The Fractured Landscape of Southern Ming Politics

The Yongli court (1646-1662), the last substantial regime of the Southern Ming dynasty, presents a tragic case study of how internal divisions can undermine a cause even in the face of existential threats. As the Manchu Qing forces advanced southward, what should have been a united resistance movement became paralyzed by bitter factional struggles between the so-called “Chu faction” and “Wu faction” – labels that masked deeper conflicts over regional power, personal ambition, and ideological differences regarding cooperation with former peasant rebels.

This political infighting occurred against the backdrop of catastrophic military defeats. After the fall of Beijing in 1644 and the subsequent collapse of the Hongguang regime in Nanjing, Ming loyalists retreated southward in successive waves. The Yongli Emperor Zhu Youlang, a distant imperial relative, was proclaimed emperor in Zhaoqing, Guangdong in 1646, but his court existed in perpetual crisis, constantly fleeing Qing advances while attempting to maintain some semblance of governance.

The Origins of the Factional Divide

The factional divisions emerged from two distinct sources of power within the Yongli regime. On one side stood officials who had remained loyal throughout, following the emperor through his perilous journey from Guangxi. On the other were those who had initially surrendered to the Qing during the chaotic transitions of power but later “returned to righteousness” (反正) by rejoining the Ming cause – most notably the powerful Guangdong warlord Li Chengdong and his adopted son Li Yuanyin.

As historian Qian Bingdeng observed, the court quickly split along geographical lines: “Those who came from Guangdong looked down on westerners because of their merit in returning to righteousness, while those who accompanied the emperor from Guangxi took pride in never having shaved their heads [in Qing submission] and ridiculed the easterners.” This east-west divide gradually crystallized into what contemporaries called the Wu (吴) and Chu (楚) factions.

The Chu faction coalesced around several key figures:
– Qu Shisi, the Grand Secretary defending Guilin
– Yuan Pengnian, Ding Shikui and Meng Zhengfa from Huguang province
– The “Eastern Meritorious Officials” (东勋) like Li Yuanyin

Their opposition, loosely termed the Wu faction, included:
– Grand Secretary Zhu Tianlin
– Vice Minister of Personnel Wu Zhenyu
– Grand Secretary Tu Yongsi

Regional Warlords and Court Politics

Beneath the surface of these court factions lay a more fundamental struggle between regional military strongmen. The Chu faction essentially represented the interests of Li Chengdong’s Guangdong forces, while their opponents aligned with Guangxi warlord Chen Bangfu. These military leaders used their court allies to compete for influence over the peripatetic Yongli emperor.

Qu Shisi’s alignment with the Chu faction reveals the complexity of these alliances. As a native of Jiangsu, he should have belonged to the “Wu” camp geographically. However, as the defender of Guangxi, he found himself locked in a power struggle with Chen Bangfu over control of the province. This led him to ally with Li Yuanyin’s faction against their common rival.

The factional conflict reached its peak in 1649 when Jin Bao, a Chu faction member, submitted a memorial attacking several officials including Chen Bangfu. According to Qian Bingdeng’s account, the original draft had included Li Chengdong among its targets, but this was removed after consultation with Qu Shisi’s associates. The final version strategically focused on western faction figures, earning approval from Li Chengdong while infuriating Chen Bangfu.

The Ideological Fault Line: Cooperation with Peasant Rebels

Beyond personal and regional rivalries, the factions differed profoundly on a crucial strategic question: whether to ally with former peasant rebel forces against the Qing. The remnants of Li Zicheng’s Dashun army and Zhang Xianzhong’s Daxi army represented significant military potential, but many Ming loyalists viewed them as hated rebels rather than potential allies.

The Chu faction, representing traditional Ming officialdom, maintained a rigid distinction between “loyal subjects” and “bandits,” refusing to consider cooperation with former rebels. Qu Shisi and his allies clung to the fantasy of restoring Ming rule through orthodox means, despite their dwindling military resources.

In contrast, officials like Tu Yongsi, Zhu Tianlin and Wang Huacheng recognized that survival required pragmatic alliances. Tu had pioneered cooperation with Li Zicheng’s remnants as early as the Longwu reign (1645-1646). These officials argued that in the face of Qing conquest, former rebels could become valuable allies – a position that earned them the “Wu faction” label from their opponents.

The Dramatic Fallout of Factional Conflict

The tensions erupted spectacularly in early 1649 when the Chu faction’s “Five Tigers” – a group of outspoken censors including Jin Bao and Ding Shikui – openly challenged the emperor’s authority. After Zhu Tianlin drafted an edict questioning Jin Bao’s credentials, the Five Tigers and their allies stormed the palace, throwing down their official robes and threatening to resign en masse.

The terrified Yongli emperor, knowing the Five Tigers had Li Yuanyin’s military backing, capitulated. Zhu Tianlin was forced to resign, and the edict was rewritten. This incident demonstrated how factional struggles had paralyzed the court, with military strongmen manipulating civil officials to advance their agendas.

The Tragic Consequences

The factional infighting had devastating consequences for the Southern Ming resistance:

1. Missed Opportunities for Unity: The refusal to cooperate with peasant rebels left the Ming loyalists militarily weak. Only later, when Li Dingguo of the Daxi remnants emerged as a major anti-Qing leader, did this policy begin to change – too late to alter the eventual outcome.

2. Wasted Talent: Capable officials like Tu Yongsi found themselves marginalized. Historians now recognize Tu as perhaps the most visionary Southern Ming statesman, but his proposals for broader alliances were repeatedly blocked.

3. Erosion of Central Authority: The emperor became a pawn in factional struggles, undermining any coherent resistance strategy. As control fragmented among regional warlords, coordinated defense became impossible.

Reassessing the Historical Narrative

Traditional accounts, often influenced by Chu faction sympathizers, portrayed the “Wu faction” as self-serving schemers. Modern scholarship reveals a more nuanced picture:

– Many so-called “Wu faction” members were principled officials advocating pragmatic survival strategies
– The factional labels were largely artificial, masking more complex alignments
– The real divide was between ideological purity (Chu) and pragmatic adaptation (Wu)

As the Yongli court’s territory shrank under Qing advances, these internal conflicts became increasingly divorced from military reality. The final collapse in 1662, when the Yongli Emperor was captured and executed in Burma, marked the end of organized Ming resistance – and a tragic case study of how factionalism can doom a cause even in the face of existential threat.

The Yongli court’s factional struggles represent more than just political infighting – they reveal the profound challenges of maintaining unity during national crisis, the tension between principle and pragmatism, and the tragic consequences when internal divisions prevent effective response to external threats. These lessons from 17th century China continue to resonate in studies of political survival and state collapse.