The American Designs on Taiwan and the Origins of Foreign Aggression

In 1857, American diplomat Peter Parker sent a secret report to U.S. Secretary of State William Marcy that would set in motion a series of events reshaping East Asia. Parker argued passionately for American occupation of Taiwan, stating: “From both commercial and political perspectives, especially from the American standpoint, the island’s location is ideal. As we develop shipping routes from California to Japan and China, this coal supply source would provide us incomparable benefits.” His memorandum chillingly predicted that Taiwan “would not long remain under Chinese rule,” suggesting the U.S. should seize the island under the principle of maintaining regional power balances.

This marked the beginning of Western powers viewing Taiwan not just as a trading post but as a strategic asset. The American interest stemmed from Taiwan’s geographic position astride major Pacific shipping lanes and its potential as a coaling station for steam-powered vessels. Parker’s recommendations reflected the growing American ambition in the Pacific following Commodore Perry’s opening of Japan in 1854.

The 1867 Rover Incident and Failed American Invasion

A decade later in 1867, the American ship Rover wrecked near Taiwan’s southern Langqiao (modern Hengchun), with over ten crew members killed by indigenous Gaoshan people. Using this as pretext, the U.S. dispatched Rear Admiral Henry Bell with two warships to invade Taiwan. The American forces landed at Langqiao but were repelled by Gaoshan fighters, with Lieutenant Commander Alexander MacKenzie killed in action.

The American consul in Amoy, Charles LeGendre, then traveled to Taiwan under the pretense of negotiating with indigenous leaders, while actually conducting extensive reconnaissance. He collected detailed information about Taiwan’s coastline, harbors, and interior, creating maps and charts that would later prove valuable to Japan. This intelligence-gathering mission marked a shift in American strategy – rather than direct colonization, they began encouraging Japanese expansion into China to reap indirect benefits.

Japan’s Emergence as an Imperial Power

Japan’s transformation under the Meiji Restoration (1868) saw the island nation rapidly adopt Western technology while developing its own imperial ambitions. By 1870, Japan was testing China’s resolve, sending diplomats to renegotiate treaties while subtly challenging China’s traditional tributary system. Key figures like Foreign Minister Soejima Taneomi became architects of Japan’s expansionist policies, studying diplomatic strategies to deal with China while dispatching officers like Kabayama Sukenori to survey Taiwan.

The turning point came in 1871 when a Ryukyuan fishing boat shipwrecked in Taiwan, with over fifty crew members killed by indigenous people. Japan seized on this incident despite Ryukyu being a Chinese tributary state, beginning its campaign to detach the islands from Chinese influence. In 1872, Japan unilaterally declared the Ryukyu king a vassal, laying groundwork for eventual annexation.

The 1874 Japanese Invasion of Taiwan

By 1874, Japan was ready for bold action. The government established a Taiwan Affairs Bureau, appointing Finance Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu as director while setting up a military base in Nagasaki. The expeditionary force of 3,000 soldiers under Saigō Tsugumichi landed at Taiwan’s southern tip, marking Japan’s first overseas military campaign of the modern era.

The invasion exposed Qing China’s weak coastal defenses. As British Ambassador Thomas Wade queried the Zongli Yamen about whether Taiwan’s indigenous territories were part of China, the Qing court belatedly realized Japan’s aggression. Officials like Shen Baozhen were hastily appointed to oversee Taiwan’s defense, recommending purchasing ironclad warships and modern weapons while establishing telegraph lines – China’s first recognition of Taiwan’s strategic vulnerability.

The Beijing Convention and Its Consequences

The resulting 1874 Beijing Convention contained dangerous language that Japan would later exploit. By having China refer to Japan’s invasion as a “righteous act to protect its people” and paying indemnities, Japan claimed this implied Chinese recognition of Ryukyu as Japanese territory. In 1879, Japan formally annexed Ryukyu, creating Okinawa Prefecture – a crucial step in its southward expansion.

This crisis prompted the Qing to elevate Taiwan to full provincial status in 1884 under Liu Mingchuan, its first governor. The move strengthened administrative control and coastal defenses, but came too late to prevent future Japanese ambitions. As historian John King Fairbank observed, “Japan’s success in 1874 gave it the blueprint for subsequent aggressions in Korea and Manchuria.”

Parallel Developments in Korea

While events unfolded in Taiwan, Japan was executing its northern strategy in Korea. The 1876 Treaty of Ganghwa forced Korea open, with its first article declaring Korea “an independent state” – a direct challenge to China’s suzerainty. Japanese intrigue continued through the 1882 Imo Incident and 1884 Gapsin Coup, where Japanese-trained reformers attempted to overthrow the pro-Chinese Korean government.

The 1885 Tianjin Convention between China and Japan established mutual withdrawal of troops but gave Japan equal rights to intervene in Korea – setting the stage for future conflict. As historian Hilary Conroy noted, “Japan’s Korean policy became the single most important factor leading to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.”

The Strategic Legacy

These events between 1857-1885 created the framework for East Asia’s turbulent 20th century. Taiwan’s strategic value was recognized by multiple powers, while Japan’s successful early expansions validated its militarist policies. The Qing dynasty’s inability to protect either Taiwan or Korea revealed its weakening grip, encouraging further foreign encroachments.

Most significantly, the period established Japan as the primary challenger to Chinese regional dominance. As American diplomat William Woodville Rockhill warned in 1885, “Japan has made up her mind to control Korea…and China will have to fight or abandon her ancient suzerainty.” This prediction would prove tragically accurate in the coming decade.