Introduction: A Pivotal Moment in Meiji Japan

In the summer of 1894, Japan stood at a critical juncture in its modern history. Fresh from decades of rapid modernization under the Meiji Restoration, the nation was poised to assert itself on the international stage through military conflict with its ancient cultural mentor and regional rival: Qing China. At the heart of this momentous undertaking stood an unlikely figure—a civilian prime minister who would help steer Japan’s first modern war. This is the story of how Ito Hirobumi, a statesman without military credentials, came to occupy a central role in Japan’s wartime decision-making, challenging conventional understandings of civil-military relations in the emerging constitutional monarchy.

The Genesis of the Imperial Headquarters

On June 5, 1894, as Japan dispatched mixed brigades to Korea, the Supreme War Council—known as the Imperial Headquarters—was established within the Army General Staff Office. This organizational innovation represented a significant departure from previous military command structures. During the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, the largest conflict of the Meiji era until that time, military commands had been issued from the imperial temporary palace in Kyoto. The headquarters of the expeditionary force commander was initially established in Osaka, where two civilian officials—Okubo Toshimichi and Ito Hirobumi—had directed military mobilization, organization, key appointments, and overall strategy. Even when the headquarters relocated to Kyushu, these civilian leaders remained in Osaka, continuing to shape fundamental strategic decisions.

The 1894 establishment of the Imperial Headquarters within the Army General Staff reflected institutional changes implemented through the Wartime Imperial Headquarters Ordinance of May 1893. This legislation designated the Chief of the Army General Staff as the head of the military staff. This represented a significant shift from the earlier Daijo-kan system, where the cabinet composed of ministers and councilors had served as the central command for military operations. The change also reflected Article 11 of the Meiji Constitution, which vested supreme command of the army and navy in the emperor—a provision that would fundamentally reshape civil-military relations in imperial Japan.

The First Imperial Conference and an Unprecedented Inclusion

The first meeting of the Imperial Headquarters convened as an imperial conference on July 17, 1894, with Emperor Meiji in attendance. The gathering included the highest military leadership: Army General Staff Chief Prince Arisugawa Takehito, Army Minister Oyama Iwao, Navy Minister Saigo Tsugumichi, and other senior army and navy officials. Also present was the influential elder statesman of the army, Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo, who served as President of the Privy Council. This assemblage represented the pinnacle of Japan’s military establishment, yet within ten days, this exclusively military body would witness an unprecedented inclusion.

As tensions with China escalated toward open conflict, Emperor Meiji made a remarkable decision. On July 27, he instructed Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi to attend that morning’s Imperial Headquarters meeting and to continue participating in these sessions going forward. The emperor recognized that Ito’s comprehensive understanding of military expenditures and operations would advantage the government in diplomatic negotiations. On July 26, Ito had accepted this imperial command, preserved in historical correspondence. Though a civilian, Ito—as the most influential figure among the domain clique forces and enjoying the emperor’s deep trust—received authorization to participate in military decision-making.

Historical Precedents for Civilian Involvement

From a strict constitutional perspective, the emperor’s decision might appear irregular. Yet historical context reveals important precedents for civilian involvement in military affairs. Throughout the 1880s, Ito and other civilian leaders like Inoue Kaoru had participated significantly in armament planning and military personnel decisions. Even after the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution, civilians continued to influence key military appointments.

In March 1893, regarding the succession to Navy Minister Nire Kagenori, a group that included Prime Minister Ito —representing both Satsuma and Choshu domains—collectively decided to appoint Saigo Tsugumichi as the new navy minister. Thus, Ito’s attendance at Imperial Headquarters meetings followed established practice of civilian participation in military matters dating back to the Restoration era.

However, the fact that only Ito among civilians was permitted to attend these meetings signaled both recognition of his special status following his handling of the Otsu Incident and indicated that civilian influence over military affairs was becoming increasingly circumscribed in the post-constitutional era.

The Outbreak of Hostilities and Strategic Coordination

The first military engagement between Japanese and Chinese forces occurred on July 25, 1894, with the Naval Battle of Pungdo. Between the evening of July 27 and 28, news of the Japanese navy’s victory reached the Imperial Headquarters. Simultaneously, reports arrived that two British citizens flying their national flag had been aboard a sunk transport vessel. Prime Minister Ito immediately directed Navy Minister Saigo to verify this information, demonstrating his consistent approach of linking military actions with diplomatic considerations and managing affairs from a comprehensive strategic perspective.

On July 29, Japanese army forces occupied Seonghwan, followed by Asan on July 30. On August 1, Japan formally declared war against China. These successive victories dominated newspaper headlines daily, fueling public enthusiasm for the war.

This military success coincided with diplomatic achievements. On July 16, Japan had signed a new treaty in London abolishing extraterritoriality and other unequal provisions. The treaty documents arrived in Japan on August 20, received Privy Council approval on August 24, and was formally exchanged between Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu and the British minister on August 25 before being proclaimed on August 27. Although hardline nationalists expressed some dissatisfaction, no significant opposition movement emerged—a situation inseparable from the continual reports of battlefield successes.

The Emperor’s Deliberative Approach and Civilian Mediation

Emperor Meiji continued to value Prime Minister Ito’s counsel on significant military matters throughout the conflict. A notable example concerned the deployment of the Third Division to Korea. On August 13, the Imperial Headquarters decided to dispatch this division following the Fifth Division already deployed in Korea.

When this decision was presented to the emperor, he expressed reservations, believing the Fifth Division’s strength sufficient for current needs. He instructed Prime Minister Ito to inform Lieutenant General Kawakami Soroku, the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, that even if the Third Division might eventually be deployed, expenses should be conserved for the time being by maintaining current troop dispositions. Under the established system, Army General Staff Chief Prince Arisugawa commanded both army and navy forces, with Kawakami serving as the supreme commander for army operations.

As Japan’s first foreign war since becoming a modern state, the emperor approached the conflict with measured caution. His intervention appeared to exceed the parameters established by the theory of the emperor as an organ of state, which stipulated that the monarch should only engage in politics through mediation in difficult situations where the government could not reach decisions. The emperor himself seemed aware of this constitutional nuance, hence he did not issue direct orders to Vice-Chief Kawakami in his capacity as supreme commander but instead directed his instructions through Prime Minister Ito.

When Ito delayed his response, the emperor had Imperial Household Minister Tokudaiji Sanetsune follow up on August 23. Historical records do not preserve Prime Minister Ito’s exact response, but we might reasonably speculate that he recognized the emperor’s action stretched constitutional boundaries. Given his personal relationship with Vice-Chief Kawakami, Ito likely judged himself the appropriate channel to convey the emperor’s concerns while maintaining proper constitutional procedures.

Cultural and Social Impacts of Wartime Leadership

The unusual arrangement of civilian participation in military decision-making reflected broader social and cultural transformations underway in Meiji Japan. The Meiji Restoration had dismantled the rigid status system of the Tokugawa era, theoretically creating opportunities for talent to rise regardless of background. Yet the military remained a sphere where traditional notions of specialized expertise held particular sway.

Ito’s presence at the Imperial Headquarters signaled several important developments. First, it demonstrated the continuing influence of the genro—the elder statesmen who had engineered the Meiji Restoration—despite the formal establishment of constitutional government. Second, it revealed the persistent importance of personal relationships and informal networks within Japan’s emerging modern bureaucracy. Third, it highlighted the ongoing negotiation between traditional patterns of authority and new constitutional principles.

Public perception of Ito’s role also reflected the complex relationship between civilian leadership and military operations in a nation rapidly embracing both parliamentary government and imperial expansion. The widespread newspaper coverage of Japan’s military successes, coupled with diplomatic achievements like the revised treaties, created a narrative of comprehensive national advancement under capable leadership—both military and civilian.

Legacy and Modern Relevance

The precedent established by Ito’s participation in the Imperial Headquarters during the First Sino-Japanese War would have long-lasting implications for Japan’s political development. His involvement represented a high-water mark for civilian influence over military affairs in imperial Japan. In subsequent decades, as military leaders increasingly asserted autonomy based on the emperor’s direct command authority, civilian politicians would find their ability to influence military decisions progressively constrained.

The constitutional ambiguity surrounding the emperor’s role in military affairs—highlighted by his instructions regarding the Third Division deployment—would continue to pose challenges for Japan’s constitutional system. The question of where ultimate authority resided for military decisions—with the emperor as supreme commander, with military leaders as his professional advisors, or with civilian government officials responsible for overall policy—would never be fully resolved in the prewar period.

Ito’s dual role as prime minister and imperial advisor also established a precedent for later civilian leaders attempting to maintain oversight of military operations. His careful navigation of the relationship between military necessity and diplomatic considerations established a model of strategic coordination that would be studied—and sometimes ignored—by subsequent generations of Japanese leaders.

From a broader historical perspective, Japan’s conduct of the First Sino-Japanese War, with its blending of civilian and military leadership, represented a distinctive approach to modern warfare that differed from both Western models and traditional East Asian patterns. The integration of diplomatic, military, and economic considerations evident in Japan’s war management anticipated aspects of what would later be termed “grand strategy.”

The legacy of these institutional arrangements extends beyond Japan’s imperial period. Postwar Japan’s strict constitutional separation of civilian and military authority, with the Self-Defense Forces under firm civilian control, represents in part a reaction against the perceived excesses of military autonomy during the 1930s and 1940s. Yet the ongoing debates about Japan’s security policy continue to engage with questions about the proper relationship between civilian leaders and military professionals that first emerged during the Meiji period.

Conclusion: The Civilian Strategist in Historical Perspective

Ito Hirobumi’s participation in Japan’s wartime decision-making during the First Sino-Japanese War represents a fascinating chapter in the history of civil-military relations. His unusual position—a civilian prime minister attending meetings of the Imperial Headquarters—reflected both lingering practices from the early Meiji period and the continuing evolution of Japan’s constitutional system.

The episode illuminates the complex reality of Meiji governance, where formal institutions coexisted with informal networks, constitutional principles interacted with personal relationships, and modern bureaucratic structures accommodated traditional patterns of authority. Emperor Meiji’s deliberate approach to military decisions, his consultation with civilian leaders, and his careful attention to constitutional proprieties reveal a more nuanced picture of Meiji leadership than sometimes portrayed.

Ultimately, the story of Ito’s role in the First Sino-Japanese War reminds us that historical transitions are rarely clean breaks with the past. Even as Japan established modern military institutions and embraced constitutional government, earlier practices of civilian involvement in military affairs persisted, however attenuated they would later become. This moment in 1894 thus captures Japan suspended between tradition and modernity, between constitutional principles and practical governance, between military professionalism and civilian oversight—tensions that would continue to shape Japanese history long after the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed.