The Fragile Southern Ming Court

When Qing forces advanced into eastern Zhejiang in 1646, Zhu Yihai, the Prince of Lu who had established a rival Ming court, fled to the Zhoushan archipelago, marking the beginning of the end for his resistance government. This event unfolded against the backdrop of a fractured Southern Ming landscape, where multiple claimants to the throne vied for legitimacy while Qing armies methodically dismantled their defenses.

The Longwu Emperor (Zhu Yijian) had established his court in Fujian after the fall of Nanjing in 1645, inheriting a precarious political situation. His regime depended heavily on the support of powerful military leaders, particularly the pirate-turned-warlord Zheng Zhilong. This dependence would prove fatal when Zheng, facing the overwhelming Qing advance, made secret overtures to the enemy as early as March 1646.

The Treachery of Zheng Zhilong

Zheng Zhilong’s betrayal unfolded with calculated precision. In early June, as Qing forces crossed the Qiantang River, the Qing commander Boluo dispatched envoy Su Zhonggui with an imperial edict offering Zheng favorable terms for surrender. Zheng, recognizing the shifting tides, secretly ordered his general Shi Fu to abandon the strategically crucial Xianxia Pass – the gateway to Fujian province – without resistance.

To cover his tracks, Zheng fabricated a crisis, memorializing the emperor: “The three passes’ provisions come from me, and I obtain them from the sea. If there’s a maritime alert, I have no home. I must personally go to deal with this.” When the Longwu Emperor sent a handwritten plea – “Please wait, sir, let us go together” – Zheng ignored it completely, withdrawing his forces to his stronghold at Anping.

The Qing Advance Through Fujian

On August 13, 1646, Prince Boluo, along with Fujian-Zhejiang Governor Zhang Cunren and Provincial Governor Tong Guoding, led Manchu and Han troops from Quzhou into Fujian. Five days later, they crossed the undefended Xianxia Pass, where a macabre scene unfolded with the notorious turncoat Ruan Dacheng. Suffering severe facial swelling, Ruan insisted on pressing forward to demonstrate his vigor, boasting to younger officers about his stamina. He collapsed and died atop the pass, his body discovered sitting motionless on a boulder.

The Qing forces then took Pucheng, executing the Ming censor Zheng Weihong who refused to surrender. A popular ballad circulated mocking Zheng Zhilong’s capitulation: “The steep Xianxia road saw the Qing army pass undisturbed; The general loved the people, presenting rivers and mountains with both hands.”

The Longwu Emperor’s Final Days

As Qing forces approached, the Longwu court disintegrated. On July 25, the emperor dramatically revealed before his ministers that over 200 surrender letters had been intercepted, which he then burned publicly, declaring: “I don’t wish to know the names. Those who wrote them should reform; those who didn’t should remain steadfast.”

By August 21, the emperor departed Yanping for Jiangxi with minimal escort, unaware of his impending doom. His entourage included scholars carrying books and imperial clan members – hardly a mobile retreat. Reaching Tingzhou (modern Changting) on August 27 with only 500 soldiers, the exhausted party found the local magistrate unable to provide support. The next day, Qing troops arrived at Tingzhou.

Historical accounts differ on the emperor’s final moments. Qing records claim he was captured and executed at Zhaojiatang with his empress and concubines. Alternative accounts suggest he died in battle wearing military attire, while persistent legends claimed he escaped to become a monk – though no credible evidence supports this. The more plausible version describes his capture and execution on August 28, 1646.

The Fall of Fuzhou and Ming Loyalists’ Fate

On September 19, Qing forces entered Fuzhou. The Ming Minister of Works Zheng Xuan groveled in the mud before Prince Boluo, who dismissed him contemptuously. In contrast, the renowned scholar and Minister of Rites Cao Xuequan chose suicide over submission.

The tragic case of Fu Guan, former Grand Secretary under both Chongzhen and Longwu emperors, epitomized the era’s betrayals. Hiding with his disciple Jiang Henglong, he was betrayed when Jiang and his son, fearing repercussions, forced the aged statesman to surrender to Qing forces. Despite respectful treatment from Qing general Li Chengdong, Fu refused to adopt the queue, declaring: “My hometown produced Wen Tianxiang. We have no kowtowing grand secretaries, only those who would rather lose their heads!” He was executed in Tingzhou on November 21, 1646.

Historical Significance and Legacy

The collapse of the Longwu regime represented more than another Ming defeat – it demonstrated how internal betrayal and factionalism fatally undermined resistance efforts. Zheng Zhilong’s defection, motivated by self-preservation, handed the Qing a strategic advantage while exposing the Southern Ming’s reliance on unreliable military strongmen.

The varied responses to Qing conquest – from Zheng’s opportunism to Cao Xuequan’s principled suicide and Fu Guan’s defiant martyrdom – illustrate the complex moral landscape of dynastic transition. These events also foreshadowed the more prolonged resistance that would emerge under Zheng Zhilong’s son, Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong), who inherited his father’s naval forces but not his accommodationist politics.

Modern historians continue debating the Longwu Emperor’s decisions during his final days. His failure to implement a mobile defense or consolidate with other Ming loyalists contrasts sharply with later Southern Ming resistance efforts. The episode remains a poignant case study in how leadership, geography, and timing intersect during dynastic collapse.