The Dawn of Constitutional Government in Japan

The Meiji Restoration of 1868 marked Japan’s dramatic transformation from feudal isolation to modern nation-state. By the 1880s, the new government faced mounting pressure to establish a constitutional framework that would balance traditional authority with modern political institutions. The ruling oligarchy, composed largely of former samurai from Satsuma and Choshu domains, recognized the need for political reform but disagreed profoundly on its pace and nature. This tension between progressive and conservative visions would culminate in the events surrounding the Atami Conference of 1881, a critical moment that would shape Japan’s political development for decades to come.

The government’s approach to constitutional development had been characteristically gradualist. The establishment of the Genroin in 1875 represented an initial step toward representative government, though its members were appointed rather than elected. By 1880, popular demands for a national assembly had grown increasingly vocal, fueled by the People’s Rights Movement and supported by influential intellectuals. The government found itself navigating between reactionary elements who opposed any dilution of imperial authority and progressive forces demanding immediate democratic reforms.

Ito Hirobumi’s Constitutional Proposal

On December 14, 1880, Ito Hirobumi, one of the most influential Meiji oligarchs, submitted a carefully crafted proposal regarding constitutional government. His memorandum reflected the pragmatic approach that would characterize much of his political career. Ito suggested expanding the Genroin’s powers and establishing publicly elected censors as intermediate steps before creating a full parliamentary system. This measured approach aimed to accommodate opposition demands for political participation while avoiding direct confrontation between the government and popular movements.

Ito’s proposal emerged from his conviction that immediate establishment of a parliament, as demanded by popular rights activists, would create chaos in Japan’s still-developing political system. Yet he equally rejected the position of conservative colleagues like Kuroda Kiyotaka, who argued that constitutional discussion should be postponed entirely as premature. Ito sought a middle path that would allow both government and opposition forces to gain experience with parliamentary practices before establishing a full legislative body. At the time of his proposal, his colleague Okuma Shigenobu had not yet submitted his own recommendations, leaving the government’s direction uncertain.

The Gathering at Atami

On January 2, 1881, Ito traveled to the coastal resort town of Atami, where he summoned three fellow councillors: Okuma Shigenobu, Inoue Kaoru, and Kuroda Kiyotaka. From mid to late January, these four powerful figures engaged in intensive discussions about Japan’s constitutional future. The Atami Conference represented an attempt to reach consensus among the ruling elite about the timing and nature of political reforms. Hot spring resorts like Atami had traditionally served as venues for political negotiation in Japan, offering a relaxed atmosphere away from the formalities of Tokyo.

The discussions, however, failed to produce the agreement Ito had hoped to achieve. One significant obstacle was Okuma’s increasingly radical position favoring immediate establishment of a parliament, which he had not clearly communicated to his gradualist colleagues. While Ito and Inoue favored incremental reform, Okuma had begun embracing the more rapid transition advocated by popular rights activists. This divergence remained largely unspoken during the meetings, with Okuma offering vague responses rather than clearly articulating his position. The failure to achieve consensus at Atami would have profound consequences for Japan’s political development.

The Influence of Fukuzawa Yukichi

The intellectual backdrop to these political maneuvers was significantly shaped by Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of Meiji Japan’s most influential thinkers. Between July and August 1879, Fukuzawa had published a series of ten articles on parliamentary government in the Yubin Hochi Shinbun newspaper, sparking widespread public debate about constitutionalism. These articles, published under the names of his students, helped galvanize the popular movement for immediate establishment of a national assembly.

In a letter to Inoue and Ito dated October 1881, Fukuzawa would later claim that his newspaper articles from December 1880 through January 1881 had been published at the request of Okuma, Inoue, and Ito themselves. He further asserted that Inoue had informed him in January 1881 that the three leaders were in complete agreement about the goal of establishing a parliament. According to Fukuzawa’s account, both Okuma and Inoue expressed identical views to him upon returning from Atami in February. This version of events, however, contradicts contemporary correspondence between the principals.

Records show that while Inoue did maintain contact with Fukuzawa with Ito’s knowledge, he explicitly denied having approached Fukuzawa on the premise of supporting immediate establishment of a parliament. The evidence suggests that rather than a coordinated effort among government leaders, Fukuzawa was collaborating specifically with Okuma to advance the cause of rapid political reform, hoping to secure a role in the new political order.

Okuma’s Constitutional Memorandum

The political situation escalated dramatically on March 10, 1881, when Fukuzawa sent his writings on parliamentary government to Okuma, noting that most of the content aligned with Okuma’s views. Pressure mounted on Okuma to formalize his position when Emperor Meiji, through Imperial Household Minister Arisugawa Taruhito,催促 him to submit his recommendations on constitutional government.

In March 1881, Okuma presented his constitutional proposal directly to the emperor under the condition that other ministers and councillors would not see it. His memorandum outlined a radical vision for Japan’s political transformation modeled extensively on the British system. The proposal included several groundbreaking provisions: adoption of a constitutional monarchy with separation of powers between legislative, judicial, and executive branches; formation of cabinets by the leader of the majority party in parliament; classification of officials into “political officials” ; and an ambitious timeline calling for a constitution to be drafted in 1881, promulgated in 1882, and a parliament convened in early 1883.

Okuma’s proposal demonstrated little consideration for the differences between Japanese and British political traditions or levels of development. Most alarmingly to his colleagues, it left the emperor’s role and authority vaguely defined while suggesting that parliament could effectively determine who would form the government. The two-year timeline seemed implausibly short given the extensive legal and institutional groundwork required for constitutional government.

The Political Fallout

Okuma’s memorandum represented nothing less than a political betrayal in the eyes of his colleagues. By submitting his proposal directly to the emperor while bypassing normal governmental channels, Okuma had violated the collective decision-making process that characterized Meiji oligarchic rule. More significantly, his advocacy for British-style parliamentary government aligned him with popular rights activists against the gradualist approach favored by most government leaders.

For Okuma, the proposal offered a potential path to leadership. If implemented, his plan would likely make him prime minister, as he positioned himself to lead both government reform and collaboration with popular rights forces. This ambition directly challenged the dominance of the Satsuma-Choshu faction that had dominated Meiji politics since the Restoration. His actions threatened to destabilize the careful balance of power within the oligarchy and accelerate political change beyond what most leaders considered prudent.

The revelation of Okuma’s memorandum triggered what became known as the Political Crisis of 1881 . In October 1881, the government forced Okuma to resign, purging his supporters from official positions. The incident consolidated power around Ito Hirobumi and other gradualists, who would go on to craft Japan’s Meiji Constitution of 1889. This document established a constitutional monarchy with limited parliamentary powers and preserved significant authority for the emperor and his advisors—a far cry from the British system Okuma had envisioned.

Cultural and Social Impacts

The Political Crisis of 1881 and its surrounding events reflected broader social transformations underway in Meiji Japan. The popular rights movement, though ultimately disappointed by the government’s response, had demonstrated growing public engagement with political questions. Newspaper debates about constitutionalism, such as those sparked by Fukuzawa’s articles, signaled the emergence of a public sphere in which political ideas could be discussed beyond official channels.

The incident also revealed tensions within Japan’s ruling elite about the nature of modernization. While all agreed Japan needed to strengthen itself against Western imperialism, they disagreed profoundly about how much Western political models should be adopted. Okuma’s proposal represented the most radical embrace of foreign institutions, while his opponents favored adapting Western models to Japanese circumstances. This tension between wholesale adoption and selective adaptation would characterize Japan’s modernization throughout the Meiji period.

The purge of Okuma and his supporters had significant consequences for Japan’s political development. Many of those forced out of government would go on to form opposition parties or engage in business and journalism, creating alternative centers of influence outside government. This diversification of elite activity contributed to the development of civil society even as political power remained concentrated within the bureaucracy.

Legacy and Modern Relevance

The events of 1881 established important precedents for Japanese political development. The Meiji Constitution that emerged from this period created a system that balanced representative institutions with conservative safeguards, a compromise that would shape Japanese politics until 1945. The document established the Imperial Diet as Asia’s first parliamentary body, but with limited powers that preserved ultimate authority for the emperor and his advisors.

The Political Crisis also established patterns of political behavior that would persist in modern Japan. The emphasis on consensus within ruling circles, the suspicion of radical reform, and the careful management of political change all characterized Japanese governance throughout the twentieth century. The incident demonstrated the continuing tension between bureaucratic authority and popular participation that would define Japanese politics even after the establishment of democratic institutions.

Today, the events of 1881 offer insight into the challenges of political transition in rapidly developing societies. Japan’s experience illustrates the difficulties of balancing stability and change, tradition and innovation, in constructing political institutions. The measured approach favored by Ito ultimately produced a constitutional system that lasted until Japan’s defeat in World War II, though scholars continue to debate whether Okuma’s more radical proposal might have put Japan on a different political trajectory.

The Atami Conference and its aftermath remain a subject of historical interest precisely because they represent a critical juncture—a moment when Japan’s political future might have developed differently. The choices made in 1881 established patterns of governance, political competition, and constitutional interpretation that would influence Japan for generations. As such, this seemingly obscure political struggle from the early Meiji period continues to offer valuable lessons about the complex process of political modernization.