The Fragile State of the Southern Ming Court

By 1659, the Southern Ming Yongli regime found itself in a desperate situation following the Qing conquest of Guizhou and Kunming. Rather than being the result of catastrophic military defeats, this collapse stemmed primarily from a series of disastrous strategic decisions made by the Yongli court. The Qing forces advanced rapidly along three routes, while Ming troops retreated continuously, abandoning territories they had controlled for years. Remarkably, the Ming armies suffered no major losses of their core forces during these engagements, suggesting their failures resulted from poor strategic planning rather than battlefield inferiority.

The Yongli Emperor’s panicked flight into Burma and Li Dingguo’s withdrawal to southern Yunnan after the Battle of Mopan Mountain left the remaining Ming forces without central leadership. Scattered across southwestern China, these isolated military units and officials had to fend for themselves, accelerating the regime’s disintegration.

Qing Consolidation and Ming Disarray

Following their successful campaign in Yunnan, the Qing concentrated formidable forces under commanders like Dorgon’s brother Doni, Zhao Butai, Wu Sangui, and Xian Guo’an. Luo Tuo’s troops garrisoned Guiyang, while additional forces under Hong Chengchou and Wu Sangui guarded crucial transportation routes. This deployment left the scattered Ming remnants, now mostly in remote border regions, with little chance to regroup or counterattack.

Ironically, Sichuan’s defenses became particularly vulnerable after Wu Sangui’s main force entered Yunnan. Li Dingguo’s decision to retreat westward rather than move through Jianchang into Sichuan proved a critical mistake. For about six months following this decision, most of Sichuan remained under Ming control until Qing forces under Governor Gao Minzhan systematically reclaimed key cities including Chengdu in July 1659.

The Wave of Defections

As the Southern Ming leadership disintegrated, defections among Ming officers became epidemic. Between 1659 and 1660, numerous high-ranking Ming officials and military leaders surrendered to the Qing, including:

– Duke Ma Weixing and Duke Ma Bao with 6,000-7,000 troops
– Marquis Wu Zisheng in Yongchang
– Various generals including Wang Hui, Yang Cheng, and Zhao Wu with 4,100 soldiers
– Civil officials like Grand Secretary Zhang Zuochen and Minister of Revenue Gong Yi
– Imperial clan members including Zhu Qiyu and Marquis Wang Guoxi

By mid-1660, Wu Sangui had organized these surrendered Ming troops into ten battalions under former Ming commanders. The total number of defectors likely exceeded 30,000, not counting those who died from disease, starvation, or desertion during the chaotic retreat.

Li Dingguo’s Desperate Stand

After the Battle of Mopan Mountain, Li Dingguo led his remaining forces into southern Yunnan’s border regions, moving through Cheli (modern Xishuangbanna) before settling in Menggen (near modern Kengtung, Myanmar). Facing deteriorating conditions and wavering loyalty among his officers, Li grew increasingly suspicious and authoritarian.

In June 1660, he ordered the execution of General He Jiuyi on suspicion of contemplating surrender, which caused many of He’s troops to desert. Fearing these deserters might guide Qing forces to his location, Li burned Menggen in September before retreating further into Burma. He also executed his close advisor Jin Weixin, whose poetry had revealed growing despondency among the Ming loyalists.

The Brutal Qing Occupation

The Qing conquest brought immense suffering to Yunnan’s population. Hong Chengchou’s reports described scenes of utter devastation:

“Every prefecture has suffered from war and plunder. Beyond the loss of clothing, grain, property, and livestock, men and women of all ages have been captured, separating families in the cruelest manner. The remaining elderly and disabled are tortured to reveal hidden grain and silver, their homes destroyed. Rice prices have skyrocketed to 26 taels per shi (about 100 liters), leaving people starving to death daily.”

These atrocities, committed primarily by Manchu Eight Banner troops, contrasted sharply with the relative prosperity under Southern Ming rule. As late as 1658, on the eve of the Qing invasion, Yunnan had enjoyed bountiful harvests and peaceful celebrations.

The Yuanjiang Uprising and Its Aftermath

In this atmosphere of oppression, the Yuanjiang uprising emerged as a significant resistance movement. Native chieftain Na Song, appointed by the Yongli Emperor as Governor of Yunnan, organized anti-Qing forces with other Ming loyalists including generals Gao Yingfeng and Xu Mingchen. By July 1659, they had established connections with various local leaders and indigenous tribes.

The rebellion began in earnest when Xu Mingchen captured Shiping in September. Wu Sangui and Doni responded swiftly, marching from Kunming with a formidable force. Despite being outnumbered, Na Song rejected Wu Sangui’s offer to surrender Xu and Gao in exchange for amnesty, declaring: “We three began this together—how could we betray each other to save ourselves?”

After a fierce siege, Yuanjiang fell in October. Na Song and his family committed suicide by fire, while Gao Yingfeng was captured. The uprising’s failure stemmed partly from poor coordination—had Na Song waited to coordinate with Li Dingguo’s forces in western Yunnan, the outcome might have differed.

Legacy of Resistance

The Yuanjiang rebellion marked the beginning of sustained resistance by Yunnan and Guizhou’s ethnic minorities against Qing rule. Between 1660-1665, numerous uprisings occurred, often invoking the Ming legacy and sometimes claiming connection to Li Dingguo. These included:

– The 1660 Shuixi rebellion led by An Kun
– The 1661 Ma’na uprising under Long Jizhao
– The 1664 large-scale rebellion involving multiple ethnic leaders

These movements, though ultimately suppressed, demonstrated the enduring opposition to Qing conquest in southwest China. They also revealed the complex interplay between Ming loyalism and local ethnic autonomy movements during this turbulent transition period.

The fall of the Southern Ming in Yunnan represents not just a military defeat, but a tragic collapse of leadership and strategy. The Yongli regime’s failures in coordination and decision-making squandered significant military resources and popular support that might have prolonged resistance. Meanwhile, the brutal Qing occupation and subsequent indigenous rebellions would shape the region’s complex relationship with central authority for generations to come.