The Precarious Peace After the Jin Withdrawal

When the Jin armies withdrew from Kaifeng in early 1127, Emperor Qinzong of Song faced three critical issues that would shape the dynasty’s fate. Two concerned key figures – the hostage Prince Su and the retired Emperor Huizong – while the third involved the controversial territorial concessions promised to the Jin.

Prince Su Zhao Shu had been sent as a replacement hostage when Prince Kang (the future Emperor Gaozong) was recalled. Despite repeated Song attempts to secure his release during the Jin withdrawal across the Yellow River, the Jin commanders, wary of Song military actions led by officials like Li Gang and Zhong Shidao, kept Prince Su captive. His eventual death in 1130 at Wuguo City marked the first royal casualty of what would become known as the Jingkang Incident.

Meanwhile, Prince Kang received honors and titles as the Jin retreated, setting the stage for his eventual establishment of the Southern Song dynasty. This contrast in fates – one prince perishing in captivity while another rose to power – highlights the chaotic transitions of this period.

The Return of Retired Emperor Huizong

The more politically complex issue involved Emperor Huizong, who had fled south when the Jin invaded. Settling in Yangzhou, the retired emperor effectively created a parallel court that intercepted taxes and blocked reinforcements from reaching the capital. His actions threatened to split the Song state geographically and politically.

Historical precedents weighed heavily on Huizong’s mind. From the Northern Wei’s Emperor Xianwen to Tang Xuanzong, retired emperors often faced isolation or worse. Huizong feared returning to a capital where he would face humiliation rather than welcome. His hesitation created a constitutional crisis, as the imperial court couldn’t function properly with two centers of power.

Li Gang’s diplomatic solution – offering Huizong the dignified but politically neutral residence at Ningde Palace while ensuring ceremonial honors – successfully reintegrated the retired emperor without further destabilizing the regime. This delicate resolution temporarily preserved Song unity during a critical juncture.

The Purge of Huizong’s Faction

Huizong’s return enabled the final reckoning with the discredited officials blamed for the dynasty’s crises. The purge targeted two groups: those who had enabled Huizong’s extravagant projects (like Cai Jing and the notorious flower-rock纲 coordinator Zhu Mian) and the advocates of the disastrous alliance with Jin against Liao (notably Tong Guan).

The case of Zhao Liangsi, architect of the Jin alliance policy, proved particularly tragic. Executed in March 1127 and later vilified in the Song Shi’s “Biographies of Treacherous Ministers,” Zhao’s strategic vision might have succeeded with competent military execution. His fate reflects how policy failures became personalized in Chinese political culture.

The Impossible Terms of Peace

The territorial concessions – particularly the Three Prefectures of Taiyuan, Zhongshan, and Hejian – proved the most intractable issue. These strategic locations formed the northern defense line; their loss would leave the Central Plains vulnerable to future Jin incursions.

When Jin representatives arrived to take possession, local commanders refused to surrender, even firing on imperial envoys attempting to enforce the agreement. This grassroots resistance forced the court to reconsider, with officials like Yang Shi (precursor to Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism) arguing the concessions would leave the capital defenseless.

The Song attempted to renegotiate, offering increased annual payments instead of territory. When this failed, they sought technical violations of the agreement to justify non-compliance – from Jin looting during withdrawal to alleged promises about Prince Su’s release. These legalistic arguments masked the fundamental problem: the treaty terms were unsustainable from the outset.

Military Preparations and the Northern Defense

As relations deteriorated, Li Gang proposed eight comprehensive reforms for northern defense in April 1127. These ranged from reviving regional military commands (a partial return to Tang-style jiedushi) to restoring wetlands as natural barriers. While some measures showed foresight, bureaucratic inertia prevented meaningful implementation.

The aging general Zhong Shidao retired in May, leaving defense to his brother Zhong Shizhong and Yao Gu. When pressured into premature action against Taiyuan, Zhong Shizhong’s under-supplied forces disintegrated after initial successes. His heroic last stand at Shaxiong Ridge in May 1127 marked the loss of one of Song’s most capable commanders.

Li Gang’s Impossible Mission

With the military situation deteriorating, the court faction led by Geng Nanzhong maneuvered the civilian Li Gang into taking military command – essentially setting him up for failure. Despite creative attempts like Zhang Xingzhong’s anti-cavalry war carts, Li lacked proper resources or authority. The disjointed July offensive by multiple uncoordinated columns ended predictably in defeat.

Li’s subsequent dismissal and exile removed the last consistent voice for resistance. His replacement, the recalled Zhong Shidao, arrived too late with too few resources. The old general’s final recommendation – moving the court to the more defensible Chang’an – was rejected as defeatism, leaving the Song without strategic options as the Jin prepared their next offensive.

The Gathering Storm

The diplomatic fiasco involving Xiao Zhonggong and the intercepted letter to Yelü Yudu provided the Jin with both pretext and justification for renewed war. By October 1127, with Zhong Shidao dead and northern defenses collapsing, the stage was set for the final Jin assault that would culminate in the infamous Jingkang catastrophe – the fall of Kaifeng and captivity of two Song emperors.

This transitional period reveals the fatal contradictions in late Northern Song governance: between diplomatic necessity and popular resistance, between civilian leadership and military reality, and between the urgent demands of crisis and the inertia of bureaucratic systems. The failures of 1127 weren’t merely military defeats but systemic collapses that would reshape Chinese history for centuries.