The collapse of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) is often attributed to external pressures—peasant rebellions, Manchu invasions, and economic crises. Yet beneath these surface-level causes lay a deeper rot: the relentless factional infighting that consumed the Ming court, particularly during its final decades. This article explores how the bitter rivalries between the Donglin-Fushe faction and their opponents not only paralyzed the Southern Ming regime but ultimately contributed to its swift demise.

The Roots of Ming Factionalism

Factional strife was not new to the Ming Dynasty. By the late 16th century, the Donglin Academy—a network of scholar-officials advocating moral governance—had emerged as a powerful political force. Their opponents, often labeled as “eunuch faction” members, were accused of corruption and cronyism.

The Wanli Emperor’s (r. 1572–1620) decades-long refusal to hold court debates exacerbated tensions, leaving bureaucratic positions unfilled and policy decisions stagnant. By the Chongzhen era (1628–1644), these divisions had hardened into irreconcilable camps:

– The Donglin-Fushe Alliance: Composed largely of Jiangnan literati, they saw themselves as moral purists opposing eunuch influence.
– The “Eunuch Faction”: A loose coalition of officials marginalized by Donglin rhetoric, including figures like Ma Shiying and Ruan Dacheng.

The 1629 “Wei Zhongxian Case”—a posthumous purge of officials tied to the notorious eunuch—became a weapon for the Donglin faction to exclude rivals. Those blacklisted (like Ruan Dacheng) were barred from office, creating lasting resentments.

The Southern Ming’s Fatal Divisions

When Beijing fell to Li Zicheng’s rebels in 1644, Ming loyalists regrouped in Nanjing to establish the Hongguang regime (1644–1645). The succession crisis exposed factional fault lines:

### The “Legitimacy” Debate
– Pro-Fu Camp: Backed the Prince of Fu (Zhu Yousong, later the Hongguang Emperor), arguing for hereditary succession.
– Pro-Lu Camp: Supported the Prince of Lu (Zhu Changfang), touting his “virtue” over lineage—a thinly veiled Donglin attempt to control the court.

Military governors like Huang Degong and Gao Jie tipped the scales by endorsing Zhu Yousong, ensuring his enthronement but also binding the regime to warlord influence.

### The Scapegoating of Ma Shiying
As chief grand secretary, Ma Shiying sought pragmatic alliances, including rehabilitating Ruan Dacheng—a capable administrator tainted by the Wei Zhongxian Case. The Donglin faction, led by Liu Zongzhou, framed this as “reversing the righteous verdicts of Chongzhen,” ignoring that:
– Only a handful of blacklisted officials were reappointed.
– Ma’s memo explicitly stated: “The Wei Zhongxian Case itself should not be overturned; only Ruan’s talent merits reconsideration.”

Historian Li Qing noted Ma’s initial outreach to Donglin leaders, even composing conciliatory poetry:
> “Had Su Hui and Yang Tai not quarreled,
> Dou Lianbo’s joy would’ve been complete.”
(Su Hui symbolized Donglin stalwarts; Yang Tai represented Ruan.)

Cultural and Strategic Consequences

### Paralysis in Crisis
While the Qing consolidated power in the north, Nanjing’s officials wasted months on:
– “Orthodoxy” debates: Endless quarrels over ritual propriety.
– Personnel purges: Donglin hardliners blocked non-aligned talent, rejecting even Shi Kefa’s proposal to relax hiring restrictions.

### The Military’s Kingmaker Role
The Four Guardian Generals—rewarded with ducal titles for supporting Hongguang—became de facto power brokers. Their extortionate demands (e.g., Gao Jie’s seizure of Yangzhou) crippled governance, yet Donglin attacks focused solely on Ma and Ruan.

Legacy: A Historiographical War

The Donglin narrative, amplified by Huang Zongxi’s Hongguang实录钞, dominated later accounts, casting Ma and Ruan as villains. Yet primary sources reveal a more nuanced tragedy:

– Shi Kefa’s lament: “Factional mindsets birthed grudges; grudges bred attacks. The Ming’s fall began with this poison.”
– Xia Yunyi’s critique: “The Donglin spoke loftily but offered no practical solutions for border defense.”

Modern reassessments suggest the Southern Ming’s fatal flaw was ideological rigidity. By prioritizing purity over pragmatism, the literati elite doomed their own revival.

Conclusion: Echoes in Modern Politics

The Ming’s factional strife mirrors recurring historical dilemmas:
– Elite polarization paralyzing crisis response.
– Moral absolutism blinding actors to strategic compromises.

As Shi Kefa warned, when “water and fire” replace unity, even the noblest causes perish. The Southern Ming’s collapse stands as a cautionary tale—one where the greatest threat came not from without, but within.