive Prussian landlords like Major von Kleist found hired free labor more productive than serf obligations.

Village Communes and Resistance to Change

Serfdom intertwined with communal structures like Russia’s mir (village assembly), which allocated land, set cultivation dates, and maintained discipline. This collective system resisted change—as a German observer noted in 1720: “Their minds are very dark, their senses highly confused by slavery…they have no intention of abandoning the old ways.” Hungarian liberal Berzeviczy Gergely explained peasant distrust: “They regard every innovation with aversion, convinced it’s designed to advance the lord’s interest at the serf’s expense.”

The Tithe: Ecclesiastical Exactions

Adding to state and lordly demands, the church claimed one-tenth of produce. Though theoretically universal (even Louis XIV paid tithes on Versailles’ gardens), exemptions and variations abounded. Actual rates ranged from 1/20 (Languedoc wine) to 1/4 (parts of Brittany), averaging 7-8%. Tithes applied mainly to grains, with disputes over new crops like clover and roots fueling litigation. Most tithes went to ecclesiastical institutions rather than parish priests—the Benedictines of La Chaise-Dieu held rights in 300 parishes. French church tithes totaled 70-133 million livres annually pre-1789.

Protestant tithes were equally burdensome. England’s persisted until 1836, expanding to cover new crops. Arthur Young complained in 1768 that surrendering one-tenth of produce after all expenses was harsher than any other tax. Though courts usually favored tithe-owners (660 of 700 cases in 1782), peasants resisted—as one harvest song went: “We’ve cheated the parson, we’ll cheat him again / For why should the vicar have one in ten?”

Peasant Resistance and Rebellion

As population pressure grew, conflicts between producers and appropriators intensified. Seventeenth-century peasants often rebelled against wartime taxation, sometimes allied with local elites against central authorities. Post-1700, protests shifted toward lords, increasingly through legal channels. Prussian peasants successfully challenged illegal labor increases through 30-year lawsuits. Where courts failed, peasants employed foot-dragging, sabotage, and crime—Calabria’s 1780s social banditry (including the famous Fra Diavolo) reflected rural class war after landowners encroached on communal rights.

Russia’s vast peripheries hosted Europe’s largest revolts. Stenka Razin’s 1667-71 Cossack rebellion reached the Volga before collapsing. A century later, Yemelyan Pugachev’s 1773-74 uprising (claiming to be Peter III) mobilized serfs, Old Believers, and ethnic minorities across an area larger than Britain, killing thousands of nobles and officials before betrayal ended his campaign. Pugachev’s manifesto promised “freedom from source to mouth, land and its fruits,” reflecting deep-seated grievances that made serfs declare: “If we win, we’ll have our own tsar and our own ranks and status.”

Poverty and Prosperity in the Countryside

Population pressure created a scissors crisis—food prices rose faster than wages. British food costs rose 30% (1760-95) versus 25% wage increases; French living costs rose 62% (1730-90) versus 26% wages; Spanish grain prices doubled (1750-1800) with only 20% wage growth. Landless laborers suffered most—comprising 20-75% of populations across Europe, reaching 80% in Andalusia. Britain’s commercialized agriculture had the highest rural proletariat proportion—by 1851, 30,000 farmers employed 1.5 million laborers.

Periodic famines triggered food riots—England’s worst were 1727-29, 1739-40, 1756-57, 1766-68, 1772-73, 1783, 1795-96, 1800-01, and 1810-13. Edward Thompson’s “moral economy” concept explains how rioters enforced “fair” prices rather than simply looting. As one poem protested grain exports: “The wagon groans with its heavy load / Its dark track winds along the road… While the poor farmer, from his bed / Sees the great barn as empty as a shed.”

Yet rural poverty coexisted with prosperity. Market access allowed some peasants to thrive—German folklore museums preserve their ornate furniture and houses. A 1763 Magdeburg farmer’s wedding featured 42 capons, 14 calves, and a 3,000-thaler bridal gown. Coastal Ditmarschen peasants reportedly grew “more refined, with higher noses, softer hands always full of coins.”

The Changing Image of Peasants

Early modern elites often scorned peasants—a 1684 German cleric called them “coarse, stubborn beasts.” Bavarian jurists excluded them from diets as “between irrational animals and men.” By the 18th century, Enlightenment thought rehabilitated peasants. Physiocrats like Quesnay declared: “Poor peasants, poor kingdom.” Frederick the Great praised agriculture as humanity’s primary activity—”without it, no merchants, courtiers, kings, poets or philosophers.”

Rulers performed agrarian theatrics—Maria Theresa grape-picking, Joseph II plowing a Moravian field (immortalized in monuments), George III as “Farmer George.” Agricultural societies proliferated—Dublin (1731), Florence (1757), Bern (1759), St. Petersburg (1765), over 40 by 1800. Adam Smith noted peasants’ underestimated intelligence, while Rousseau idealized rural virtue in “Julie” (1761), Europe’s 18th-century bestseller.

Yet high culture’s