The Origins of the “Resentment Army” and the Fall of Liaodong
In the sixth year of the Zhenghe era (1116 CE), the Liao Dynasty faced internal rebellion under Gao Yongchang, allowing the Jin Dynasty to seize control of the eastern capital region. Seeking revenge, the Liao established a special force known as the “Resentment Army” (怨军), composed of soldiers from Liaodong, symbolizing their vengeance against Jin. Among its commanders was Guo Yaoshi, a figure who would later play a pivotal role in the shifting loyalties of the era.
However, the Resentment Army proved ineffective against the Jurchen-led Jin forces. By the second year of the Xuanhe era (1120 CE), it rebelled against the Liao court. Guo Yaoshi, siding with the Liao, helped suppress his former comrades. The Liao court debated disbanding the force entirely, but ultimately split it into four battalions under separate commanders, including Guo Yaoshi.
The Defection of Guo Yaoshi and the Song’s Illusory Triumph
When Emperor Tianxi of Liao (Yelü Chun) ascended the throne, the Resentment Army was renamed the “Ever-Victorious Army.” Guo Yaoshi’s forces were stationed in Zhuozhou, facing Song troops. However, as the Liao regent Empress Xiao grew distrustful of Han Chinese and non-Khitan officials, Guo—a Han himself—defected to the Song Dynasty in 1122.
Guo’s defection was dramatic. Fearing execution by Liao general Xiao Gan, he orchestrated a banquet to persuade Xiao to join him in defecting. When Xiao fled, Guo acted swiftly, leading 8,000 elite troops and 500 cavalry to surrender alongside Gao Feng, the defender of Yizhou. The Song, having suffered repeated defeats, suddenly gained Zhuozhou and Yizhou without a fight—a moment of euphoria for Emperor Huizong.
The Ill-Fated Campaign for Yanjing
Emboldened, Emperor Huizong ordered an attack on Yanjing (modern Beijing), hoping to conquer the Liao remnants without Jin assistance. Guo Yaoshi’s forces were integrated under Song general Liu Yanqing’s command. The campaign initially showed promise when Guo proposed a daring raid on Yanjing, exploiting its weakened defenses.
For a brief moment, Song troops entered Yanjing, sparking jubilation. However, due to Liu Yanqing’s incompetence and failure to reinforce Guo, the Liao counterattack under Xiao Gan devastated the Song forces. The retreat turned into a rout, with Song troops abandoning supplies and fleeing over 100 li. The dream of capturing Yanjing with Song forces alone collapsed.
The Jin Intervention and Diplomatic Extortion
With the Song’s military failure, the Jin seized the opportunity to intervene. Diplomatic negotiations, led by Song envoys Zhao Liangsi and Ma Kuo, became increasingly fraught. The Jin, sensing Song weakness, imposed escalating demands:
1. Territorial Concessions: The Jin agreed to cede Yanjing and six prefectures but retained the strategically vital Xijing (Western Capital) and the three contested prefectures of Ying, Ping, and Luan.
2. Tribute Increases: The annual tribute (岁币) surged from 500,000 units of silver and silk to an additional 1 million guan of copper coins.
3. Population Transfers: The Jin demanded the repatriation of refugees and the right to confiscate wealth from Yanjing.
Despite Zhao Liangsi’s desperate negotiations, the Song had little leverage. The Jin, under Aguda (Emperor Taizu of Jin), exploited every concession, knowing the Song could not resist.
The Hollow Victory and Its Aftermath
In April 1123, the Song “reclaimed” Yanjing—a city stripped of its wealth and people. The Jin had emptied it, taking 30,000 wealthy households northward. The Song received a desolate shell, its populace resentful and its defenses precarious.
Emperor Huizong celebrated the “victory” with lavish titles for his officials, including Guo Yaoshi and Zhao Liangsi. Yet the cost was staggering: tripled tribute, lost strategic territories, and a hollowed-out Yanjing.
The Legacy of a Fragile Peace
The Song-Jin alliance was a diplomatic mirage. Aguda’s death in 1123 removed the last restraint on Jin ambitions. His successors, particularly the hawkish Wanyan Zonghan (粘罕), viewed the Song with contempt. As Zhao Liangsi had pessimistically predicted, the peace lasted only three years before the Jin launched the invasions that would culminate in the Jingkang Catastrophe (1127 CE), ending the Northern Song.
### Why the “Victory” Was Doomed
– Military Ineptitude: The Song’s reliance on mercenaries like Guo Yaoshi and its corrupt leadership (e.g., Liu Yanqing) left it vulnerable.
– Diplomatic Naivety: The Song misjudged Jin intentions, believing bribes could secure lasting peace.
– Strategic Myopia: By prioritizing short-term gains over long-term defense, the Song enabled Jin dominance.
The fall of Yanjing was not just a military defeat but a cautionary tale of how diplomacy without strength invites exploitation. The Song’s bought victory was, in truth, a prelude to its collapse.
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Word count: 1,250 (Expansion possible upon request for specific sections)
### Key Figures:
– Guo Yaoshi: The defector whose tactical brilliance was squandered by Song incompetence.
– Zhao Liangsi: The envoy whose negotiations exposed Song weakness.
– Aguda: The Jin emperor who manipulated the Song into self-destruction.
### Modern Parallels:
The Song-Jin dynamic mirrors how weak states today may trade sovereignty for temporary security, only to face greater subjugation. The price of dependence on a stronger power is often sovereignty itself.