A Small Nation in a World of Giants

When Singapore gained independence in 1965, it faced existential threats: a lack of natural resources, ethnic tensions, and hostile neighbors. Founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew famously remarked that “when elephants fight, the grass gets trampled”—a metaphor underscoring Singapore’s precarious position amid Cold War rivalries and regional tensions. His response was not ideological posturing but ruthless pragmatism.

Singapore’s survival strategy rested on two pillars: economic globalization and diplomatic neutrality. Unlike post-colonial leaders who rejected Western influence, Lee embraced globalization while skillfully navigating between superpowers. His approach was crystallized in a 1965 statement: “Malaysia’s friends can be our friends, but Malaysia’s enemies need not be our enemies.” This philosophy would define Singapore’s foreign policy for decades.

Walking the Tightrope: Relations with China and ASEAN

Lee’s China policy exemplified his balancing act. In 1975, he confided to Thailand’s Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj about his fears of being perceived as a “Third China” due to Singapore’s ethnic Chinese majority. Beijing’s ideological support for communist parties in Malaysia and Indonesia had stirred anti-Chinese sentiment, and Lee worked tirelessly to distance Singapore from such perceptions.

A revealing episode occurred when Singaporean Chinese spectators cheered for China during a badminton match against Indonesia. Lee personally assured Indonesian President Suharto that Singaporeans would gradually develop a distinct national identity. He also promised Indonesia that Singapore would not establish diplomatic ties with China before Jakarta did—a pledge honored until 1990, when both nations normalized relations within months of each other.

The Great Game: Engaging Superpowers Without Alignment

The 1967 British withdrawal from “East of Suez” and escalating U.S. involvement in Vietnam reshaped Southeast Asia’s power dynamics. Lee responded with characteristic pragmatism:

– Courting the Soviets: In 1968, Singapore became one of the first ASEAN nations to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR. When Soviet warships sailed through the Malacca Strait during the 1971 Commonwealth Summit, Lee dismissed Western alarm, stating, “No one raised an eyebrow when the U.S. Seventh Fleet passes through.”
– Partnering with America: Despite privately criticizing U.S. impetuousness (he once struggled to secure an American doctor for his wife), Lee urged Nixon to persist in Vietnam, seeing U.S. engagement as a stabilizer. Singapore profited economically, supplying fuel to U.S. forces and hosting R&R for troops.
– Championing Multipolarity: Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam articulated Singapore’s doctrine in 1976: “We accept that great power competition is a permanent reality… The absence of such balance would lead to worse power struggles.”

The China Calculus: From Suspicion to Strategic Partner

Lee’s 1976 China visit marked a turning point. He argued that “a stronger China creates balance against Soviet and American power, making Singapore safer.” His foresight was validated in 1979 when China’s punitive war against Vietnam checked Soviet expansionism—a move Lee applauded as “correcting East Asia’s historical trajectory.”

Legacy: The Fox Who Outmaneuvered the Cold War

Harvard’s Graham Allison categorized Lee as a “fox”—a leader who adapted to complexity rather than imposing ideological rigidity. By the 1980s, Singapore’s economic success and diplomatic agility silenced critics who dismissed it as unsustainable.

When Vietnam’s Prime Minister Võ Văn Kiệt sought Lee’s advice in 1991 on replicating Singapore’s model, Lee demurred, acknowledging the uniqueness of city-state governance. Yet, his true lesson was universal: small states thrive not by choosing sides, but by making all sides see value in their existence.

Lee Kuan Yew’s Cold War playbook—non-alignment, economic interdependence, and strategic ambiguity—remains a masterclass in pragmatic statecraft for vulnerable nations navigating great power rivalries.