A Dynasty at the Crossroads

In the sweltering summer of 959 CE, the Later Zhou Empire stood at a pivotal moment. Emperor Shizong, the dynamic ruler who had expanded his realm and reformed its institutions, lay dying at just 39 years old. His sudden illness during the northern campaign against the Khitan Liao dynasty forced an abrupt return to the capital Kaifeng, where the emperor faced his most daunting challenge – ensuring the survival of his dynasty under a child successor.

The Later Zhou (951-960) represented the fifth and final regime of the tumultuous Five Dynasties period. Founded by Guo Wei (Emperor Taizu) after overthrowing the Later Han, the Zhou had brought relative stability to north China. Shizong, originally named Chai Rong and adopted by Guo Wei, inherited this legacy in 954. His reign saw military successes against Southern Tang and Northern Han, administrative reforms, and economic recovery. But now, with death approaching, all these achievements risked unraveling.

The Heir Problem

Shizong’s succession dilemma stemmed from tragic personal history. In 950, when he was still Chai Rong serving under the Later Han, three of his sons had been executed during Emperor Yin’s purge of Guo Wei’s family. His fourth son, Chai Zongxun, born in 953, stood as heir apparent – but at just seven years old, the boy could hardly govern independently. The emperor needed to construct a regency system that could maintain stability while preventing any single faction from usurping power.

This challenge reflected broader patterns in Five Dynasties politics. Of the thirteen emperors across this era, six had previously served as military governors of Weibo (later Tianxiong Army), demonstrating how regional military power often translated into imperial claims. Shizong himself had faced invasion from Northern Han and Khitan forces when he ascended at 34. Now history threatened to repeat itself with a vulnerable child emperor.

The Strategic Marriage

Ten days before his death on June 9, 959, Shizong made a surprising move – he elevated Lady Fu, younger sister of his deceased empress, to become the new empress. This was no romantic gesture but a calculated political maneuver with four strategic objectives:

First, it bound the powerful Fu Yanqing, Lady Fu’s father and commander of the critical Tianxiong Army, to the throne through familial ties. As military governor of this historically rebellious but strategically vital region bordering Khitan territory, Fu represented both a potential threat and essential defense.

Second, it secured the northern frontier. Fu Yanqing was legendary for his victories against the Khitan, including the 945 Battle of Yangcheng where he routed 100,000 Khitan troops, forcing Emperor Yelü Deguang to flee on camelback. Khitan soldiers reportedly feared him so much they blamed sick horses on his imagined presence.

Third, it co-opted the extensive Fu family network holding key military and civil posts across the empire. By making them imperial in-laws, Shizong turned potential rivals into regime stakeholders.

Fourth, it created checks and balances. The Fu clan’s regional power could counterbalance central factions, preventing any single group from dominating the child emperor.

Crafting the Regency Council

With regional forces addressed through the Fu marriage, Shizong turned to central governance. He appointed a triumvirate of senior ministers to guide young Zongxun:

1. Fan Zhi – The principled but temperamental chancellor known for refusing bribes and blunt criticism, making him unlikely to build personal factions.
2. Wang Pu – The experienced administrator who had supported Shizong’s controversial first northern campaign when others opposed it.
3. Wei Renpu – The remarkable self-made official with photographic memory, promoted over objections about his non-examination background.

These choices reflected careful calculation. Each brought administrative competence without the ambition or charisma to challenge Zhou authority. As Shizong told critics of Wei’s appointment: “Since ancient times, have all chancellors come through examinations? What matters is talent.”

The emperor rejected other candidates for perceived flaws. When recommended Li Tao for his foresight in warning about past crises, Shizong dismissed him as “frivolous and lacking ministerial dignity,” unsuitable for mentoring a child ruler.

Restructuring the Military

Most delicate was reorganizing the palace armies to prevent coup attempts. Shizong made three key changes:

1. He removed Zhang Yongde as Palace Commandant, likely due to indecisiveness that made him vulnerable to manipulation.
2. He appointed Zhao Kuangyin (the future Song founder) as new Palace Commandant. Despite later events, Zhao had earned trust through battlefield valor and displays of loyalty, like refusing to open city gates for his own father during military operations.
3. He promoted the hot-tempered but loyal Han Tong as Deputy Capital Military Commissioner to counterbalance Zhao in the parallel Metropolitan Command system.

This created competing military power centers – Zhao controlling the elite Palace Army while Li Chongjin (Guo Wei’s nephew) and Han Tong oversaw the Metropolitan Command. Their mutual suspicion would theoretically prevent any single commander from dominating.

The System in Practice

Shizong’s deathbed arrangements created interlocking safeguards:

– Regional stability through Fu Yanqing’s Tianxiong Army
– Civil governance through the balanced chancellor triumvirate
– Military checks via competing capital garrison commands

For six months, this system worked. The Fu clan maintained northern defenses while the chancellors administered state affairs. The military balance held until February 960 when frontier reports of Khitan invasion prompted Zhao Kuangyin’s deployment – and subsequent mutiny at Chenqiao that established the Song dynasty.

Historical Assessment

Shizong’s measures reflected deep understanding of Five Dynasties politics, where personal loyalty often trumped institutional allegiance. His choices balanced competence against ambition, creating competing power centers that temporarily stabilized the transition.

The system’s eventual failure highlights the inherent instability of child successions in this era of military dominance. Yet Shizong’s comprehensive planning – from strategic marriage to careful personnel selections – demonstrates remarkable statecraft for a dying ruler. His arrangements bought crucial time that allowed the Song to emerge with less violence than typical dynastic transitions.

Modern leadership studies might analyze Shizong’s approach as stakeholder management – identifying key power groups and aligning their interests with regime survival. While ultimately unsuccessful in preserving the Zhou, his deathbed strategies ensured enough continuity to facilitate China’s eventual reunification under the Song.