The Diplomatic Prelude: A Vision for Regional Stability

In the summer of 1909, Japan stood at a critical juncture in its imperial expansion and diplomatic relations. The Meiji Restoration had transformed the island nation into a modern power, but its ambitions in Korea and Manchuria created complex tensions with Western powers and neighboring empires. Against this backdrop, Home Minister Gotō Shinpei approached Elder Statesman Ito Hirobumi with a bold proposal: a European tour to personally explain Japan’s intentions to world leaders. This mission would culminate in a strategically vital meeting with Russian Finance Minister Vladimir Kokovtsov, the czarist empire’s foremost expert on Asian affairs.

Gotō recognized that Kokovtsov, as Russia’s de facto minister for Oriental affairs, held significant influence over St. Petersburg’s Far Eastern policy. By securing his understanding of Japan’s position regarding Korea—a territory both nations had previously contested—Japan could potentially avoid renewed conflict and gain international legitimacy for its expansionist goals. Ito, the principal architect of Japan’s constitutional government and former Prime Minister, immediately grasped the proposal’s significance. Though officially serving as President of the Privy Council, he remained Japan’s most respected statesman and logical choice for such a delicate diplomatic mission.

Through careful coordination with the Foreign Ministry, the historic meeting was scheduled for late October in Harbin, a city that symbolized the competing imperial interests in Northeast Asia. By September’s end, Ito had secured approval from Prime Minister Katsura Tarō and Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō, indicating the mission had full governmental support. The stage was set for what would become one of the most fateful diplomatic encounters in early 20th-century Asian history.

A Statesman’s Premonition: Final Conversations and Concerns

On October 11, 1909, Ito visited the residence of Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo at Rinnanzaka. The two elder statesmen, who had alternately collaborated and competed throughout their careers, discussed matters that seemed tinged with unusual gravity. That evening, at a dinner hosted by Prime Minister Katsura, Ito granted an interview to a British journalist that would later read like a prophetic farewell.

When questioned about his personal safety during the upcoming mission, Ito responded with remarkable candor: first, he acknowledged he faced constant danger; second, he stated that while he had previously been reckless with his life, he now had little of it remaining and would gladly sacrifice what was left for his country; third, he confessed that Korea remained his one unresolved concern—the final problem that troubled him, and whose resolution would bring him peace.

This extraordinary admission revealed the central preoccupation of Ito’s final years. Having dedicated his political life to establishing constitutional government in Japan, he had seen his creation—the Rikken Seiyūkai party—weather numerous crises and emerge stronger under the leadership of Saionji Kinmochi and Hara Takashi. The constitutional system had taken root sufficiently that domestic politics no longer greatly concerned him. Aside from the ongoing challenge of establishing legal controls over the military, Japan’s internal affairs seemed stable. Korea, however, represented unfinished business—both personally and for the empire he had helped build.

Ito’s secretary, Furuya Hisatsuna, later recalled that had Ito survived, his next plan would have taken him to Beijing. This was not mere speculation; Ito had confided to his aide Murota Yoshifumi that he intended to go to China as an advisor the following year and wanted Murota to accompany him. These plans reflected Ito’s growing interest in China’s constitutional development, which paralleled his earlier efforts in Japan and his recent involvement in Korea.

Constitutional Missions: Japan’s Role in China’s Political Reform

Ito’s prospective China mission grew from his ongoing engagement with Chinese reformers. On August 28, 1909, he had hosted a luncheon at his Oimachi residence—the “Onshikan” or “Imperial Gift Hall”—for Li Jiaju, China’s constitutional investigation commissioner who had completed his studies in Japan and was returning home. The guest list included prominent figures: Prime Minister Katsura, Army Minister Terauchi, Foreign Minister Komura, Privy Councillor Itō Miyoji, and constitutional scholars Hozumi Yatsuka and Ariga Nagao.

Following the formal luncheon, Ito took Li to a separate room for a private discussion, joined only by Prime Minister Katsura and Itō Miyoji. In this confidential meeting, Ito offered detailed advice about implementing constitutional government in China, warning of particular challenges and pitfalls. Li expressed profound gratitude for Ito’s guidance, recognizing the value of learning from Japan’s experience with modernization.

This interaction was not isolated. China had been sending investigation missions abroad since July 1905, when peace negotiations were underway in the Russo-Japanese War. In December 1905, a delegation led by Zaize arrived in Japan, and on January 4, 1906, Ito met with the head delegate. He explained that while the Japanese emperor retained supreme authority, actual administrative responsibility rested with the cabinet. He advised China to follow Japan’s example: first reduce imperial power, then establish a state with strong executive authority. The Chinese commissioners envisioned establishing constitutional government within 10-15 years.

Ito’s thinking about China’s constitutional development evolved alongside his Korean concerns. In speeches on August 19 and 20, 1909, he discussed China’s “reform theory” and “constitutional government theory,” expressing concern about China’s vast size, underdeveloped transportation and taxation systems, and limited local self-government. He warned that internal conflict in China could affect the entire world, and that Japan could not simply “watch the fire from the opposite shore”—though he cautioned against alarming Western powers about Japanese ambitions in China.

The Journey North: Final Preparations and Arrival in Manchuria

On October 14, 1909, Ito departed from Ōiso by train with his retinue: Murota Yoshifumi . The group reflected Ito’s diverse interests—political, military, administrative, medical, and cultural.

They reached Shimonoseki on October 15, staying at the famous Shunpanrō restaurant where the Treaty of Shimonoseki had been signed fourteen years earlier—a agreement that had dramatically expanded Japanese influence in Asia. On October 16, they boarded a ship at Moji, beginning the voyage to continental Asia. On October 18, they arrived in Dalian—Ito’s first visit to Manchuria, the territory that had been so central to Japan’s recent wars and diplomatic struggles.

The following day, October 19, Ito addressed Japanese officials and civilians at a welcome ceremony in Dalian. His speech acknowledged the significance of being in Manchuria, a region transformed by war and diplomacy, where Japan’s interests now extended beyond Korea into China proper. He spoke of regional stability and development, carefully framing Japan’s role as constructive rather than purely expansionist.

Historical Context: Japan’s Place in the Imperial World Order

To understand the significance of Ito’s mission, we must examine Japan’s position in the early 20th-century international system. The Meiji Restoration had propelled Japan from feudal isolation to imperial power in just four decades. Victory in the Sino-Japanese War surprised the world by demonstrating Japan’s military capability against a European power, resulting in Japanese control over southern Manchuria and consolidated influence in Korea.

Yet these victories created new challenges. The 1905 Taft-Katsura Agreement secured American recognition of Japanese suzerainty in Korea in exchange for Japanese recognition of American control in the Philippines. The 1907 Gentleman’s Agreement addressed Japanese immigration issues with the United States. Meanwhile, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided Britain’s support against Russian revanchism. Despite these diplomatic achievements, Japan remained sensitive to Western perceptions and needed to continually justify its expansion as legitimate and civilized rather than merely imperialistic.

Korea represented a particular dilemma. The 1905 Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty had made Korea a Japanese protectorate, with Ito serving as the first Resident-General from 1906-1909. His approach emphasized gradual assimilation and respect for Korean institutions, contrasting with more aggressive expansionists who favored immediate annexation. Ito’s planned meeting with Kokovtsov aimed to secure Russian acceptance of Japan’s Korean policy, thereby removing the last major diplomatic obstacle to complete control.

Cultural and Social Impacts: The Ideological Foundations of Expansion

Ito’s mission reflected broader cultural and social currents in Meiji Japan. The rapid modernization under the slogan “Rich Country, Strong Army” had created a nation that simultaneously embraced Western technology and institutions while asserting Asian leadership. Japanese intellectuals developed the concept of “Datsu-A Ron” , arguing that Japan should align with Western civilization while distancing itself from backward Asian neighbors. Yet practical politics required engagement with those same neighbors.

The constitutional system Ito had helped create—modeled partly on European examples but adapted to Japanese circumstances—became a template that Japanese leaders offered to other Asian nations. The advice Ito gave to Chinese reformers represented not merely personal opinion but an emerging Japanese worldview: that Japan had successfully synthesized Eastern and Western civilization and could guide other Asian nations through modernization.

This perspective contained inherent contradictions. Japan presented itself as Asia’s liberator from Western imperialism while practicing its own imperial expansion. The proposed guidance for China’s constitutional development stood alongside military and economic penetration of Manchuria. Ito himself embodied these contradictions: the cosmopolitan constitutionalist who also served as architect of imperial expansion.

The Unfolding Tragedy: Assassination and Its Immediate Aftermath

The historical account breaks off as Ito begins his speech in Dalian, but we know the tragic conclusion to this story. On October 26, 1909, as Ito arrived at the Harbin railway station for his meeting with Kokovtsov, Korean independence activist An Jung-geun stepped forward and shot him three times. The assassination shocked the international community and dramatically altered the course of East Asian history.

Ito’s death removed the leading advocate for gradualist policies in Korea. The more aggressive expansionists, who favored immediate annexation, gained the upper hand. On August 22, 1910, just ten months after Ito’s assassination, Japan formally annexed Korea with the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty, beginning thirty-five years of colonial rule.

The planned European tour never occurred, and Japan’s efforts to explain its “true intentions” to Western powers were significantly set back. Rather than presenting Japan as a responsible power seeking understanding through diplomacy, the assassination reinforced perceptions of Japanese expansion as generating violent resistance.

Legacy and Modern Relevance: Constitutional Dreams and Imperial Realities

Ito Hirobumi’s final mission represents a road not taken in East Asian history. His vision of constitutional development throughout the region, with Japan playing a guiding role, offered an alternative to pure military expansion. His death cut short this potential trajectory, leading to more aggressive imperial policies that would ultimately culminate in the Pacific War.

The constitutional systems Ito helped create—in Japan, and through his advice, potentially in China and Korea—might have developed differently had he lived. His approach to Korea emphasized gradual integration and respect for existing institutions, contrasting sharply with the harsh assimilation policies implemented after annexation. His advice to Chinese reformers suggested a genuine interest in successful constitutional government throughout East Asia, not merely Japanese dominance.

Today, as East Asian nations continue to navigate complex relationships between constitutional government, national identity, and regional leadership, Ito’s final concerns remain relevant. The tension between development and domination, between guidance and interference, between regional stability and national interest—these dilemmas continue to shape international relations in Asia.

Ito’s assassination in Manchuria, a territory contested by multiple powers, symbolizes the violent intersection of imperialism and nationalism that would characterize much of the twentieth century. His life’s work—creating a constitutional Japan that could stand equal to Western powers—succeeded spectacularly. His final mission—creating a stable regional order in which Japan’s leadership would be accepted rather than resisted—ended in tragic failure.

The story of Ito’s last journey reminds us that history turns on both structural forces and individual actions. The meeting that might have secured understanding between empires instead became the site of a murder that accelerated confrontation. The statesman who sought to explain Japan’s intentions instead became a symbol of them. The constitutionalist who hoped to spread representative government instead enabled authoritarian colonialism. In these contradictions, we find not just the story of one man’s final mission, but the complex birth of modern East Asia.