A Divided Empire in Crisis

The spring of 1644 marked a pivotal moment in Chinese history as the Ming dynasty collapsed under multiple pressures. When rebel leader Li Zicheng captured Beijing in April, prompting the Chongzhen Emperor’s suicide, the Ming imperial clan fled southward. In Nanjing, Prince Fu established the Hongguang regime, creating a rump Ming state that historians would later call the Southern Ming. This fledgling government faced an impossible strategic dilemma: how to confront both the peasant rebels who had toppled Beijing and the rising Manchu forces that had already breached the Great Wall.

Historical scholarship remains divided about the primary contradiction of this era. Some argue ethnic conflict between Han Chinese and Manchu invaders became dominant after the fall of Beijing, while others maintain class struggle between peasants and landlords remained central. The Hongguang Court’s disastrous policy choices would ultimately resolve this debate through tragic consequences.

The “Borrowing Barbarians” Doctrine Takes Shape

During its brief existence from June 1644 to June 1645, the Hongguang regime became obsessed with what officials termed “allying with the northern barbarians to pacify the bandits” (借虏平寇). This strategy had intellectual roots in earlier Ming crises. During the 1630s, Grand Secretary Yang Sichang had proposed “expelling external threats by first securing internal order,” advocating truce with the Manchus to focus on suppressing peasant rebellions.

By 1644, this concept evolved into something more dangerous. Advisors like Mao Yuanyi and Yao Kang studied Tang dynasty precedents where rulers employed foreign troops against domestic rebels. Their treatises – though lacking scholarly merit – circulated among Hongguang officials, promoting the seductive idea that borrowing Manchu military power could crush Li Zicheng’s peasant army while preserving Southern Ming rule.

The policy gained momentum after news arrived that Ming general Wu Sangui had allied with Manchu forces to defeat Li Zicheng at Shanhai Pass. Misreading this as Wu heroically “borrowing” Qing troops rather than submitting to them, the Hongguang Court showered Wu with honors. Grand Secretary Ma Shiying enthusiastically proposed supplying Wu’s forces, seeing this as opening diplomatic channels with the Manchus. On May 28, the court enfeoffed Wu as Duke of Ji, sending silver, rice and ceremonial robes – unaware Wu had already sworn allegiance to the Qing as their “Pacified Western Prince.”

Strategic Delusions and Missed Opportunities

The Hongguang leadership’s miscalculations reached breathtaking proportions. Chief Minister Shi Kefa memorialized in June 1644 that since the Manchus had “killed bandits to avenge us,” the court should “grant them righteous recognition” and “borrow their strong military power to exterminate the ugly mob.” Left Censor Liu Zongzhou similarly advocated sending envoys north to “imitate the righteous example of Bao Xu” (a Spring and Autumn period figure who sought foreign aid to restore his ruler).

While senior officials fantasized about Manchu allies, some junior officers recognized the peril. Censor Zhang Zhengchen warned: “Today the Jiangzuo situation is more precarious than during the Jin or Song dynasties…if we don’t prepare now, the barbarians will surely point their bows southward.” He criticized the court’s passive strategy as “destroying the morale of loyal officials and righteous scholars.” Another official, Ma Jiazhi, cautioned that “inviting Turkic or Khitan troops” had historically brought disaster.

By July 1644, as the court debated sending envoys to the Qing, military advisor Chen Zilong argued forcefully for self-strengthening over dependence. His memorial outlined a sophisticated strategy: while temporary appeasement might be necessary, the Southern Ming should simultaneously prepare its own forces to strike when the Qing became preoccupied elsewhere. “If we rely solely on others’ strength,” he warned, “we will only exacerbate our crisis” – citing Song dynasty precedents where borrowing Jin forces against the Liao or Mongol troops against the Jin had led to catastrophe.

The Collapse of Strategic Alternatives

Chen’s proposals found no traction because the Hongguang regime’s military foundation – the Four Guardian Armies – showed no interest in northern campaigns. These mercenary forces, instrumental in installing the Hongguang Emperor, cared only about maintaining their Jiangnan bases. Meanwhile, factional infighting consumed Nanjing’s energy.

The strategic window was closing fast. After Li Zicheng’s retreat west, vast territories in Shandong and Henan lay vulnerable. Local gentry had risen against peasant rebel administrators, hoping to restore Ming authority. Eyewitness Zhang Yi described how Shandong communities organized militia, “looking southward for imperial troops like crops awaiting rain.” But no Southern Ming forces arrived. Zheng Yuqiao, a Shandong resistance leader, lamented: “The Jiangnan rulers squabble like mice fighting in a hole…ignoring our shared hatred against the bandit rebels.”

By autumn 1644, the consequences became irreversible. Without military support, Shandong gentry like Zhu Guang and Pan Shiliang submitted to Qing authority. A Southern Ming envoy reported: “Shandong’s popular sentiment could still be rallied…but our appointed governors never arrived.” Even Shi Kefa acknowledged failure in a September memorial, admitting northern territories were lost because “our troops remained idle south of the Huai.” His solution – recruiting northern refugees rather than contesting territory – revealed the regime’s fatal timidity.

The Fatal Consequences

The Hongguang Court’s paralysis allowed the Qing to consolidate control over northern China virtually unopposed. Former Ming official Ling Jiong typified the confusion, alternately serving both regimes before belatedly resisting the Qing – too late to avoid execution. Southern Ming appointments like Shandong Governor Wang Xie dared not assume office, while “Governor” Liu Zeqing used his troops only for personal vendettas before retreating south.

Contemporary observers recognized the tragedy. Scholar-official Yang Shicong noted the Qing took Shandong with minimal forces: “Had the Southern Court sent just one thousand troops across the Yellow River first, how could Shandong have fallen?” Retired Grand Secretary Jiang Dejing criticized the regime’s passive strategy, arguing this wasn’t like the Southern Song – with the Qing distracted and northern gentry eager to support the Ming, recovery was possible “if civil and military officials united their efforts.”

Instead, the Hongguang regime squandered its opportunity, consumed by internal power struggles while clinging to the delusion that the Qing would remain satisfied with northern conquests. By spring 1645, when Qing forces turned south, the Southern Ming’s “borrowed time” expired. The Yangzi defenses collapsed, Nanjing fell, and the Hongguang Emperor was captured – all consequences flowing from that original fatal miscalculation to “borrow barbarians against bandits” rather than build genuine strength.

Historical Legacy and Lessons

The Hongguang debacle illustrates how strategic misdiagnosis can prove fatal for regimes in crisis. By misidentifying peasant rebels as the primary threat while underestimating Manchu ambitions, Southern Ming leaders pursued policies that ensured their destruction. Their failure to recognize shifting power dynamics – that the Qing represented not potential allies but existential threats – doomed China to nearly three centuries of alien rule.

Modern historians continue debating whether ethnic or class conflict dominated this transitional period. The Hongguang experience suggests the answer lies in their intersection: a regime representing landlord class interests became so fixated on suppressing peasant rebellion that it blinded itself to the greater danger of foreign conquest. In the end, neither “bandits” nor “barbarians” were pacified – only the Ming itself was destroyed.