The Historical Backdrop: France in Crisis

The year 1870 found France in a precarious position, both politically and militarily. Emperor Napoleon III’s Second Empire had entered a period of decline, with growing domestic discontent and increasing international isolation. The immediate catalyst for conflict emerged from diplomatic tensions over the Spanish succession, which Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck skillfully manipulated into a casus belli. France declared war on Prussia on July 19, 1870, with expectations of a quick victory that rapidly evaporated as Prussian forces demonstrated superior organization, tactics, and artillery.

The early weeks of the Franco-Prussian War brought a series of devastating French defeats at Wissembourg, Spicheren, and Wörth. The situation deteriorated further when Marshal Bazaine’s Army of the Rhine became trapped at Metz in mid-August. Napoleon III himself, along with Marshal MacMahon’s Army of Châlons, marched toward Metz only to be encircled and defeated at the Battle of Sedan on September 1-2. The emperor’s surrender marked the collapse of the Second Empire and created a power vacuum in Paris, where a Government of National Defense proclaimed the Third Republic on September 4.

As Prussian forces advanced toward the capital, Paris prepared for siege. The city’s fortifications, expanded under Adolphe Thiers in the 1840s, consisted of 94 bastions and a 34-kilometer wall. Within these defenses, the regular French forces available included approximately 100,000 soldiers from various units, supplemented by the Garde Mobile . It was this latter force—the Paris National Guard—that would become both the hope and despair of the besieged city.

Composition and Character of the Paris National Guard

The Paris National Guard of 1870 was a curious institution with roots stretching back to the French Revolution. Originally created in 1789 as a bourgeois militia to maintain order, it had undergone numerous transformations throughout the 19th century, alternately being suppressed and revived depending on the political climate. Following the February Revolution of 1848, the National Guard had been expanded to include working-class elements, making it both more democratic and more politically volatile.

By the time of the Prussian siege, the National Guard had swollen to approximately 300,000 men, organized into 254 battalions. On paper, this represented a formidable force, but in reality, it suffered from fundamental weaknesses. The guard consisted largely of untrained civilians with minimal military experience, drawn from diverse social backgrounds and political persuasions. While some battalions from wealthier arrondissements maintained better discipline and equipment, those from working-class districts like Belleville exhibited pronounced radical tendencies and resistance to military authority.

The guard did include some competent officers with genuine military experience, such as Arthur de Fonvielle. The brother of balloonist Wilfred de Fonvielle, Arthur had fought with the Circassian resistance leader Imam Shamil against Russian forces in the Caucasus during the 1850s. Such professionals were unfortunately the exception rather than the rule. Most officers were elected by their troops—a democratic practice that undermined military hierarchy and discipline.

The Siege Begins: Drunkenness and Disobedience

As the Prussian encirclement tightened in September 1870, the reality of siege life began to set in for Parisians. The National Guard found itself assigned to two primary duties: manning the city’s fortifications and maintaining internal order. Both tasks proved problematic for the ill-disciplined force.

Alcoholism emerged as a pervasive issue almost immediately. With normal civilian life disrupted and the anxiety of siege conditions prevailing, many guardsmen turned to drink. The problem became so severe that it compromised military effectiveness. One notable incident involved a National Guard battalion sent to relieve the exhausted defenders of Fort Issy. The fort’s commander sent them back the following day, explaining that they had arrived drunk and spent the night brawling among themselves. He preferred to keep his weary regular soldiers on duty rather than rely on such unreliable reinforcements.

Another telling episode involved the 200th Battalion, which arrived at Créteil during the major sortie in November 1870. The unit became so intoxicated that General Thomas himself had to intervene and send them back to the rear lines. The hot-tempered veteran subsequently made this battalion a public example, declaring that the National Guard in such condition represented an additional threat rather than a defense. According to contemporary accounts, this act would effectively “sign his death warrant” when the Paris Commune emerged months later.

Attempts to address the discipline problems met with limited success. One naval officer tried sending drunkards to dangerous outposts for several nights as a corrective measure, but such approaches were exceptional. More typically, guardsmen simply refused orders they found inconvenient. A grocer once declined sentry duty because “it was cold and wet,” while the entire 147th Battalion refused to man forward outposts because their wives had not received the expected allowances during their previous deployment.

Ideological Resistance to Military Discipline

The disciplinary problems within the National Guard were not merely practical but also ideological. Many guardsmen, particularly those from radical political backgrounds, viewed military discipline with suspicion or outright hostility. At the Favier Club, an orator demonstrated what one observer called “extraordinary logic” when questioning the value of discipline following the dissolution of Flourens’ sharpshooter units: “What use is discipline? How has it served us? It caused us to be defeated by the Prussians. It was the disciplined troops who were defeated at Reichshoffen, Forbach, and Sedan; it was the disciplined troops who surrendered at Metz.”

This attitude reflected a broader political context in which the regular army was associated with the defeated Second Empire, while the National Guard represented the republican spirit of resistance. The tension between military effectiveness and democratic principles would plague the guard throughout the siege and contribute significantly to its military failures.

A Soldier’s Diary: The Reality of Service

The diary of Edwin Child, a guardsman serving during the siege, provides a ground-level view of the National Guard’s experience. His entries from early December 1870 capture the combination of boredom, discomfort, and occasional excitement that characterized service:

December 1: Rose at 7. Assembled at 8 at our company’s usual meeting place . We then marched to the Champs-Élysées behind the Palais de l’Industrie, met three other companies, and conducted about two hours of “battalion drill” under our battalion commander. Returned several pairs of trousers in the afternoon for alterations due to various reasons—mostly because they were too large…

December 2: Rose at 7. Full company assembly at 8, but no training—just some advice and warnings from our captain. At 2 PM, we were ordered to collect our “greatcoats”… After collecting coats at 2, we were ordered to be in full kit—coats, backpacks—within half an hour and proceed to the Madeleine, where we remained under arms, hour after hour, waiting for marching orders until 7 PM, when we received ammunition and learned to prepare for a 3:30 AM departure. Having stood nearly 8 hours without movement, most were frozen stiff, and order was not particularly good.

December 3: Rose at quarter to 3. Went to the Madeleine in full equipment but met there by the sergeant who told us the operation was cancelled. I wasn’t particularly annoyed—it had snowed most of the night—and returned to bed without complaint. Rose again at 8, prepared a second time for action , went to our assembly point, and received orders to rest at home but remain ready to move…

December 4: Rose at 7. Had a good breakfast cheerfully, then walked to our assembly point, from there to the Madeleine, stayed about an hour, but finally around 10:30 heard the long-awaited command: “Battalion! By half-platoons, form up! Forward march!” Then, with drums and smiles, we marched nicely on the road to glory, passing through Rue de Rivoli and the Bastille, leaving Paris through the Porte de Charenton…

Child’s battalion eventually reached Créteil-sur-Marne, where they encountered defeated troops retreating toward Paris. The operation was terminated, and the guardsmen found themselves in a static position. Subsequent entries reveal the alternating monotony and tension of frontline duty:

December 5: …At 1 PM we underwent arms inspection in full kit. Afterwards strolled along the Marne, watching artillery and mobile guards crossing via a pontoon bridge—a very beautiful picture on this clear, cold day with a flawlessly blue sky; afterwards, I searched around for something to soften my bed…

December 6: …An amateur concert was held at dusk , I did my duty by teaching them “Rule Britannia.” We learned that the enemy might attack at any moment, so we slept only intermittently…

By December 11, Child had been at the front for several days, experiencing the strange combination of extreme danger and extreme boredom that characterized the siege warfare around Paris.

Military Operations and Failures

The major sortie of late November and early December 1870 represented one of the largest attempts to break the Prussian encirclement. The plan called for a three-pronged attack: the Army of the Loire would advance from the south while General Ducrot led forces from Paris toward the Marne valley. The National Guard was meant to play a supporting role in these operations.

In practice, the sortie proved disastrous. The Belleville battalions, despite their revolutionary rhetoric, fled at the first artillery bombardment. Other National Guard units performed similarly at the Second Battle of Le Bourget. These failures resulted from inadequate training, poor leadership, and low morale exacerbated by the previously mentioned disciplinary problems.

The regular military command grew increasingly frustrated with the National Guard’s unreliability. General Louis Jules Trochu, president of the Government of National Defense and military governor of Paris, had always been skeptical about the guard’s military value. The sortie’s failure confirmed his doubts and those of other professional officers.

Social and Cultural Impact on Paris

The National Guard’s presence had profound effects on Parisian society during the siege. As the most visible armed force within the city, it became a political entity as much as a military one. The practice of paying guardsmen 1.50 francs per day provided crucial income for many working-class families while creating a form of dependence on the institution.

The guard’s political clubs and battalion committees became centers of radical discourse, particularly in working-class neighborhoods. This political activation would have significant consequences after the siege ended, contributing directly to the Paris Commune of spring 1871.

Culturally, the guard embodied the contradictions of the besieged city—simultaneously representing patriotic resistance and military incompetence, revolutionary fervor and personal dissipation. Parisians developed ambivalent attitudes toward the force: appreciating its role in defense while recognizing its limitations.

Legacy and Historical Significance

The Paris National Guard of 1870-1871 left a complex legacy that influenced French military and political development for decades. Its failures during the siege demonstrated the limitations of citizen soldiers without proper training and discipline, contributing to later French military reforms that emphasized professionalization.

Politically, the radicalization of the National Guard during the siege directly fed into the Paris Commune. When the national government attempted to disarm the guard in March 1871, the result was open rebellion and the establishment of the revolutionary commune. The brutal suppression of the commune in May 1871 marked the effective end of the National Guard as a significant political force, though the institution would be formally dissolved only in 1872.

The memory of the National Guard’s dual nature—both heroic defender and unreliable rabble—entered French historical consciousness as a cautionary tale about the challenges of combining democratic participation with military effectiveness. Contemporary debates about citizen soldiers, reserve forces, and the relationship between military and civil society still echo the experiences of 1870.

The story of the Paris National Guard during the Prussian siege remains relevant today as societies continue to grapple with questions of how to balance military professionalism with democratic values, and how to maintain discipline and effectiveness in citizen-based defense forces. The drunken, disorderly, but ultimately human guardsmen of 1870 remind us that the spirit of resistance must be paired with practical competence to be truly effective in defending what we value.