The Fragmented Southern Ming Resistance

As the Qing forces consolidated their control over northern China in the mid-17th century, the remnants of the Ming dynasty—collectively known as the Southern Ming—struggled to maintain their foothold in the south. By 1646, two rival Ming claimants vied for legitimacy: the Longwu Emperor in Fujian and the Prince of Lu (Zhu Yihai) in Zhejiang. This division fatally weakened Ming resistance against the advancing Qing armies under the leadership of Dodo (Duoduo), a seasoned Manchu commander.

The Southern Ming courts were plagued by factionalism, with former Ming officials like Hong Chengchou defecting to the Qing and providing critical intelligence. Meanwhile, Ming loyalists such as Zhang Guowei and Zhu Dadian prepared for a last stand, unaware that the Qing would soon launch a coordinated campaign to crush both Ming regimes.

Dodo’s Southern Campaign: A Swift and Brutal Offensive

In February 1646, the Qing court appointed Dodo as the “Great General Who Conquers the South” (征南大将军), tasking him with subduing Zhejiang and Fujian. Reinforced by Han Chinese defectors, including former Ming generals like Li Chengdong, Dodo amassed an army of at least 10,000 troops.

By May, Dodo’s forces reached Hangzhou, where they exploited an unusual drought that had left the Qiantang River shallow enough to ford. On May 25, Qing troops crossed the river in two prongs: infantry at Liuhe Pagoda and a naval contingent via Biezi Gate. The Ming defenses under Fang Guo’an collapsed almost immediately.

The Prince of Lu fled to Taizhou, but his family was captured by the turncoat general Zhang Guozhu. Fang Guo’an, once a Ming loyalist, surrendered with 7,500 troops, followed by a wave of defections from Ming officials. Only a few, like Wang Zhiren, chose martyrdom—famously drowning his family before surrendering to deliver a scathing rebuke to Hong Chengchou.

The Siege of Jinhua and Ming Loyalist Defiance

As Qing forces advanced, Ming holdouts made desperate last stands. In Jinhua, Zhu Dadian—a controversial figure once known for corruption—refused to surrender. For 20 days, his defenders resisted until Qing artillery breached the walls on July 16. Zhu’s final act was to ignite his own gunpowder stores, killing himself and his retinue in a defiant explosion. The Qing retaliated with a massacre, slaughtering civilians under the pretext of rebellion.

Meanwhile, the fate of Ma Shiying—the reviled Ming minister—became a subject of historical dispute. While pro-Qing sources claimed he was executed after capture, anti-Ming writers like Huang Zongxi insisted he had surrendered. Recent evidence suggests Ma died resisting, having retreated to a monastery before his capture.

Cultural Memory and Historical Controversies

The fall of Zhejiang marked a turning point in the Ming-Qing transition, exposing the Southern Ming’s fatal disunity. Later historians, particularly those influenced by the Donglin faction, vilified figures like Ma Shiying while downplaying their resistance. Writers such as Zhang Dai and Huang Zongxi—who themselves avoided martyrdom—shaped narratives that often prioritized factional grudges over accuracy.

Modern reassessments, however, highlight the complexity of loyalties. Defectors like Hong Chengchou were instrumental in Qing victories, yet even compromised figures like Zhu Dadian redeemed themselves through defiant last stands. The Qing’s brutal tactics, including the Jinhua massacre, also underscore the human cost of conquest.

Legacy: The Qing Consolidation and Ming Memory

By late 1646, the Qing had extinguished both the Lu and Longwu regimes, paving the way for the eventual conquest of all southern China. The Ming loyalist cause lived on in Taiwan under Koxinga, but the mainland resistance never recovered.

Today, the events of 1646 serve as a case study in the collapse of dynastic legitimacy, the role of betrayal in warfare, and the politicization of historical memory. The Ming loyalists’ failures—and their contested legacies—remain a poignant chapter in China’s imperial twilight.