The Birth of Military Historiography After Conflict

In the wake of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), both imperial powers embarked on unprecedented projects of military self-examination through official war histories. The Russian Army established its War History Committee under the General Staff in September 1906, chaired by General Vasily Lomeyko-Gurko with eight major generals and colonels as members. This committee would produce the monumental 9-volume, 16-book series “The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905” by 1910 – a work remarkable for its critical analysis and thorough documentation.

The first volume focused on “Eastern Affairs Before the Russo-Japanese War and Preparations for the Conflict,” spearheaded by the brilliant but controversial military historian Major General Shchepansky. Born in 1866 and educated at the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff, Shchepansky had established himself as Russia’s premier military historian through works on the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), biographies of Suvorov, and studies of the Siege of Plevna during the Russo-Turkish War. Though disciplined for his troops’ refusal to fire on Moscow protesters in 1905, his scholarly reputation secured him a place on the war history commission in 1907.

Shchepansky’s Monumental Secret Study

Shchepansky’s three-volume investigation “Eastern Affairs Before the Russo-Japanese War” represented the pinnacle of pre-revolutionary Russian military historiography. Drawing from classified Foreign Ministry, Army, and Navy archives along with personal interviews, his 791-page study broke new ground:

– Volume 1: Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea (1890s)
– Volume 2: Conflict in China (1900-1902)
– Volume 3: The final prewar year (1903)

The work displayed a clear historiographical stance – critical of War Minister Kuropatkin while sympathetic to the “forward policy” advocates like Bezobrazov and Vogak. However, its extensive use of state secrets led Foreign Minister Izvolsky to block publication. Only seven copies were printed for restricted circulation, condemning this masterpiece to obscurity until its partial rediscovery in the 1990s.

Naval Histories and Institutional Self-Criticism

Russia’s Naval General Staff proved equally rigorous in its postwar analysis. Between 1907-1914, it published the 9-volume “Naval Operations” documentary collection, followed by the 7-volume “Russo-Japanese War at Sea” (1912-1917) which incorporated Japanese sources. These works subjected Russia’s naval leadership to withering scrutiny:

– Questioning the choice of Port Arthur over Vladivostok as main base
– Critically examining the doomed voyage of the Second Pacific Squadron
– Analyzing command failures under Admiral Rozhestvensky

The naval histories exemplified the Russian military’s remarkable willingness to confront painful truths in the war’s aftermath – a stark contrast to developments in Japan.

Japan’s Dual Historiography: Public Myths and Secret Truths

Victorious Japan developed a bifurcated approach to war documentation. Publicly, it cultivated a mythologized narrative of triumph while secretly compiling far more critical internal studies.

The Navy began war history preparations before hostilities even commenced. Vice Admiral Ijuin Goro ordered detailed record-keeping on January 28, 1904, explicitly for future historiography. Postwar efforts produced:

– The 150-volume “Top Secret Naval War History” (1911)
– A sanitized 4-volume public version (1909-1910)
– Complete translations of Russian naval histories

The Army followed suit with:
– A 10-volume official history (1912-1915)
– Secret supplementary volumes covering sensitive matters
– Extensive documentation including 34 volumes of “Historical Materials”

This institutional secrecy created what historian Shiba Ryotaro called “the absolutization of victory” that turned Japan’s military success into “a kind of religious belief,” ultimately distorting national understanding of the war.

Revolutionary Revelations: Soviet Historiography

The Russian Revolution (1917) opened imperial archives, transforming war scholarship. Key developments included:

– Publication of Kuropatkin’s diaries (1922-1923)
– Historian Mikhail Pokrovsky’s release of suppressed documents
– Boris Romanov’s groundbreaking “Russia in Manchuria” (1928)

Romanov revolutionized understanding by:
– Challenging the “Vitte as peacemaker” myth
– Demonstrating continuity between Vitte’s and Bezobrazov’s policies
– Arguing for systemic Russian responsibility

The Soviet lens increasingly emphasized Japanese aggression, especially after the 1931 Manchurian Incident. Military theorist Svechin analyzed Japanese strategic culture but fell victim to Stalin’s purges in 1938.

Cold War Scholarship and New Discoveries

Post-WWII research continued evolving:

– Romanov’s 1947 diplomatic history (expanded 1955)
– Narochitsky’s 900-page colonial policy study (1956)
– Rostov’s 1977 military history
– Korean scholars’ work on Russo-Korean relations

The 1990s saw major breakthroughs:
– Partial rediscovery of Shchepansky’s work
– Igor Lukoianov’s post-Soviet archival research
– Western studies incorporating new Russian sources

Enduring Legacies and Unanswered Questions

The Russo-Japanese War histories reveal how nations process military trauma:

– Russia’s remarkable critical tradition versus Japan’s myth-making
– The tension between institutional transparency and national narratives
– How archival access transforms historical understanding

Shchepansky’s lost masterpiece symbolizes the incomplete nature of our knowledge – even a century later, historians continue uncovering new dimensions of this pivotal conflict that reshaped Asian geopolitics and foreshadowed 20th century total war. The competing Russian and Japanese approaches to documenting their shared war experience offer enduring lessons about historical memory, national identity, and the complex relationship between truth and power.