The Geopolitical Chessboard of 1880s East Asia

In the closing decades of the 19th century, the Korean Peninsula became the focal point of an intense geopolitical struggle involving regional powers and European empires. The Joseon Dynasty, long a tributary state of Qing China, found itself caught between competing visions for its future: Japan’s modernization agenda, Russia’s eastward expansion, and China’s attempts to maintain traditional suzerainty. This complex interplay reached a critical juncture in 1885 when secret maneuvers by King Gojong to seek Russian protection triggered alarm across diplomatic circles.

The strategic importance of Korea had grown exponentially following Japan’s 1876 Treaty of Ganghwa, which forcibly opened Korean ports. Western powers including the United States, Britain, and France soon established treaty relations, while Russia – expanding its Far Eastern territories with the founding of Vladivostok in 1860 – watched with growing interest. The peninsula represented both a buffer zone and potential springboard for regional dominance.

The Russian Gambit and Japanese Alarm

Tokyo’s shock in June 1885 was palpable when Acting Minister Kondo Masatake reported that German advisor Paul Georg von Möllendorff was conspiring with palace officials to send secret envoys to Vladivostok. Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru, perceiving this as existential threat, urgently summoned Qing diplomat Xu Chengzu on June 5. Inoue’s scathing assessment of King Gojong – comparing his governance to “childish behavior” – revealed Japan’s growing frustration with Joseon’s political instability.

The eight-point plan Inoue subsequently drafted (June 10) marked a watershed in Japan’s Korea policy:
1. Secret coordination between Tokyo and Li Hongzhang on all Korean matters
2. Restriction of royal authority and removal of palace officials from governance
3. Appointment of pro-reform ministers like Kim Hong-jip requiring Sino-Japanese approval
4. Centralization of foreign affairs, military, and finance under these ministers
5. Replacement of Möllendorff with an American advisor
6. Removal of ineffective Qing representative Chen Shutang
7. Li Hongzhang to appoint Chen’s replacement after consulting Japan
8. Close collaboration between new Qing representatives and Japanese diplomats

This bold proposal, presented to Li Hongzhang in July, sought to establish de facto joint oversight while maintaining Joseon’s nominal independence. Its rejection by Qing officials – particularly objections to shared personnel decisions – forced Japan to temporarily retreat from collaborative approaches.

Russia’s Strategic Pivot and the Second Act

Undeterred by earlier setbacks, Russia doubled down through new envoy Karl Waeber, who arrived in Seoul in October 1885 with revolutionary instructions:
– Establish Russian dominance surpassing other powers
– Cultivate absolute trust with Korean leadership
– Offer military and material support against threats to independence

Waeber’s November 1885 analysis identified shifting power dynamics: Japan’s waning influence post-1884 Gapsin Coup, British occupation of Geomun Island, and Qing’s reassertion through Yuan Shikai’s appointment as Resident-General. When Gojong secretly petitioned for Russian warships at Incheon in August 1886 – complaining of Yuan’s “oppression” – St Petersburg cautiously declined, wary of provoking Qing.

The Qing Counterplay and Great Power Diplomacy

Li Hongzhang’s response demonstrated Qing’s determination to maintain hegemony. The 1885 repatriation of conservative Daewongun (Gojong’s father) created internal checks on pro-Russian factions, while Yuan Shikai’s heavy-handed governance – including threats to depose Gojong – showcased Beijing’s hardening stance.

The 1886-1887 Russo-Qing negotiations revealed both powers’ cautious calculus. While agreeing in principle to preserve Korean independence, they deadlocked over Qing’s insistence on formal suzerainty recognition. Meanwhile, Britain’s February 1887 withdrawal from Geomun Island after Russian pressure demonstrated the complex great power balancing act.

The Strategic Retreat and Lasting Consequences

By 1888, Russian policymakers concluded that Korean annexation would be strategically disastrous. Foreign Minister Nikolay Giers’ assessment noted:
– Korea’s poverty offered minimal economic benefit
– Defensive challenges outweighed potential military advantages
– Occupation would irreparably damage relations with Qing and Japan

This pragmatic retreat allowed Japan to gradually assume the dominant position, culminating in the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War. The late Joseon period’s diplomatic struggles presaged Korea’s tragic 20th century experience as a pawn in great power rivalries, while highlighting the challenges smaller nations faced in maintaining sovereignty during the imperialist era. The 1880s maneuvering established patterns of external intervention that would ultimately lead to Korea’s colonization – a cautionary tale about the perils of geopolitical competition in vulnerable regions.