The Collapse of Ming Authority in Henan

The mid-17th century witnessed the dramatic unraveling of Ming dynasty control across northern China, with Henan province becoming the epicenter of this revolutionary storm. By 1642, the Ming government found itself in desperate straits following the disastrous defeat at Xiangcheng where veteran commander Fu Zonglong perished in battle against Li Zicheng’s peasant rebels. This catastrophic loss forced the imperial court to make a fateful decision in November – appointing Wang Qiaonian, the Shaanxi governor, as the new supreme commander of three border regions with orders to crush the rebellion through a pincer movement with Zuo Liangyu’s forces.

Wang Qiaonian’s appointment came at a critical juncture. The Ming military apparatus, once the terror of steppe nomads, now struggled against domestic uprisings fueled by decades of economic distress, natural disasters, and administrative corruption. Henan had become particularly volatile, with successive crop failures and heavy taxation pushing the peasantry toward open revolt. The court’s response revealed both its desperation and detachment – rather than addressing root causes, they doubled down on military solutions while resorting to increasingly superstitious tactics.

The Superstition and Strategy of Wang Qiaonian

Wang Qiaonian’s preparations for his eastern campaign exposed the psychological state of Ming leadership. Convinced of Li Zicheng’s growing momentum, Wang resorted to geomantic warfare – ordering Mi Zhi county magistrate Bian Dashou to desecrate Li’s ancestral graves. This act, recorded in meticulous detail by contemporary chroniclers, reflected the leadership’s blend of Confucian statecraft and folk belief. The discovery of a small snake in the graves was interpreted as an omen of Li’s imperial destiny, which Wang theatrically “executed” during his Xi’an mobilization ceremony in January 1642.

The military expedition that followed in February assembled 30,000 troops from Shaanxi’s frontier garrisons, including commanders He Renlong, Zheng Jiadong, Niu Chenghu, Zhang Guoqin, and Zhang Yinggui. Wang’s strategy appeared sound on paper: relieve Zuo Liangyu’s forces besieged at Yan City while coordinating a joint attack. However, the campaign would expose fatal flaws in Ming military coordination and morale.

The Battle of Xiangcheng: A Military Debacle

Wang’s advance toward Xiangcheng in February 1642 initially showed promise. Local gentry, victims of rebel confiscations, provided intelligence that made Wang boast: “The rebels are in my sights now. Within two or three days I shall sweep away their menace for your forces, crushing their leaders to powder.” He deployed three columns toward Yan City while personally leading 4,000-5,000 troops into Xiangcheng.

Li Zicheng’s response demonstrated his growing strategic acumen. Abandoning the siege at Yan City, he redirected forces westward in a classic interior line maneuver. The February 13 engagement east of Xiangcheng proved disastrous for Ming forces – General Zhang Guoqin fell in battle while He Renlong, Zheng Jiadong and Niu Chenghu retreated without fighting. Zuo Liangyu, rather than pressing the attack, withdrew eastward, abandoning Wang to his fate.

By February 17, rebels stormed Xiangcheng, killing General Zhang Yinggui and capturing Wang Qiaonian. After interrogation by Li Zicheng himself, the Ming commander was executed. This victory opened eastern Henan to rebel expansion throughout March and April, with cities like Suizhou and Guide (modern Shangqiu) falling with minimal resistance. The stage was set for the decisive confrontation at Kaifeng.

The Third Siege of Kaifeng: Strategy and Stalemate

On May 2, 1642, Li Zicheng launched his third attempt on Kaifeng, establishing headquarters at Yanli Village while ally Luo Rucai camped at Hengdipu. The Ming response was unprecedented – mobilizing 180,000 troops (claimed as 400,000) under Ding Qirui, Yang Wenyue and Zuo Liangyu. The subsequent Battle of Zhuxian Town on May 13 became a masterpiece of rebel deception and Ming incompetence.

Li’s forces cleverly feigned retreat from Kaifeng while circulating forged orders from Zuo Liangyu warning against city sorties. When Ding Qirui’s disorganized forces reached Zhuxian Town, Zuo Liangyu’s 7,000 troops fled without combat, triggering a general rout. The rebels captured thousands of soldiers and 7,000 horses while killing General Jiang Mingwu. By May 25, Kaifeng was again besieged.

The Desperation of a Doomed City

Kaifeng’s defenders, abandoned by relief forces, turned to radical measures. On June 26, prefectural judge Huang Peng rallied gentry support under a white banner reading: “Heroes of Bianliang (Kaifeng), those willing to join me stand beneath this flag.” This mobilization of local elites created a 10,000-strong militia, though popular sentiment clearly favored the rebels, as shown by the tragic case of blacksmith Sun Zhong who attempted to supply arrowheads to the besiegers before being crucified on the city gates.

The siege’s humanitarian toll became horrific as food supplies dwindled. Grain prices skyrocketed to 100 taels per peck, then became unobtainable. Residents resorted to eating leather, medicinal herbs, even clay before cannibalism emerged. The military reportedly engaged in organized anthropophagy – “The general’s secret plan approved by the governor: fat or lean, all can fill military rations.”

The Cataclysmic Flood and Its Aftermath

By September 1642, Ming officials made their fateful decision. Facing certain defeat, they breached the Yellow River dikes on September 15, flooding Kaifeng and surrounding areas. While Zhou Prince Zhu Gongxiao and officials escaped by boat, most citizens perished. Contemporary poet Chen Zhilin’s “Ballad of Bianliang” captured the tragedy: “The defending officials on the walls could only weep, faces like dust, hearts cold ash… Soon the filled city became fish and turtles, the common people all died, the bandits scattered.”

The court’s reaction was telling – rather than punishing the officials, Chongzhen Emperor praised their loyalty. Even more grotesque, in 1644 as the dynasty collapsed, officials proposed salvaging silver from the flooded city, prompting the emperor to order “a special officer to secretly conduct” the operation.

Strategic Consequences and Historical Legacy

The fall of Kaifeng marked a geopolitical turning point. As Ming officials had warned, “Kaifeng is the pivot of Henan, the throat between north and south… If Kaifeng is not held, there is no Henan; if Henan is not protected, there is no Central Plain.” With Henan lost, the Ming lost strategic initiative while Li Zicheng gained a base to challenge the dynasty directly.

The events also revealed Li Zicheng’s political maturation. His proclamations now bore the title “Marshal of Righteousness Advocating Heaven’s Mandate,” signaling transition from rebel leader to state-builder. The offer to spare surrendering officials showed developing administrative vision, though Ming intransigence forced more destructive outcomes.

Historically, the Xiangcheng-Kaifeng campaign demonstrated how environmental stress, military overextension, and ideological rigidity combined to undermine a once-powerful dynasty. The Ming’s resort to flooding their own city epitomized their moral and strategic bankruptcy, while Li Zicheng’s victories, though pyrrhic, paved the way for the Qing transition. These events remain cautionary tales about the consequences when governing elites prioritize self-preservation over their fundamental responsibilities to those they rule.