The Fragile Southern Ming Court in Crisis

By 1649, the Southern Ming dynasty clung to survival like a drowning man grasping at reeds. The Yongli Emperor’s court, having fled Beijing years earlier, now operated as a government-in-exile from Guangdong and Guangxi provinces. This precarious existence followed the catastrophic fall of Beijing in 1644 to rebel forces, then the Qing conquest that swept across northern China. The Ming loyalists faced an existential threat from the expanding Qing empire, whose disciplined banner armies had already demonstrated their military superiority across multiple campaigns.

The Southern Ming’s military situation appeared particularly dire after the defeats of two key commanders – Li Chengdong and Jin Shengheng – whose forces had previously provided some defense against Qing incursions. With these losses, the Yongli court desperately needed to shore up its defenses in Guangdong, the last major territory under its control. In March 1649 (the third year of Yongli reign, sixth year of Shunzhi era), the court appointed the courageous general Yan Keyi as defender of Nanxiong, a strategic gateway city to Guangdong.

The Battle for the Southern Gateway

Yan Keyi, known for his loyalty and battlefield prowess, launched a bold counteroffensive in July 1649. Leading his troops over the formidable Meiling Pass, he attacked Qing positions at Nan’an prefecture. Initial successes saw Ming forces gain momentum, putting Qing defenders under such pressure that Nan’an’s garrison commanders Liu Bolu and Jin Zhen sent desperate pleas for help to their superiors in Ganzhou, reporting they faced imminent destruction.

The Qing response proved characteristically swift and decisive. Southern Jiangxi governor Liu Wuyuan dispatched deputy general Li Yangzhi with reinforcements. On the seventh and sixteenth days of July, Qing forces divided into two columns and engaged Yan’s army in direct combat. The Ming forces suffered defeat, with generals Liu Zhiguo and Chen Jie captured. Both the Greater and Lesser Meiling passes fell to Qing control, marking a significant setback for Ming defenses.

Leadership Collapse and Strategic Blunders

Following the Meiling campaign, General Yan Keyi’s death from illness at Nanxiong created a leadership vacuum. The Ming command structure began unraveling as disputes emerged over succession. Du Yonghe and Li Yuanyin proposed appointing Luo Chengyao as Yan’s replacement, but Luo resisted bitterly, complaining: “You all enjoy comfortable positions while sending me to suffer? Even Duke Li (Li Chengdong) launched multiple campaigns without success – what can I possibly achieve?” Only after extensive persuasion and substantial bribes did Luo reluctantly accept, though he stationed himself at Shaozhou rather than Nanxiong, delegating the frontline defense to subordinate Jiang Qilong.

This leadership crisis coincided with a major Qing offensive. On December 3, 1649, the formidable Qing generals Shang Kexi and Geng Jimao departed Linjiang in Jiangxi, reaching Ganzhou by the sixteenth. Their campaign demonstrated the Qing’s strategic patience – after arriving at Nan’an on the twenty-seventh, they spread misinformation about celebrating the New Year there to lull Ming forces into complacency. On the twenty-eighth, they secretly crossed Meiling Pass into Guangdong territory.

The Fall of Nanxiong and Shaozhou

Qing forces reached Nanxiong by the twenty-ninth, where they executed a devastating surprise attack. Dozens of Qing spies had infiltrated the city beforehand. On New Year’s Eve, they set fire to the drum tower, creating chaos as defenders rushed to fight the blaze. Seizing the moment, the infiltrators opened the Wenming Gate, allowing Qing troops to flood into the city. Ming general Yang Jie organized a hasty defense but fell in combat along with deputy commander Xiao Qi and over a dozen other officers. The battle resulted in the deaths of 200 Ming cavalry and 6,000 infantry, with civilian casualties so severe that contemporary accounts described the city’s population as “nearly exterminated.”

With Nanxiong secured, Qing-appointed Guangdong governor Li Qifeng established his administration there. On January 3, 1650 (seventh year of Shunzhi era), Shang Kexi and Geng Jimao advanced to Shaozhou, where Ming commander Luo Chengyao had already fled south with civilian officials. The Qing took Shaozhou unopposed and began pacifying its six subordinate counties.

Panic in the Yongli Court

News of Nanxiong and Shaozhou’s fall sent the Yongli court in Zhaoqing into panic. Official Ma Jixiang advocated fleeing to Guangxi, arguing Qing forces were unstoppable. Guangdong-Guangxi governor Du Yonghe urged the emperor to remain, warning that abandoning Guangdong would collapse morale. The indecisive Yongli Emperor dispatched Liu Yuansheng and Jin Bao to Guangzhou to explain the proposed retreat.

Liu’s report back to court highlighted Du Yonghe’s emotional plea: “If Your Majesty goes west, you abandon Guangdong to the barbarians and sacrifice all loyalists who joined our cause – those who planned this strategy have created a tragedy!” This temporarily swayed the emperor to remain, but eunuch Xia Guoxiang intervened, having the empress dowager carried to the palace gates to pressure Yongli into fleeing. On January 8, the court embarked for Wuzhou in Guangxi, creating a disastrous impression of abandonment that demoralized Guangdong’s defenders.

The Siege of Guangzhou

By late January 1650, Shang Kexi and Geng Jimao advanced from Shaozhou, reaching Yingde County on the twenty-ninth. They divided forces, sending a detachment under Xu Erxian to take Qingyuan County, Guangzhou’s water gateway. By March 6, the main Qing army reached Guangzhou’s outskirts, where governor Du Yonghe rejected surrender demands and prepared for siege.

Initial Qing assaults on March 9 failed against determined Ming resistance. Recognizing Guangzhou’s formidable defenses, Shang Kexi adopted a systematic approach: constructing siegeworks, casting new cannons, and securing surrounding areas. A critical development came when the Ming’s “Red Banner Navy” defected on April 26, giving Qing forces naval superiority. By controlling waterways and securing surrenders from regional commanders like Huang Yingjie and Hao Shangjiu, the Qing isolated Guangzhou.

The Final Assault and Massacre

After months of preparation, Qing forces launched their decisive attack in late October 1650. Concentrated artillery fire breached Guangzhou’s northwest wall on November 1, creating a 30-zhang (about 100 meter) gap. The next day, Qing troops stormed through, engaging in brutal street combat that left 6,000 Ming soldiers dead and commander Fan Cheng’en captured. Du Yonghe and other leaders escaped by sea with over a thousand vessels.

What followed became one of the Qing conquest’s darkest chapters. From November 24 to December 5 (by Western calendar), Qing forces conducted systematic massacres. Contemporary accounts describe indiscriminate killing: “They slaughtered cruelly regardless of age or gender, saying nothing but ‘Kill! Kill these rebellious barbarians!'” The slaughter reached such scale that monks organized mass cremations outside the city, with bones piled “like snowdrifts” visible from miles away. Poet Wang Leilei’s memorial essay captured the horror: “Blood splashed across heaven’s streets as ants gathered to feed… The north wind carried the stench of piled skulls resembling pagodas or hills…”

Legacy of the Guangdong Campaign

The fall of Guangzhou marked the effective end of organized Ming resistance in southern China. While scattered loyalist forces continued fighting – notably Zheng Chenggong’s maritime resistance – the Yongli court’s flight and Guangdong’s conquest destroyed the Southern Ming’s territorial base. The campaign demonstrated Qing military effectiveness: combining rapid maneuver, psychological warfare, technological superiority (especially in artillery), and ruthless determination.

Shang Kexi and Geng Jimao’s brutal methods, particularly the Guangzhou massacre, served as both punishment and warning against resistance. This pattern of overwhelming force followed by selective brutality became characteristic of Qing consolidation. The campaign also revealed Ming weaknesses: leadership fractures, defensive passivity, and the court’s inability to inspire confidence among regional commanders.

For Guangdong’s people, 1650 represented a traumatic break in regional history. The devastation reshaped demographics and power structures, facilitating Qing control but leaving lasting scars in cultural memory. The resistance’s collapse and subsequent Qing administration marked Guangdong’s full incorporation into the new dynasty’s framework, ending two centuries of Ming rule in the region.