The Precarious Throne: Korea’s Struggle for Sovereignty

In the early 20th century, the Korean Empire found itself caught in an increasingly precarious position between expanding imperial powers. Following the Russo-Japanese War , Japan had established a protectorate over Korea through the Eulsa Treaty of 1905, effectively stripping Korea of its diplomatic sovereignty and establishing Japanese residency-general oversight. Emperor Gojong, though formally remaining on the throne, saw his power substantially diminished under the watchful eye of Japan’s first Resident-General, Itō Hirobumi.

This arrangement created profound tension within the Korean court. Emperor Gojong, who had ruled since 1864, found himself increasingly frustrated by Japanese encroachment on Korean sovereignty. Though outwardly compliant, he secretly sought avenues to reverse Korea’s diminishing independence. The international stage presented what appeared to be his best opportunity—the Second Hague Peace Conference scheduled for 1907, where world powers would gather to discuss international law and relations. For Gojong, this represented a potential lifeline to appeal directly to Western powers who might intervene on Korea’s behalf against Japanese expansionism.

The political climate in Korea during this period was one of quiet desperation mixed with patriotic fervor. Korean intellectuals and officials were divided between those who advocated accommodation with Japan and those who sought to preserve Korean independence at all costs. Gojong himself embodied this tension—officially bound by treaty obligations to Japan while secretly seeking restoration of full sovereignty.

A Desperate Gambit: The Secret Mission to The Hague

In late June 1907, Emperor Gojong made his boldest move yet against Japanese domination. He dispatched three secret emissaries—Yi Wi-jong, Yi Sang-seol, and Yi Jun—to the Netherlands with instructions to present Korea’s case at the Second Hague Peace Conference. Their mission was straightforward yet dangerous: convince the international community that the 1905 Eulsa Protectorate Treaty had been signed under duress and was therefore invalid under international law.

The emissaries carried official credentials from Gojong himself, designating them as legitimate representatives of the Korean Empire. Their journey to Europe was fraught with difficulty, requiring stealth and discretion to avoid detection by Japanese agents who monitored Korean officials closely. Upon arrival in The Hague, they immediately sought recognition as official delegates to the conference.

The conference organizers, however, faced a diplomatic dilemma. Japan, as a rising power and conference participant, insisted that Korea had no independent diplomatic status under the terms of the protectorate treaty. Western powers, while potentially sympathetic to Korea’s plight, were reluctant to challenge Japan’s growing influence in East Asia. The conference committee ultimately refused to recognize the Korean emissaries as official delegates, effectively silencing Korea’s appeal before it could even be heard.

Frustrated but undeterred, the emissaries took their case to the court of public opinion. They held press conferences, distributed statements to newspapers, and attempted to lobby conference delegates individually. Their public campaign highlighted what they characterized as Japanese coercion and violations of Korean sovereignty. This publicity effort, while unsuccessful in changing the conference’s official stance, did bring international attention to Korea’s predicament and embarrassed the Japanese government.

The Japanese Response: From Irritation to Retribution

News of the secret mission reached Japanese authorities through multiple channels. On July 2, 1907, the Japanese Foreign Ministry formally notified Resident-General Itō Hirobumi about the emissaries’ activities in The Hague. Ironically, historical evidence suggests that Itō had known about Gojong’s plans well before this official notification and had even warned the emperor against such action. The emperor’s decision to proceed despite these warnings infuriated Itō, who viewed it as both a personal betrayal and a direct challenge to Japanese authority.

Itō’s reaction was swift and severe. In a telegram to Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu on July 3, he proposed using the incident as justification for further encroachment on Korean sovereignty. Specifically, he suggested seizing control of Korea’s taxation system, military, and judicial authority—the remaining pillars of independent governance. This response reflected Itō’s growing frustration with what he perceived as Korean intransigence and his diminishing patience with the protectorate arrangement.

The Japanese government moved quickly to coordinate its response. On July 10, 1907, an important meeting convened including Elder Statesman Yamagata Aritomo, Prime-Minister-designate Katsura Tarō, Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi, Home Minister Hara Takashi, Foreign Minister Hayashi, and Army Minister Terauchi Masatake. This gathering of Japan’s most powerful leaders demonstrated the seriousness with which they viewed the Hague incident.

The meeting produced a decisive plan: Japan would assume direct control over Korean internal affairs. If this proved impractical, they would install Japanese officials within the Korean cabinet or require that all cabinet appointments receive prior approval from the Resident-General. Most significantly, the participants agreed to entrust Itō with implementing these measures as he saw fit, giving him considerable latitude in dealing with the situation.

The Abdication Crisis: Removing an Uncooperative Monarch

The discussion among Japanese leaders inevitably turned to the question of Emperor Gojong himself. Home Minister Hara Takashi suggested that forcing Gojong’s abdication might be necessary, noting that “the ultimate objective had been decided when Korea became a protectorate”—a carefully worded statement that hinted at eventual annexation without explicitly committing to it. This ambiguous language reflected ongoing debates within Japanese leadership about how far to push their control over Korea.

Military leaders like Yamagata Aritomo and Army Minister Terauchi Masatake advocated for more extreme measures, proposing that Gojong should surrender his throne directly to the Japanese emperor. However, they acknowledged that such a bold move could not be implemented immediately, indicating both strategic caution and some reluctance to confront Itō, who still favored a more gradual approach.

The pressure on Gojong intensified rapidly. After the Korean cabinet—under significant duress—approved the abdication proposal, Prime Minister Lee Wan-yong personally presented the motion to Gojong on July 16. The emperor initially resisted, but facing overwhelming pressure and limited options, he finally relented on July 19, 1907. His son, Sunjong , ascended to the throne, though his reign would prove even more constrained than his father’s.

Historical records reveal interesting insights into Itō’s thinking during this period. On July 20, the day after Gojong’s abdication, Itō met with Ogawa Heikichi, a hardline member of Japan’s Diet who advocated for immediate annexation of Korea. Their conversation, preserved in Ogawa’s papers, reveals Itō’s pragmatic concerns about annexation. He acknowledged that international conditions might permit such action but expressed worry about the financial burden of directly administering Korea. More interestingly, he noted that Korea had historically been an independent nation and warned that “extreme measures implemented too hastily might plant seeds of future trouble.”

The Third Japan-Korea Agreement: Formalizing Control

The political upheaval surrounding the Hague incident and Gojong’s abdication created the perfect pretext for Japan to formalize and expand its control over Korea. On July 24, 1907, just days after the emperor’s forced resignation, Itō pushed through the Third Japan-Korea Agreement, which dramatically expanded Japanese authority over Korean affairs.

This agreement contained several devastating provisions for Korean sovereignty: the Korean emperor’s decrees required prior consultation with the Resident-General; all “administrative reforms” would be conducted under Itō’s guidance; laws and major administrative decisions needed the Resident-General’s approval; the judiciary was separated from general administration; official appointments required Itō’s consent; Japanese officials recommended by Itō would be appointed to Korean government positions; and Korea could not hire foreigners without Japanese approval.

An accompanying memorandum contained an even more devastating provision: the complete disbanding of the Korean military. This decision, which eliminated Korea’s last organized means of resistance, would have immediate and violent consequences.

The agreement represented a fundamental shift in Japan’s approach to Korea. Where previous agreements had established Japanese oversight, this one effectively transferred actual governance to Japanese authorities while maintaining the fiction of Korean administration. Itō, who had initially advocated for a more gradual approach to Japanese influence, now found himself implementing the very policies he had once cautioned against.

In a revealing moment preserved in historical documents, Itō confessed to Ogawa around this time that “until now, I’ve come to understand that my initial thinking was mistaken.” This admission suggests that the Hague incident had fundamentally changed Itō’s assessment of what was required to maintain Japanese control over Korea.

The Violent Aftermath: The Righteous Army Movement

The dissolution of the Korean military on August 1, 1907, proved to be the catalyst for widespread armed resistance. Korean soldiers, suddenly stripped of their positions and dignity, joined with peasants, scholars, and former officials to form guerrilla units known as the “Righteous Armies.” These resistance fighters launched what would become known as the Righteous Army Movement, a nationwide uprising against Japanese rule that would continue for years.

The rebellion presented Itō with precisely the kind of troubles he had feared. Rather than a compliant population accepting Japanese guidance, he now faced determined armed resistance across the Korean countryside. The Japanese military response was predictably brutal, involving scorched-earth tactics, mass arrests, and public executions designed to terrorize the population into submission.

Itō’s frustration with the situation became increasingly evident. In a speech to journalists at the Seoul Japanese Club on July 29, he expressed unusual candor about his difficulties, complaining about Korean Confucian scholars and noting that “administering government in Korea is absolutely not easy. So I’m thinking it might be about time for me to take my leave.” This statement from the normally composed diplomat revealed the tremendous pressure he was under and his growing disillusionment with the Korean project.

The Righteous Army Movement reached its peak in July 1908, nearly a year after it began. Though ultimately suppressed through overwhelming Japanese military force, the rebellion demonstrated the depth of Korean resistance to foreign domination and became an important symbol for later independence movements.

Strategic Calculations: The Debate Over Annexation

The Hague incident and its aftermath accelerated Japanese discussions about Korea’s ultimate status. Itō’s previously expressed reservations about annexation began to weaken under the pressure of events. By April 1909, he would give his consent to Prime Minister Katsura and Foreign Minister Komura’s proposal for formal annexation, despite the fact that Japan’s financial situation had not improved—contradicting his earlier stated concern about the economic burden of direct rule.

This evolution in Itō’s thinking suggests that his previously expressed reservations about annexation may have been strategic rather than philosophical. By emphasizing practical concerns like financial cost, he may have been attempting to manage hardline factions within Japan’s leadership while gradually moving toward the outcome they desired. His assassination by Korean independence activist An Jung-geun in October 1909 would remove one of the last significant voices urging caution in Japan’s Korea policy, paving the way for formal annexation in 1910.

The historical evidence suggests that figures like Yamagata Aritomo and other military leaders had been contemplating annexation well before the Hague incident, viewing the protectorate as merely a stepping stone to full incorporation. The emissary affair provided them with the perfect pretext to accelerate their timeline and overcome Itō’s reservations.

Legacy and Historical Significance

The Hague Secret Emissary Affair represents a critical turning point in Korea’s transition from protectorate to colony. Emperor Gojong’s desperate attempt to appeal to international opinion backfired spectacularly, providing Japan with the justification it needed to eliminate Korea’s remaining sovereignty and military capacity.

The incident demonstrates the limited effectiveness of diplomatic appeals in an era of imperial expansion. Western powers, despite their rhetorical commitment to international law and sovereignty, proved unwilling to challenge Japan’s growing influence in Northeast Asia. This failure of international protection would resonate throughout Korea’s colonial period and influence its postwar foreign policy decisions.

For Japan, the affair highlighted the challenges of colonial administration and the limitations of indirect rule. The brutal suppression of the Righteous Army Movement established patterns that would characterize Japan’s colonial administration throughout its empire. The financial costs that concerned Itō proved prescient—Japan would indeed invest substantial resources in controlling Korea, though it would also exploit Korean resources and labor to offset these expenses.

Most importantly, the Hague incident and its aftermath became powerful symbols in Korean nationalist narratives. The courage of the emissaries and the resistance of the Righteous Armies entered Korean historical memory as examples of patriotic resistance against overwhelming odds. These stories would fuel independence movements throughout the colonial period and shape Korea’s modern national identity.

The complex figure of Itō Hirobumi embodies the contradictions of this period. A sophisticated statesman who understood international diplomacy, he nevertheless implemented policies that destroyed Korean sovereignty. His assassination by a Korean nationalist would make him a martyr in Japan and a villain in Korea, illustrating how the same historical events can generate completely opposing narratives in different national contexts.

The Hague Secret Emissary Affair thus stands as a watershed moment—the point at which Korea’s subjugation became inevitable, Japan’s imperial ambitions became undeniable, and the tragic course of early 20th century East Asian history was set. Its legacy continues to influence how Japan and Korea remember this period and relate to each other in the present day.