The Collapse of the Later Jin Dynasty

In the fourth year of the Kaiyun era (947 CE), on the fifth day of the first lunar month, a historic moment unfolded as the first Chinese emperor destined for northern exile prepared his belongings. This marked the dramatic conclusion of the Later Jin dynasty (936-947), one of the Five Dynasties that ruled northern China during this turbulent period.

The Khitan-led Liao dynasty had launched a massive southern campaign, overwhelming the Later Jin forces. Emperor Shizhong Gui (posthumously known as Emperor Chu of Jin) was stripped of his imperial title by Liao Taizong (Emperor Yelü Deguang) and given the humiliating title “Marquis of Broken Faith.” The emperor, along with his entire court, was ordered to relocate northward beyond Chinese territory.

The Imperial Exile Northward

The exiled imperial party constituted a microcosm of the Later Jin court in motion. Accompanying the deposed emperor were Empress Feng, his younger brother Shizhong Rui, sons Shiyan Xu and Shiyan Bao, along with fifty palace women, thirty eunuchs, fifty guards, and various officials including physicians, ceremonial officers, and kitchen staff. Several high-ranking ministers—Zhao Ying, Feng Yu, and Li Yantao among them—also joined the forced migration.

A particularly poignant figure in this procession was the emperor’s mother, Empress Dowager Li. Though the Liao emperor, considering her advanced age and the arduous journey ahead, offered to let her remain in Chinese territory, she steadfastly refused to be separated from her son.

Khitan Treatment of Conquered Rulers

The Khitan approach to conquered rulers followed traditional steppe practices. Rather than executing deposed leaders, they preferred to relocate them—a pragmatic strategy to prevent future rebellions while maintaining the dignity of noble bloodlines. These exiled rulers often integrated into Khitan society, sometimes even intermarrying with the imperial family and assuming high positions, albeit with no possibility of returning to their homeland.

The Khitan applied this same policy to the Later Jin emperor. The journey north lasted several months, passing through Youzhou (modern Beijing) before turning northeast near present-day Shanhaiguan. Their ultimate destination was Huanglong Prefecture (modern Nong’an County, Jilin Province), with interim stops at Huaimi Prefecture before finally settling in Liaoyang—the most temperate of the Liao dynasty’s five capitals and their eastern capital.

Failed Marriage Alliance and Cultural Tensions

The Khitan attempted to solidify their relationship with the former Jin emperor through marriage. A high-ranking Khitan official, Channu Sheli (brother-in-law to Liao Shizong Yelü Wuyu), sought to marry the emperor’s daughter—a common steppe practice to cement political alliances. However, the Han Chinese courtiers viewed such intermarriage as polluting their “pure” bloodlines, leading the Jin emperor to refuse the proposal. Undeterred, the Khitan emperor forcibly took the princess for Channu Sheli anyway.

This incident foreshadowed larger cultural exchanges to come, as Han imperial blood merged with steppe nobility—a precursor to more extensive interactions that would occur a century later during the Jin dynasty’s conquest of northern China.

The Liao Dynasty’s Hybrid Identity

By this period, the Liao dynasty could no longer be considered a purely nomadic regime. Significant sinicization had occurred since the time of Liao Taizu (Yelü Abaoji), who had adopted many Han Chinese customs during the Later Tang period (923-936). Yet the Khitan remained wary of excessive Chinese influence, fearing it might erode their martial virtues.

An anecdote involving Later Tang envoy Yao Kun illustrates this cultural tension. When the envoy visited the Khitan court, news arrived of Later Tang Zhuangzong’s death in a rebellion. Abaoji reportedly lamented that the emperor’s downfall was inevitable given his indulgence in luxury—maintaining 2,000 palace maids, 1,000 musicians, and obsessions with hunting and wine. Upon hearing this, Abaoji immediately imposed austerity measures on his own court, banning alcohol, releasing hunting birds, and dismissing musicians to avoid similar decadence.

Origins of the Later Jin and the Sixteen Prefectures

The Later Jin dynasty had been founded by Shi Jingtang, the adoptive father of the deposed emperor. As a prominent Later Tang general, Shi had turned to the Khitan for help in 936 when the Later Tang emperor grew suspicious of him. Liao Taizong responded by sending 50,000 cavalry (claimed as 300,000) to assist Shi Jingtang.

This military aid came at a steep price. In exchange for Khitan support, Shi Jingtang ceded sixteen strategic prefectures along the northern frontier—a decision that would haunt Chinese dynasties for centuries. These territories included:

– The “pre-mountain prefectures” south of the Yan Mountains: You, Ji, Ying, Mo, Zhuo, Tan, and Shun
– The “post-mountain prefectures” west of the Taihang Mountains and north of Yanmen Pass: Xin, Gui, Ru, Wu, Yun, Ying, Huan, Shuo, and Wei

Collectively known as the Sixteen Prefectures of Yan and Yun, this region formed a crucial natural defensive line along the Yan Mountains. Its loss meant northern dynasties could now bypass traditional mountain defenses and strike directly into the North China Plain.

Strategic Consequences of the Territorial Cession

The ceded territories created an enduring security dilemma for subsequent Chinese dynasties. The Yan Mountains had historically served as China’s primary northern barrier against steppe incursions. With these lands in Khitan hands, the Liao gained unimpeded access southward while denying Chinese forces critical defensive positions.

Three additional prefectures—Ying, Ping, and Luan—had been seized by the Khitan from Youzhou warlord Liu Shouguang in 923. Though Later Tang recovered Youzhou, these three coastal prefectures remained under Liao control, further complicating the frontier situation.

The Later Jin’s Downfall and Northern Han’s Rise

Initial relations between the Khitan and Later Jin remained stable under Shi Jingtang. However, when his adopted son (the deposed emperor) abandoned his father’s agreements with the Liao, the Khitan launched their devastating invasion that toppled the dynasty in 947.

The Liao’s victory proved short-lived. Unable to administer such vast conquered territories amid widespread resistance, they withdrew north of the sixteen prefectures. This power vacuum allowed the short-lived Later Han (947-951) to emerge, followed by the more ambitious Later Zhou (951-960) under Emperor Shizong, who attempted to recover the lost territories.

Zhou Shizong’s Northern Campaigns and the Song Founding

Emperor Shizong of Later Zhou organized northern expeditions that briefly recaptured Ying and Mo prefectures—the southernmost of the sixteen. His sudden death in 959 cut short these campaigns, and within a year, general Zhao Kuangyin seized power through the Chenqiao mutiny, establishing the Song dynasty.

The early Song maintained an uneasy peace with the Liao. After Zhao Kuangyin (Emperor Taizu) died, his brother Emperor Taizong conquered the Northern Han based in Taiyuan in 979, then turned his attention toward the Khitan. This launched twenty-five years of intermittent Song-Liao warfare with mixed results for both sides.

The Chanyuan Treaty and Century of Peace

By 1004, both exhausted empires negotiated the landmark Chanyuan Treaty. Its provisions established:
– Equal status as “brotherly states”
– Fixed borders along existing lines
– Annual Song payments of 100,000 taels of silver and 200,000 bolts of silk to the Liao

Remarkably durable, this treaty maintained peace for over a century. The Song payments—less than 1% of annual revenue—proved far cheaper than continuous warfare. For their part, the Khitan became reliable neighbors, using these resources to strengthen their administration while generally honoring the agreement.

Diplomatic Rituals and Cultural Exchange

The prolonged peace fostered an elaborate system of interstate relations unprecedented in Chinese history. Unlike traditional tributary systems where foreign rulers acknowledged Chinese supremacy, Song-Liao relations operated on equal footing, developing sophisticated diplomatic protocols.

Annual exchanges occurred on each emperor’s birthday and New Year’s Day, with additional missions for coronations or funerals. The reception process exemplified this ritual complexity:

1. At the border, Song officials (a civil “reception envoy” and military “escort envoy”) greeted Liao delegations
2. Banquets at Baigou Station and Beizhou
3. Tea and medicine gifts in Qinghe
4. Final banquet in Daming before reaching the capital
5. Kaifeng prefectural judges received the mission at the capital’s outskirts

In the capital, specialized “accompanying envoys” hosted the visitors at designated guesthouses like the Banjing Lodge and Duting Post Station. The emperor bestowed lavish gifts—silver crowns, robes, boots, and horses for principal envoys, with scaled-down versions for their retinues.

This system created a remarkably modern diplomatic framework, though it accelerated Khitan acculturation to Chinese norms—a process that would ultimately weaken Liao military capabilities as new threats emerged from Manchuria.

The Jurchen Rise and Liao Decline

The early 12th century saw the ascendance of the Jurchen people in Manchuria—a development the Liao fatally underestimated. What began as minor border friction escalated when Jurchen chieftain Aguda (later Emperor Taizu of Jin) refused to perform for Liao Emperor Tianzuo during a 1112 fishing banquet.

When Aguda assumed leadership of the Wanyan tribe in 1114, he exploited Liao demands for tribute (especially the prized gyrfalcons) to justify rebellion. With just 2,500 warriors, Aguda launched his campaign by capturing Ningjiang Prefecture—a modest beginning that snowballed as the overextended Liao struggled to respond effectively.

Military Reversals and Strategic Errors

The Jurchen scored successive victories at Chuhui Village (1114) and Huanglong Prefecture (1115), exploiting Liao logistical weaknesses and poor morale. Critical mistakes compounded the Liao’s troubles:

1. Tianzuo’s delayed response to early Jurchen raids
2. Failed two-pronged counteroffensive (1115) undermined by a rebellion led by general Zhang Nu
3. Economic strain from prolonged mobilization
4. Overreliance on defensive tactics rather than nomadic cavalry strengths

By contrast, the Jurchen perfected a low-cost warfare model where soldiers sustained themselves through plunder, maintaining high morale and mobility. Aguda’s 1115 declaration of the Jin dynasty formalized their challenge to Liao supremacy.

The Song’s Strategic Miscalculation

As the Liao foundered, Song China faced a fateful choice: prop up their longtime Liao neighbors or ally with the ascendant Jurchen to recover the sixteen prefectures. Under the influence of hawkish officials like eunuch-general Tong Guan and turncoat strategist Zhao Liangsi (the former Liao official Ma Zhi), the Song chose the latter course.

This decision ignored several realities:
– The Liao had been a stable buffer against northern threats
– The Jurchen represented an unknown quantity with greater expansionist potential
– Song military capabilities remained questionable despite Tong Guan’s earlier successes against the Tanguts

Secret negotiations with the Jin (conducted via risky sea routes from Shandong to Liaodong) produced the 1120 “Alliance on the Sea,” pledging joint action against the Liao in exchange for Song recovery of the sixteen prefectures.

The Fallout and Northern Song Collapse

The alliance proved disastrous. While the Jin rapidly conquered Liao territory (taking their capital in 1122), Song forces failed miserably in their attacks. This exposed Song military weakness, encouraging Jin ambitions southward. After extinguishing the Liao in 1125, the Jin turned on their Song allies, culminating in the 1127 fall of Kaifeng and the captivity of Emperor Qinzong—an eerie parallel to the Later Jin emperor’s exile 180 years earlier.

The Jurchen conquest of northern China completed a geopolitical transformation begun with the 947 fall of the Later Jin, demonstrating how steppe policies of relocating conquered rulers and interethnic marriage gradually reshaped East Asian power structures. These events underscored the enduring strategic importance of the sixteen prefectures while highlighting the risks of short-term diplomatic calculations against long-term stability.