The Collapse of Ming and Rise of the Shun

The mid-17th century witnessed one of China’s most dramatic dynastic transitions. As the Ming Dynasty crumbled under internal rebellions and external pressures, peasant leader Li Zicheng established the short-lived Shun Dynasty in 1644 after capturing Beijing. However, his triumph proved fleeting when the Manchu-led Qing forces, allied with Ming loyalists, drove him from the capital after just 42 days. What followed was a desperate westward retreat that would culminate in the decisive Battle of Tong Pass – a military engagement that sealed the fate of the Shun regime and paved the way for Qing dominance over China.

The Strategic Importance of Tong Pass

Tong Pass stood as one of China’s most formidable natural fortresses, guarding the eastern approach to Shaanxi province and its capital Xi’an. This narrow passage between mountains and the Yellow River had protected China’s heartland for centuries. For the retreating Shun forces, holding this choke point became essential to maintaining their foothold in northwest China. The Qing leadership recognized equally that capturing Tong Pass would open the road to Xi’an and deliver a fatal blow to Li Zicheng’s regime.

The Qing Advance and Shun Defensive Preparations

In December 1644, Prince Dodo’s Qing army, having defeated Shun forces in Huaiqing, crossed the Yellow River at Mengjin County. By the 15th day of the month, they reached Shanzhou (modern Shan County, Henan). The Shun garrison at Lingbao, led by Zhang Youzeng, fell quickly due to numerical inferiority. As Dodo’s forces advanced to within 20 li (about 10 km) of Tong Pass by the 22nd, Li Zicheng received alarming intelligence about the inadequate defenses. Realizing that Tong Pass’s fall would mean the inevitable loss of Xi’an, the Shun emperor personally led reinforcements including generals Liu Zongmin and Liu Fangliang to the front.

The Qing prepared meticulously for the assault. Reinforcements under Gushan Ezhen Ashan and Malaxi arrived from Shanxi, while the Qing urgently deployed their formidable red cannon artillery for the siege. This preparation demonstrated the Qing leadership’s understanding that Tong Pass represented more than a military objective – its capture would symbolize the irreversible decline of Shun power.

The Thirteen-Day Battle for Tong Pass

The battle commenced on December 29, 1644. Initial Shun attacks led by Liu Zongmin failed, as did subsequent attempts by Liu Fangliang on January 4, 1645. When Li Zicheng personally led combined cavalry and infantry forces into combat, Prince Dodo committed his elite Eight Banner troops, inflicting heavy casualties on Shun infantry. Desperate night attacks on January 5-6 proved equally ineffective.

The battle’s turning point came on January 9 with the arrival of Qing artillery. Two days later, as Qing forces pressed toward the pass entrance, Shun troops desperately fortified their positions with deep trenches and sturdy walls. The Qing first bombarded these defenses with their red cannons before launching a full assault. Even in this dire situation, Shun forces displayed remarkable tenacity, attempting cavalry counterattacks and flanking maneuvers, all of which ultimately failed.

The Strategic Dilemma and Shun Retreat

While the Tong Pass battle raged, another Qing army under Prince Ajige penetrated Shaanxi from the north. Though Shun generals Li Guo and Gao Yigong resisted fiercely at Yan’an and Yulin, Ajige detached forces to contain them while marching south toward Xi’an. Faced with this pincer movement, Li Zicheng made the fateful decision to abandon Shaanxi rather than risk complete annihilation. On January 11, recognizing the untenable situation at Tong Pass, he withdrew to Xi’an with his main force, arriving on the 13th before evacuating the city with officials, families, and treasures via the southern route through Lantian and Shangluo.

The Tong Pass garrison commander Ma Shiyao attempted a ruse – feigning surrender while secretly plotting with Li Zicheng for a counterattack. When Qing forces intercepted his messenger, they set a brutal trap at Jinpenkou, massacring Ma and his 7,000 troops on January 12. This marked the final collapse of Shun resistance at the strategic pass.

Aftermath and Strategic Consequences

With Tong Pass secured, Dodo’s forces entered Xi’an on January 18, soon joined by Ajige’s army. The Qing regent Dorgon then implemented his strategic plan: Dodo would proceed south to conquer Nanjing from the Ming loyalist Southern Ming regime, while Ajige pursued the retreating Shun forces.

Contrary to common historical misconceptions, Li Zicheng did not lead all Shun forces from northwest China in his retreat. His contingent numbered about 130,000, including key generals and officials, but excluded substantial garrisons in northern Shaanxi. This separation would lead to the formation of eastern and western Shun military groups taking different routes southward.

Historical Records and Misconceptions

The Tong Pass campaign is well-documented in the “Veritable Records of the Qing Shunzhi Emperor” and local gazetteers. However, notable errors appear in Wu Weiye’s “Chronicle of Pacifying Bandits” and even the officially compiled “Ming History,” which incorrectly dates the battle to February and exaggerates Ma Shiyao’s forces to 600,000. These inaccuracies highlight the critical importance of consulting primary sources when studying this pivotal transition period.

The Legacy of Tong Pass

The fall of Tong Pass represented more than a military defeat – it marked the irreversible decline of peasant-led resistance to Qing conquest. The battle demonstrated Qing military superiority in combined arms tactics, particularly their effective use of artillery. Strategically, it enabled the Qing to divide their forces between completing the Shun’s destruction and conquering Southern Ming territories – a decisive step toward establishing their 268-year rule over China.

For later historians, the Shun’s collapse after Tong Pass offers insights into the challenges of transitioning from rebel movement to governing power, and the Qing’s remarkable ability to exploit their enemies’ weaknesses during China’s turbulent mid-17th century.