A Kingdom Divided: The Fragile Southern Ming Alliance

In the turbulent mid-17th century, the Southern Ming regime under the Yongli Emperor represented China’s last stand against the conquering Qing dynasty. After relocating the court to Kunming in 1656, a precarious balance existed between three key military leaders: Li Dingguo, the emperor’s loyal protector; Sun Kewang, the ambitious warlord controlling Guizhou; and Liu Wenxiu, the newly appointed Prince of Shu tasked with reclaiming Sichuan.

This tripartite dynamic reflected the Southern Ming’s desperate circumstances. While Li Dingguo’s victories at Xianggui had temporarily stabilized Yunnan, the regime remained geographically constrained. Sun Kewang’s forces dominated eastern supply routes, leaving Sichuan as the only viable direction for expansion. The strategic value of Sichuan – with its potential to connect to anti-Qing forces in Shaanxi and Huguang – made Liu Wenxiu’s mission critical for the regime’s survival.

The Sichuan Expedition: A Military Operation Against All Odds

In spring 1656, Prince Liu launched his ambitious campaign, deploying troops through two primary routes:

1. General Gao Cheng’en’s 5,000-strong vanguard advancing toward Ya’an
2. Main forces under Qi Sansheng moving toward Leshan

By September, Liu established his headquarters at Qianqiu Ping in Hongya County, where he erected an elaborate military complex. His commemorative stele inscription revealed the campaign’s grand vision: “To make Sichuan our foundation… recovering Shaanxi and Henan before sweeping across the Central Plains.”

Contemporary accounts describe impressive construction projects – palaces, government offices, and barracks rising from the war-torn landscape. The strategic location near Ya’an allowed connection to Yunnan while maintaining defensive advantages with natural water barriers. However, these visible displays of authority masked fundamental challenges:

– Severe manpower shortages (Sichuan’s population had plummeted after decades of conflict)
– Near-total collapse of agricultural production
– Constant threat of Sun Kewang’s betrayal

The Human Cost of War and Reconstruction

Local chronicles present conflicting perspectives on Liu Wenxiu’s administration. Scholar Li Fan’s “Yaan Memoirs” criticized the campaign as wasteful pageantry: “Though bearing the Yongli reign name, they remained bandits at heart.” His account highlights the burden placed on civilians through forced labor and requisitioned lands.

Yet other records suggest pragmatic governance. The Hongya County gazetteer documents Liu’s officials replacing monetary taxes with grain payments – an adaptation to Sichuan’s destroyed economy. Military-agricultural colonies (tuntian) emerged under commanders like Zheng Shoubao, attempting to revive farmland around Chongqing.

Eyewitness Shen Xunwei, whose family lands were confiscated for military use, provides the most poignant testimony. While resentful of personal losses, his account inadvertently reveals Liu’s systematic approach: selecting defensible positions, establishing administrative systems, and attempting long-term provisioning solutions.

The Abrupt Recall and Historical What-Ifs

The campaign’s potential was never fully realized. In February 1657, urgent summons from Kunming forced Liu Wenxiu to abandon Sichuan as Sun Kewang launched his rebellion. The retreating forces left behind Gao Cheng’en’s garrison, which maintained Southern Ming control over Ya’an until 1658 – a testament to Liu’s organizational achievements.

This premature withdrawal invites compelling counterfactuals:

– With three years of development (rather than eleven months), could Sichuan have become a sustainable base?
– Might coordination with the Eastern Sichuan loyalists (the “Thirteen Houses of Kuizhou”) have opened a second front?
– Would Qing forces under Wu Sangui have risked penetrating Sichuan without Sun Kewang’s defection?

Legacy of a Lost Opportunity

Liu Wenxiu’s Sichuan campaign represents both the Southern Ming’s strategic creativity and its fatal vulnerabilities. While failing to achieve its grand objectives, the operation demonstrated:

1. Adaptive military governance in devastated regions
2. Early attempts at economic-military integration
3. The critical importance of unity among resistance leaders

The ultimate tragedy lies in timing – had Sun Kewang’s betrayal occurred later, or had Liu been granted more time, the Sichuan foothold might have altered the Southern Ming’s fate. Instead, the aborted campaign became a footnote in the Qing conquest, remembered mainly through the stone steles and ruined headquarters that still dot Hongya’s landscape today.

Modern historians increasingly recognize this episode as a microcosm of the Southern Ming’s challenges: heroic efforts undermined by internal divisions, harsh logistics, and the relentless pressure of a rising dynasty. Liu Wenxiu’s unfinished work in Sichuan remains one of history’s intriguing “might-have-beens” – a campaign that nearly changed China’s seventeenth century.