The Mediterranean Chessboard: Pre-War Strategic Planning

As storm clouds gathered over Europe in the late 1930s, British and French military planners recognized the Mediterranean basin as a crucial theater in any coming conflict. Their joint strategy focused on maintaining control of the vital sea lanes while neutralizing Italian forces in Libya and Ethiopia. The plan assumed coordinated Anglo-French operations, but this careful preparation would be rendered obsolete by France’s sudden collapse in June 1940. Overnight, Britain found itself standing alone against the Axis powers across three continents, with woefully inadequate forces to defend its sprawling empire.

The Mediterranean’s strategic importance cannot be overstated. Through the Suez Canal flowed Britain’s imperial lifeline – the route to India, Australia, and the oilfields of the Middle East. Mussolini, eager to share in Hitler’s conquests, saw an opportunity to carve out his own Mediterranean empire while Britain appeared vulnerable. Italian forces in Africa outnumbered their British counterparts nearly ten to one, with over 500,000 troops mobilized across Libya and Italian East Africa (modern-day Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia).

Opening Moves: Italy’s African Offensives

On August 4, 1940, Italian forces launched their first major offensive from Ethiopia into British Somaliland. The campaign followed a predictable pattern – overwhelming numbers pushing back tiny British garrisons. Within three weeks, the Italians had conquered British Somaliland, forcing the 1,500 British and Commonwealth defenders to evacuate by sea. Simultaneously, Italian columns advanced into Sudan, capturing the border towns of Kassala and Gallabat, while another thrust took Moyale in Kenya.

However, these easy victories masked fundamental weaknesses. Italian supply lines stretched hundreds of miles through rugged terrain, while British-organized local resistance movements began harassing their communications. Most critically, the Italian advances lacked strategic focus – Mussolini had committed his forces to multiple objectives without the resources to sustain any single thrust decisively.

Britain’s Improvised Defense and Counterstroke

Facing imminent invasion of Egypt from Libya and complete collapse in East Africa, Britain’s Middle East Commander General Archibald Wavell performed logistical miracles. He reinforced Sudan and Kenya to 150,000 troops while bolstering Egypt’s defenses. The arrival of the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious at Alexandria in late August provided crucial air cover.

Wavell’s counteroffensive in January 1941 demonstrated masterful economy of force. With two understrength divisions, he launched simultaneous attacks into Eritrea from Sudan and Italian Somaliland from Kenya. The northern force fought a brutal month-long battle at Keren (March 1941) – one of the war’s forgotten epics – before breaking through to Asmara. Meanwhile, the southern column raced 1,700 miles in eight weeks, capturing Addis Ababa by April 6. By November, all Italian forces in East Africa had surrendered – the first complete Allied victory of the war.

The Desert War: Pendulum of Fortune

While East Africa was being secured, a more famous struggle unfolded in the Western Desert. In September 1940, Marshal Graziani’s Italian Tenth Army invaded Egypt with six divisions, advancing 60 miles before halting at Sidi Barrani. British Western Desert Force, though outnumbered, struck back in December with Operation Compass. Using bold flanking maneuvers through the desert, General Richard O’Connor’s troops destroyed the Italian army, advancing 500 miles and capturing 130,000 prisoners at minimal cost.

This stunning victory prompted Hitler’s fateful decision to send Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps to Libya in February 1941. Rommel’s arrival transformed the desert war. Ignoring orders to remain defensive, he launched a blistering offensive in April that drove the British back to the Egyptian border, isolating Tobruk. The siege that followed would last 242 days, becoming a symbol of Commonwealth resistance.

The Balkan Interlude: Mussolini’s Misadventure

While African campaigns raged, Mussolini sought his own conquests in the Balkans. On October 28, 1940, Italian forces invaded Greece from Albania without consulting Hitler. The operation proved disastrous. Greek forces not only halted the invasion but counterattacked into Albania, humiliating Mussolini and forcing Hitler to intervene. The German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece in April 1941 (Operation Marita) swiftly overran both countries, though the British evacuation from Crete in May allowed significant forces to escape.

The Balkan campaign had far-reaching consequences. It delayed Hitler’s invasion of Russia by five critical weeks while dispersing German forces. The heavy losses suffered by German paratroopers at Crete convinced Hitler to abandon large-scale airborne operations – a decision that would influence Allied planning for D-Day three years later.

Legacy of the Forgotten Fronts

These early war campaigns in Africa and the Balkans established patterns that would characterize the entire Mediterranean theater. Logistics proved decisive – both Rommel’s Afrika Korps and the British Eighth Army would spend as much time worrying about fuel supplies as battle tactics. The harsh desert environment created a unique warfare style where mobility and mechanical reliability mattered more than numbers.

Culturally, these battles forged military reputations. Rommel’s legend was born in the desert, while British commanders like Wavell and O’Connor demonstrated that properly led Commonwealth forces could defeat numerically superior enemies. The multicultural nature of the forces involved – British, Indian, Australian, New Zealand, South African, Free French, and later American troops fighting alongside Greek and Yugoslav partisans – made this the first truly global theater of the war.

Strategically, these campaigns kept the Mediterranean war alive during Britain’s darkest hours. While inconclusive compared to the Eastern Front or Normandy, they tied down Axis forces that might have been decisive elsewhere. The lessons learned about combined arms warfare, amphibious operations, and air-ground coordination would prove invaluable in later campaigns. Perhaps most importantly, these early victories gave Britain and the Commonwealth something increasingly rare in 1941-1942 – hope.