The Gathering Storm in East Asia

As 1903 drew to a close, Russian officials in East Asia found themselves drowning in alarming telegraphs about Japanese military movements. Admiral Alekseyev, the Russian Viceroy of the Far East, grew increasingly tense as reports flooded in about Japan’s preparations to occupy Korea. On January 6, 1904 (December 24, 1903 by the Russian calendar), Alekseyev forwarded these urgent warnings to Alexander Abaza, head of the Far Eastern Special Committee in St. Petersburg. The situation grew more dire when the cruiser Varyag arrived from Chemulpo (Incheon) to Port Arthur, carrying letters from Russian minister to Korea Alexander Pavlov dated January 1-2 (December 19-20).

Pavlov’s correspondence revealed profound distrust of Japanese intentions. He warned that if Japan established a protectorate over Korea without Russian resistance, they would soon turn their ambitions toward Manchuria and China proper. The minister painted a grim picture: Russia would face the same impossible choice – either make humiliating concessions or risk a far more dangerous war. Pavlov concluded Russia should let Japan act unopposed in Korea rather than face worse demands later.

Diplomatic Desperation in Seoul

The Russian legation in Seoul found itself at the center of the gathering crisis. Pavlov reported with palpable anxiety about the imminent Japanese landing at Chemulpo and his fears that Emperor Gojong might seek refuge in the Russian legation. The Korean monarch, described as “extremely superstitious” and in a “state of great excitement” following the death of the Empress Dowager, had reportedly considered fleeing to both the Russian and American legations. Japanese minister Hayashi Gonsuke closely monitored these developments, even considering increasing the Japanese legation guard to pressure Gojong.

Pavlov’s January 2 letter grew more urgent as Japanese-controlled telegraph offices began refusing messages to St. Petersburg and Port Arthur under the pretext of line failures. The Russian minister worked desperately to dissuade Gojong from seeking asylum, fearing it would give Japan pretext for further aggression.

Alekseyev’s Call to Arms

Faced with overwhelming evidence of Japanese intentions, Alekseyev proposed decisive action to Tsar Nicholas II on January 6. The admiral argued Japan had clearly decided to act unilaterally in Korea, presenting Russia with a strategic nightmare. He warned that unchecked Japanese occupation would leave Russia vulnerable, with Japanese forces potentially threatening the Yalu River and the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Alekseyev presented two mobilization options:
1. Full mobilization in Siberia and the Far East, martial law in Manchuria, and occupation of the lower Yalu
2. Limited reinforcement while preparing for broader mobilization

The viceroy strongly favored the first, more aggressive option. However, his proposals arrived during the Christmas holidays when the tsar was preoccupied with family celebrations and court ceremonies.

Imperial Indecision

Nicholas II’s response reflected Russia’s paralyzing internal divisions. On January 8, after tea with Abaza, the tsar approved partial measures – martial law in Port Arthur and Vladivostok, mobilization preparations in the Far East, but rejected occupying the Yalu. Crucially, War Minister Kuropatkin was not consulted, and evidence suggests the orders may never have been sent.

Kuropatkin, upon learning of the situation, remained convinced Russia should avoid provocative actions. On January 12, he secured imperial approval for restrained measures strictly prohibiting any Russian troops from entering Korean territory. The war minister feared even minor incidents could spark an unwanted conflict.

The View from St. Petersburg

The Russian capital remained strangely detached from the crisis. Naval Chief Rozhestvensky openly criticized Alekseyev as an ambitious alarmist, while the tsar’s diary entries focused on family matters and holiday celebrations. On New Year’s Day, Nicholas told Japanese minister Kurino Shinichiro that Russia wanted peace but warned “even Russia’s patience has limits.”

Meanwhile, Japan methodically prepared for war. While Russian officials debated, Japan successfully purchased two modern Italian cruisers (later named Nisshin and Kasuga) to bolster its navy – a move Russian naval attachés reported but St. Petersburg ignored.

The Last Hope for Peace

In a dramatic twist, the arch-hawk Bezobrazov – long considered a leading proponent of war – emerged as an unexpected peacemaker. Through intermediaries, he proposed a radical Russian-Japanese alliance that would recognize Japan’s primacy in Korea in exchange for Russian dominance in Manchuria. His January 10 memorandum argued this could create lasting peace in East Asia while thwarting British and American ambitions.

Japanese minister Kurino initially saw hope in Bezobrazov’s proposal, but Tokyo dismissed it outright. By January 14, with no response from the tsar, Bezobrazov left for Geneva in despair. His desperate peace initiative had failed.

The Point of No Return

As Russia hesitated, Japan moved decisively. On January 12, an imperial conference approved Foreign Minister Komura’s final terms – essentially an ultimatum demanding Russian recognition of Japanese supremacy in Korea without reciprocal constraints. When delivered on January 13, Russian officials in Port Arthur saw it as a deliberate provocation, while Foreign Minister Lamsdorf in St. Petersburg remained oddly optimistic about continued negotiations.

Russian military attachés reported alarming Japanese preparations – 45 chartered transports capable of moving multiple divisions, mobilization of reserves, and fleet concentrations. Yet St. Petersburg still couldn’t believe Japan would actually attack a European power.

The Paralysis of Empire

Alekseyev’s increasingly desperate warnings went unheeded. His January 17 telegram about Japanese forces in Korea received only tepid response – partial mobilization orders issued nine days later that sent troops away from the Korean frontier rather than toward it.

The contrast between Japanese decisiveness and Russian indecision became stark. While Japan’s leadership united behind a war policy, Russia’s remained divided between hawks and doves, with the tsar unwilling or unable to choose a clear course. The reinforcement squadron sent to the Far East crawled along at a snail’s pace, its obsolete torpedo boats slowing the entire fleet.

As January 1904 waned, all elements were in place for the first modern war between an Asian and European power. Japan stood ready to strike while Russia – despite overwhelming warnings – remained trapped in denial and indecision. The coming conflict would reveal the rot beneath the Romanov empire’s glittering facade and announce Japan’s arrival as a world power.