The Rise and Fall of the Later Yan Dynasty

The Later Yan dynasty, established by the legendary general Murong Chui in 384 CE, had once been a dominant power in northern China. Murong Chui, a brilliant military strategist and statesman, had rebuilt the Yan state after its initial collapse, creating a formidable empire that controlled much of modern-day Hebei, Shanxi, and Liaoning. However, just eleven months after Murong Chui’s death in 396 CE, his empire would collapse with shocking speed under the leadership of his son, Murong Bao.

This rapid disintegration was not merely the result of poor leadership—though Murong Bao’s disastrous decisions played a key role—but also stemmed from structural weaknesses left by Murong Chui himself. His final reforms, intended to consolidate power, instead alienated key factions and left the empire vulnerable to the rising power of the Northern Wei under the ambitious Tuoba Gui.

The First Domino: The Loss of Bingzhou

The collapse began in Bingzhou (modern-day Shanxi), a strategically vital region that served as a buffer between the Later Yan heartland and the Northern Wei. In June 396, Tuoba Gui launched an attack on Guangning Commandery, executing its governor and forcibly relocating its population to Pingcheng. Shortly after, the governor of Shanggu Commandery abandoned his post and fled.

Murong Bao, now emperor, appointed his brother Murong Nong to govern Bingzhou. This decision proved catastrophic. The region was already suffering from famine due to an early frost, making it impossible to sustain Murong Nong’s massive army. Worse, Murong Nong implemented Murong Bao’s controversial reforms—conducting population audits and dismantling military garrisons in favor of civilian administration. These policies alienated both the local Han Chinese and non-Han “mixed tribes,” who saw them as oppressive.

By August, Tuoba Gui, now declaring himself emperor, saw an opportunity. His advisor Zhang Xun urged him to exploit the Later Yan’s instability, and in late August, Tuoba Gui marched south with an army of 400,000.

### The Battle of Yangqu: A Humiliating Defeat

On September 18, Northern Wei forces arrived at Yangqu (near modern Taiyuan). Murong Nong, against all strategic wisdom, chose to engage them in open battle rather than hold the fortified city of Jinyang. The result was a disaster. His forces were routed, and when he attempted to retreat, his own subordinate, Mu Yu Song, barred the gates against him. Murong Nong fled with a handful of cavalry, only to be ambushed at Luchuan. He barely escaped alone.

This defeat was not just a tactical blunder—it exposed deeper problems. The Northern Wei had adopted the Later Yan’s own cavalry tactics, eliminating their previous military advantage. Additionally, Murong Nong’s reforms had shattered morale, leaving his troops unwilling to fight for him.

The Northern Wei’s Swift Conquest of Hebei

With Bingzhou lost, Tuoba Gui turned east toward Hebei. By October, his forces had repaired an ancient mountain pass (originally used by Han dynasty general Han Xin) and poured into the plains. The speed of the collapse was stunning:

– Changshan fell immediately, with its governor captured.
– Most commanderies surrendered without resistance—only Zhongshan, Ye, and Xindu held out, and only because they were defended by die-hard Murong loyalists.

Tuoba Gui’s success was partly due to Murong Chui’s final reforms, which had alienated local elites. Many welcomed the Northern Wei as liberators, providing them with much-needed supplies.

### The Siege of Zhongshan: A Missed Opportunity

By November, Tuoba Gui besieged Zhongshan, the Later Yan capital. Murong Long, one of Murong Bao’s more competent brothers, led a fierce defense, repelling multiple assaults. Recognizing the city’s strength, Tuoba Gui shifted focus to Ye and Xindu.

Meanwhile, Murong Bao made a fatal mistake: instead of rallying his forces for a decisive battle, he hired bandits to harass the Northern Wei—a move that baffled even his own officers. When Tuoba Gui faced a rebellion in his rear and offered peace, Murong Bao arrogantly refused, believing he could crush the retreating Northern Wei army.

The Battle of Baishi: A Repeat of Canhebei

In February 397, Murong Bao assembled a massive army (120,000 infantry, 37,000 cavalry) to ambush Tuoba Gui at Baishi. Initially, a daring night attack nearly succeeded—Tuoba Gui was forced to flee barefoot—but the Later Yan forces panicked and turned on themselves, allowing the Northern Wei to counterattack.

Murong Bao, demonstrating his trademark cowardice, abandoned his army and fled. Tens of thousands of soldiers were captured or froze to death in a blizzard. The Later Yan’s remaining weapons and supplies fell into Northern Wei hands.

### The Final Collapse

By March, Zhongshan was in chaos. Murong Bao, still refusing to fight, fled to Longcheng. The city’s defenders, desperate for leadership, installed Murong Xiang as a last-ditch ruler. When Tuoba Gui demanded their surrender, they retorted: “We know you’ll just slaughter us like at Canhebei—we’d rather die fighting!”

But without proper leadership, even their defiance was futile. By mid-March, the Later Yan was reduced to a few isolated strongholds.

Why Did the Later Yan Fall So Quickly?

1. Murong Bao’s Incompetence – His strategic blunders, refusal to delegate to capable generals (like Murong Long), and cowardice doomed the empire.
2. Murong Chui’s Reforms – His final policies destabilized the military and alienated local elites, making conquest easier for Tuoba Gui.
3. Northern Wei’s Adaptability – Tuoba Gui learned from past defeats, adopted Yan cavalry tactics, and exploited internal divisions.
4. Economic Collapse – Famine in Bingzhou and resource mismanagement left the Later Yan unable to sustain prolonged war.

Legacy: The Birth of Northern Wei Dominance

The fall of the Later Yan marked the rise of the Northern Wei as the dominant power in northern China. Tuoba Gui’s victory was not just military—he skillfully co-opted Han Chinese bureaucrats, stabilizing his rule. Meanwhile, the Murong clan fragmented, with remnants forming the Southern Yan and Northern Yan, but none regained their former glory.

The speed of the collapse remains a cautionary tale: even the mightiest empires can crumble when leadership fails and reforms backfire. Murong Chui, for all his brilliance, had sown the seeds of his dynasty’s destruction. As the Zizhi Tongjian later lamented: “The empire won by the father was lost by the son in less than a year.”

In the end, history’s verdict is clear: No dynasty falls by accident—it collapses when its leaders mistake weakness for strength and arrogance for wisdom.