The Historical Context of Ukraine’s Soviet Experience

For the majority of the 20th century, most Ukrainians lived within the political framework of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a communist state composed of 15 constituent republics. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic emerged as one of these entities, theoretically possessing certain autonomous rights while in practice witnessing most fundamental decisions made by the Russian-dominated Communist Party leadership in Moscow. This arrangement led many Ukrainians to perceive Soviet rule as a continuation of earlier Tsarist Russian domination, despite the profound transformations that would reshape Ukrainian society through industrialization, urbanization, and sweeping social changes.

The communist promise of abundant freedom and economic prosperity remained largely unfulfilled, with many Ukrainians—alongside other Soviet citizens—enduring political oppression and devastating famines. The Second World War brought catastrophic destruction to Ukrainian lands, while the Jewish population suffered devastating losses through the Holocaust perpetrated by Nazi Germany and its collaborators. Despite Soviet authorities’ hopes for the withering of nationalist sentiments, Ukrainian national consciousness persisted throughout the Soviet period, with dissident voices continually emerging to champion both individual and national freedoms. These voices, though suppressed by the Communist Party apparatus, would ultimately contribute to the independence movement of the 1980s.

The Ukrainian Experiment of the 1920s

The 1920s represented a period of remarkable cultural and linguistic revival known as Ukrainianization, emerging from the devastation of previous conflicts. Ukraine had been ravaged by the First World War, conflicts with Polish forces, and a brutal civil war that pitted Bolshevik communists against White Army anti-communists, nationalist factions, and various peasant bands. The 1921 Treaty of Riga concluded the war between Poland and the Bolsheviks, establishing the western border of the nascent Soviet state. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was formally established in December 1922 as one of the four original constituent republics of the Soviet Union.

Faced with the monumental task of rebuilding the country and establishing communist political, economic, and social institutions across the former Russian Empire, Soviet authorities initially adopted a relatively flexible approach. The harsh policies of War Communism (1918-1921), including forced grain requisitioning and peasant relocation to collective farms, had provoked political resistance and economic disruption. Consequently, beginning in 1921, Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin shifted course and implemented the New Economic Policy, perceived as a more gradual path toward communism.

The New Economic Policy characterized much of the 1920s. Rather than complete nationalization of all property, the state permitted small-scale private enterprises to continue operating. Although prices for many products were fixed, peasants were allowed to sell surplus goods on open markets. The government abandoned earlier plans for collective or state farms, permitting peasants to maintain ownership of their land. Lenin envisioned that the New Economic Policy would stimulate economic growth, eventually leading workers and peasants to voluntarily accept communist institutions, including collective farming. Despite this economic liberalization, the political system remained highly centralized, featuring single-party Communist rule and a secret police apparatus empowered to arrest “class enemies” and other anti-party elements.

The belated implementation of the New Economic Policy could not prevent the famine of 1921, which claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. By 1923, however, the Ukrainian economy began showing signs of recovery, with agricultural production, small businesses, and leasing enterprises developing steadily. State investment in major industrial projects created a growing Ukrainian working class. By 1927, the Ukrainian economy had recovered to pre-World War I levels, with living standards significantly improved. Despite these successes, Soviet authorities remained wary of the New Economic Policy’s ideological implications, particularly as it fostered the emergence of a relatively prosperous peasant class—labeled derogatorily as “kulaks” in Russian or “kurkuly” in Ukrainian. Between 1927 and 1928, the state launched several campaigns against these kulaks—often broadly defined—forcing them to sell more grain to the state to feed urban workers and generate export revenue for industrial investment.

Politically, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was led by the Communist Party of Ukraine, established in April 1918 under the direction of the All-Union Communist Party led by Lenin. In 1922, the Communist Party of Ukraine counted only 56,000 members—approximately 0.2 percent of Ukraine’s population—with most members being of Russian or Jewish ethnicity. Only one-quarter of party members were ethnic Ukrainians, and merely 11 percent spoke Ukrainian. This demographic reality necessitated efforts to broaden the party’s membership base and make it more representative of the local population.

Between 1920 and 1921, the Communist Party of Ukraine absorbed pro-Bolshevik splinter groups from other Ukrainian political parties while formally outlawing numerous socialist and nationalist organizations. In 1923, the party implemented the policy of korenizatsiia (indigenization), promoting local leaders to give the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic a more distinctly “Ukrainian” character. This subsequent Ukrainianization faced resistance from Russian leaders within Ukraine. However, by 1925, Lazar Kaganovich—a Ukrainian Jew and ally of Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin—assumed leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine. He promoted indigenous Ukrainian officials, including those previously purged by the Russian-dominated leadership. By 1927, ethnic Ukrainians constituted a majority of party members and government officials for the first time.

Ukrainianization extended beyond politics into cultural spheres. The government actively promoted the use of the Ukrainian language in education, media, and the arts, operating under the principle of “national in form, socialist in content”—permitting Ukrainian cultural expression as long as it remained within prescribed ideological boundaries. By 1927, 70 percent of official business in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was conducted in Ukrainian, compared to just 20 percent in 1925. Some scholars caution against overinterpreting these statistics, noting that only a small percentage of high-ranking officials demonstrated fluency in Ukrainian. More significantly, by 1929, 83 percent of elementary schools and 66 percent of secondary schools used Ukrainian as the language of instruction, with nearly all ethnic Ukrainian students attending Ukrainian-language schools—a dramatic reversal from the Tsarist era when Ukrainian schools were prohibited.

Similarly, by the late 1920s, most books and newspapers published in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic appeared in Ukrainian. Soviet investment in education raised literacy rates to over 50 percent by 1927. Government funding supported a renaissance in the arts—including theater, music, literature, visual arts, and cinema. Notably, in 1924, Mykhailo Hrushevsky—previously in European exile—was invited to return and join the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences while editing Ukraine, a leading journal of Ukrainian studies. Authorities even permitted religious expression, particularly through the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which—with state support—took control of Kyiv’s Saint Sophia Cathedral in 1919. The state parliament also recognized Jews, Poles, Germans, Greeks, Czechs, and other minorities, granting them the right to use their native languages in official matters.

Ukrainianization was not without its critics. Several “national communists” who advocated for both socialist development and nation-building made Moscow authorities uneasy. For example, Ukrainian Education Minister Oleksandr Shumsky argued in 1925 for electing ethnic Ukrainians to the highest leadership positions within the Communist Party of Ukraine, implementing compulsory Ukrainianization for Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine, and securing greater economic and political autonomy for Ukraine. Moscow rejected his demands, removed him from office, and accused him of “deviationism” and attacking Soviet and Ukrainian culture. Other writers who suggested that Ukraine was being colonially exploited by Moscow or that Ukrainian art should be more “European” faced similar reprimands and retractions. In 1928, Kaganovich was recalled to Moscow. Contrary to national communists’ hopes for an ethnic Ukrainian leader, Stanislav Kosior—a staunch Stalinist of Polish descent—assumed leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

The Stalinist Transformation of Ukraine

The death of Lenin in 1924 triggered a leadership struggle within the Communist Party. Through ruthless tactics and control of the party apparatus, Stalin emerged victorious by 1929, purging potential opponents. Initially supportive of the New Economic Policy, Stalin later became its fiercest critic, considering it too slow and excessively capitalistic. By the late 1920s, Stalin advocated for state control of the economy through rapid industrialization and agricultural collectivization. Utilizing political repression and terror, Stalin transformed the Soviet Union into a powerful yet highly centralized state.

The industrialization drive under Stalin reflected his belief that “backward” Russia needed to modernize rapidly to survive within a hostile capitalist world. He abandoned the New Economic Policy in favor of a “command economy” characterized by state ownership and central planning. The state controlled all aspects of economic life, determining what would be produced, at what prices, and how products and services would be distributed. The State Planning Committee (Gosplan), established in 1928, developed the First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932) to accelerate Soviet industrial production dramatically.

Ukraine played a crucial role in Stalinist industrialization, receiving substantial investment that nearly tripled between 1928 and 1929. Four hundred new factories emerged in Soviet Ukraine, with industrialization concentrated primarily in eastern and southern regions that had developed some industrial base during the late Tsarist period. Notable projects included the Dnipro Hydroelectric Station on the lower Dnipro River (Europe’s largest), the massive Kharkiv Tractor Factory, and steel plants in Zaporizhzhia and Kryvyi Rih. The Donbas region remained the center of coal production. By 1932, Ukraine produced over 70 percent of the Soviet Union’s coal, iron ore, and pig iron.

Although specific economic growth figures remain disputed (with Soviet officials often exaggerating achievements), Ukraine and the broader Soviet Union experienced impressive industrial expansion. Ukraine’s urban population doubled during the 1930s as many peasants migrated to cities and industrial centers seeking employment. Ethnic Ukrainians constituted a majority of the republic’s working class and, for the first time, a majority of the urban population. Although industrialization slowed during the Second (1933-1937) and Third (1938-1941, interrupted by World War II) Five-Year Plans, by the late 1930s Ukraine had become one of Europe’s premier industrial centers, with metal and machinery production surpassing France and Italy and nearly equaling Britain.

These achievements came at tremendous human cost. Most industrialization investment derived from grain exports obtained—through brutal means—from the peasantry. Those deemed resistant to Soviet rule were imprisoned in labor camps, where they performed slave labor on many major Soviet projects. Problems in industrial projects—construction errors, unrealistic targets, and delays—were blamed on saboteurs and wreckers. Since planners prioritized industrial output over consumer goods, food remained rationed throughout the 1930s despite rising production of steel, coal, chemicals, tractors, and other industrial products. Housing shortages persisted, and consumer goods like clothing and household items remained scarce. Harsh labor laws enforced workplace discipline. Those concerned with Ukrainian economic autonomy recognized that Stalinist economic centralization meant Ukrainian industry had become subordinate to Moscow’s ministries, unlike during the 1920s when Ukrainian authorities maintained control. In 1932, Ukrainian economists complained that Ukraine received unfair treatment within the Soviet planned economy, providing raw materials while Russian factories produced finished goods.

The human cost of Stalin’s policies reached catastrophic proportions during the Holodomor, the man-made famine of 1932-1933. Through forced requisitioning of grain and other foodstuffs from Ukrainian peasants, millions perished—with leading scholars conservatively estimating approximately 5 million deaths. This famine resulted not from poor harvests or war—typical causes of famine—but from political and ideological decisions that saw the government exporting food while the population starved.

Several motivations underlay this tragedy. First, the Soviet government sought to establish control over the peasantry. Under the New Economic Policy, authorities believed peasants would voluntarily surrender private land and join ideologically correct collective or state farms if encouraged through market incentives. However, grain procurement remained problematic, and peasants showed little enthusiasm for collectivization. Upon assuming power, Stalin promised no further indulgence of the peasantry. He used coercive measures to force peasants to surrender agricultural products to the state and launched mass collectivization campaigns in the 1930s. Many resisted these policies, slaughtering their livestock rather than surrendering them to collective farms. These resisters were labeled kulaks by Stalin and identified as class enemies requiring elimination. Millions across the Soviet Union were arrested as kulaks, publicly executed, or deported to labor camps in Siberia and the Far East. Soviet propaganda, particularly exemplified in the 1930 film Earth by director Oleksandr Dovzhenko, celebrated collectivization as a model of modernization. Collectivization proved brutally effective: by 1932, 70 percent of Ukrainian peasants worked on collective farms for meager returns.

A second motivation involved crushing Ukrainian nationalism. In 1929, the secret police began arresting Ukrainian intellectuals, accusing them of membership in illegal Ukrainian nationalist organizations. In 1930, show trials in Kharkiv denounced political figures (many from non-communist parties), writers, priests, and students on fabricated charges. In 1931, Ukraine’s most prominent public figure, Hrushevsky, was forced to move to Moscow, while many of his Academy colleagues were sentenced to labor camps for alleged participation in illegal organizations. These actions aimed to “decapitate” the Ukrainian intelligentsia. However, Stalin understood that Ukrainian nationalism drew strength from the peasantry, making collectivization—and by extension, the famine itself—a means to “eliminate the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism—private land ownership.”

The immediate cause of the famine was the Soviet government’s 1932 demand for Ukrainian grain. Although the 7.7 million ton quota was considered excessively high and unrealistic within the Communist Party of Ukraine—if fulfilled, peasants would be left without enough food to survive—Moscow bureaucrats refused concessions. Soviet official Vyacheslav Molotov told Ukrainian communists that requests for reduced quotas would be considered “anti-Bolshevik,” adding that “the plans set by the Party and Soviet government must be fulfilled without any accommodation or indecision.” Thus, all discussion ceased. Consequently, “on Stalin’s insistence, implementing such an order could only result in starvation for the Ukrainian peasantry.”

In August 1932, the government declared all collective farm property—including livestock and agricultural products—state property, with severe punishment for those using such property for personal needs. Party officials, backed by military units, dispatched teams to villages to confiscate grain from peasants. Normal farm yields proved insufficient; officials searched peasant homes for hidden food stores. Those found “hoarding grain”—even small amounts—faced execution or deportation to labor camps. Local party officials who failed to meet quotas were deemed weak and unreliable and removed from positions. During the winter of 1932, despite extreme measures, the government failed to collect the required grain quota. Party-controlled media and senior officials blamed kulaks and saboteurs for these failures, calling for harsher measures against alleged class enemies. A government decree prohibited shipping any goods or credit to regions failing to meet grain delivery targets.

The result was widespread famine, with little remaining to eat. Some attempted to flee abroad, but international borders—even with Russia—were sealed. Although peasants were prohibited from entering cities, some succeeded in reaching urban areas, where food was also rationed. Notably, emergency grain reserves existed in rural areas, and some peasants managed to seize portions through resistance. However, party officials, including those in Ukrainian villages, had sufficient food. While some Russian regions experienced famine, Russia generally had more food available, though shipment to Ukraine was prohibited. Soviet officials were aware of the famine. Nikita Khrushchev—later Soviet leader—who served in Ukraine during this period, admitted in his memoirs knowing that “people were dying in enormous numbers.” Reportedly, an official who informed Stalin of the situation was dismissed, with Stalin accusing him of inventing “fairy tales.” A communist activist recalled:

For the rest of my life, I remained convinced that the ends justify the means. Our great goal was the victory of communism throughout the world. For this goal, everything could be forgiven—to deceive, to steal, to destroy the lives of hundreds of thousands of people who hindered or might hinder our work… In the terrible spring of 1933, I saw people dying from hunger. I saw women and children with distended bellies, turning blue, still breathing but with vacant eyes. And corpses—corpses in ragged sheepskin coats and cheap felt boots; corpses in peasant huts, under melting snow in old Vologda, under the bridges of Kharkiv… I saw all this and did not go insane or commit suicide. Nor did I curse those who sent me in winter to take grain from the peasants and in spring to persuade people who could barely stand—emaciated or swollen—to go into the fields to fulfill the Bolshevik sowing plan through terrifying labor.

Peasants sold everything possible to buy food, and the Soviet government permitted exchanging gold coins, antiques, and foreign currency for bread or butter. People began eating bark, nettles, insects, dogs, cats, and even human flesh. Terrifying accounts document consumption of corpses, captured children, and elderly parents begging their children to eat them after death.

Millions ultimately perished in the famine. Most deaths occurred in Ukraine, but millions also died under similar circumstances in Russia and Kazakhstan. The Soviet government naturally denied the famine’s existence, at most acknowledging food shortages due to sabotage and worker negligence. During Stalin’s lifetime, those daring to mention the famine faced certain arrest; even post-Stalin leaders discouraged investigation. However, reports of the famine appeared in Western newspapers, though some defended Stalin—notably British socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb and New York Times correspondent Walter Duranty, then in the Soviet Union. They echoed Stalin’s declarations that no famine existed. But one Western journalist observed a “battlefield” in May 1933:

On one side, millions of peasants starving, their corpses often used as food; on the other, GPU [secret police] members preaching proletarian dictatorship. They swept through the country like locusts taking all food; they shot and exiled thousands of peasants, sometimes entire villages; they turned some of the world’s richest land into a pathetic desert.

The term “genocide” was coined after World War II by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew who studied law at Lviv University in Polish-controlled Ukraine. Was this famine genocide? Lemkin and many Ukrainian activists believed so, viewing the event as a planned destruction of Ukrainians and Ukrainian culture. Leading Western scholars of the famine Robert Conquest and James Mace also used the term. Today, Ukraine’s commemoration of the Holodomor (literally “death by hunger”) remains significant. The Ukrainian parliament has repeatedly declared the famine genocide, a position supported by 25 other countries including the United States and Canada—though not Russia. Critics argue that while catastrophic, the famine technically does not constitute genocide since not only Ukrainians suffered, urban populations were largely unaffected, and it resulted from ideologically driven collectivization. However, recalling Stalin’s hostility toward Ukrainian nationalism—Ukraine’s collectivization was largely complete by 1932, grain shipments