The Fragmented Southern Ming and the Rise of Li Dingguo

By the mid-17th century, the Ming dynasty was in its death throes. The Manchu Qing forces had breached the Great Wall, and the Southern Ming regime—a rump state loyal to the fallen dynasty—struggled to survive in China’s southern provinces. Among its most formidable defenders was Li Dingguo, a former rebel turned Ming loyalist, whose military brilliance offered a fleeting hope of restoration.

Li’s strategic acumen was evident in his focus on Guangdong, a wealthy coastal province whose resources could sustain the beleaguered Southern Ming. Unlike the impoverished regions of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi, Guangdong’s tax revenues and cultural elite made it indispensable for any revival effort. Li envisioned a pincer movement: his forces would advance from the west while the maritime warlord Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) attacked from the east. Success would link Southern Ming territories, isolating Qing strongholds and paving the way for a northward campaign.

The Zhaoqing Campaign: A Strategic Gambit

In 1653, Li Dingguo launched his first offensive into Guangdong, targeting Zhaoqing. Initial successes were undone by logistical delays and Zheng Chenggong’s failure to coordinate. Qing reinforcements, though slow to arrive, exploited the disarray, forcing Li’s retreat. Yet the campaign revealed Qing vulnerabilities: Guangdong’s garrison, under generals Shang Kexi and Geng Jimao, numbered barely 30,000, many of them poorly trained locals. Li’s army, by contrast, boasted 40,000–50,000 veterans hardened by victories at Guilin and Hengzhou.

Undeterred, Li spent 1654 meticulously preparing a second invasion. He secured alliances with Guangdong’s anti-Qing militias, such as Deng Yao’s forces on Longmen Island and Wang Xing’s “Tiger Warriors” near Enping. These partisans, though scattered, controlled key coastal and mountainous terrain, eager to support a Ming resurgence.

The New Offensive and the Agony of Newhui

In March 1654, Li’s army swept into Gaozhou and Leizhou, overwhelming Qing defenses. By April, he controlled much of western Guangdong, yet his pleas to Zheng Chenggong grew increasingly desperate. A surviving letter to Zheng reveals Li’s frustration: “The Emperor’s orders brook no delay… Why do you hesitate?” He emphasized Newhui (Xinhui), a gateway to Guangzhou, as the decisive battleground. Without Zheng’s navy, Li’s land forces faced grueling urban warfare.

The siege of Newhui became a nightmare. Qing defenders, starving and outnumbered, resorted to cannibalism, slaughtering civilians for food. Contemporary accounts describe streets littered with bones, a horror even the Qing governor lamented. Meanwhile, Zheng’s promised fleet never materialized. By December, Qing reinforcements under General Zhu Mala broke the siege, scattering Li’s army. The retreat to Guangxi marked the end of Southern Ming ambitions in Guangdong.

Why Li Dingguo’s Plan Failed

Li’s strategy was sound, but its execution hinged on Zheng Chenggong’s cooperation. Zheng, prioritizing his Fujian base, repeatedly delayed, then abandoned the campaign. His absence doomed the alliance—and with it, the last credible chance to revive the Ming. Qing sources later admitted their relief: had Zheng joined Li, Guangdong would have fallen.

Legacy: A Lost Opportunity for Ming Revival

Li Dingguo’s campaigns underscored the Southern Ming’s fatal flaw: fractured leadership. While Li fought for dynastic survival, regional warlords like Zheng pursued personal power. The Qing, though stretched thin, exploited these divisions. By 1659, Li was dead, and Zheng turned his attention to Taiwan.

Historians debate whether Guangdong could have been the Ming’s salvation. Its wealth and ports might have sustained prolonged resistance, but without unity, even Li’s genius couldn’t compensate. His story remains a poignant “what if”—a reminder of how close the Ming came to a different ending.

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Key Sources:
– Qing military dispatches from the Ming-Qing Archives
– Local gazetteers like the Gaozhou Prefecture Records
– Eyewitness accounts, including Chen Shunxi’s Memoirs of the Turmoil
– Li Dingguo’s letters in The Veritable Records of Zheng Chenggong