The Fragile Alliances of a Continent on the Brink

In the summer of 1914, Europe stood at a crossroads between peace and catastrophe. The intricate web of alliances that had maintained a precarious balance of power for decades was unraveling under the weight of nationalist tensions and imperial rivalries. Germany found itself tethered to the declining Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose internal crises made it an increasingly unreliable partner. Emperor Franz Joseph, the 83-year-old Habsburg monarch who had ruled since 1848, remained the sole unifying figure holding together a fractious multi-ethnic empire through sheer force of habit, bureaucracy, and military tradition.

The most volatile relationship in European geopolitics existed between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Two Balkan Wars had significantly weakened the Habsburg monarchy while strengthening Serbian ambitions. Though Vienna had forced Belgrade to withdraw from Albania in October 1913 with German, Italian, and even British support, Serbia increasingly looked to Russia for backing. Russian minister Nikolai Hartvig, an ardent Pan-Slavist in Belgrade, never missed an opportunity to encourage Serbian nationalist aspirations.

The Powder Keg of Serbian Nationalism

The Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913 had expanded Serbian territory, which Serbian nationalists viewed as merely a stepping stone toward their ultimate goal: a “Greater Serbia” encompassing all Serbian settlements as well as Croatian territories, despite linguistic differences in script. More radical visions included absorbing Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Muslim Bosniaks outnumbered Orthodox Serbs. This expansionist ideology found violent expression through secret societies like “Unification or Death” (better known as the Black Hand) and its affiliated youth organization Young Bosnia.

Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, head of Serbian military intelligence and a Black Hand leader, coordinated military training for Serbian revolutionaries. The extent of official Serbian government or Russian police involvement in Black Hand terrorist activities remains unclear, but the organization clearly directed Young Bosnia’s operations – including the assassination of the Austrian heir apparent in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, the 525th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo that formed the cornerstone of Serbian national mythology.

The Assassination That Shook Europe

The decision to have Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie parade through Sarajevo in an open-top car during the tense summer of 1914 proved recklessly irresponsible. Worse still, authorities published the royal couple’s route in advance. Six assassins lay in wait along the procession, and one – Gavrilo Princip – succeeded in shooting the archduke and his wife at close range.

All evidence pointed to Serbian perpetrators, and Vienna immediately held Belgrade’s government at least partially responsible. Austria had long harbored a “war party” convinced that only military force could solve the Serbian problem – a mirror image of hawkish factions in Belgrade. Chief of Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf led this influential faction, which enjoyed strong media support across Austria and Hungary. In contrast, Foreign Minister Count Berchtold advocated peaceful coexistence based on the murdered archduke’s vision of a tripartite empire harmoniously uniting Germans, Hungarians, and Slavs. In the assassination’s immediate aftermath, Berchtold, Prime Minister Stürgkh, and Emperor Franz Joseph urged caution, insisting on awaiting investigation results before issuing demands to Serbia.

The German Blank Check

Determining Germany’s stance became crucial, as war with Serbia would likely mean war with Russia. The 1879 Dual Alliance bound Germany and Austria-Hungary together, reinforced by shared history, language, and culture. As two Central European powers, Germany could only expand its regional influence in partnership with the Habsburg monarchy. Even Conrad awaited Berlin’s position before deciding Austria’s next move – no one in Vienna wanted to confront Serbia alone.

During July’s first week, Vienna and Berlin decided to prepare for war against Serbia. On July 2, Franz Joseph informed Wilhelm II that Austria-Hungary would work to “isolate Serbia and reduce its territory,” eliminating it as a Balkan power factor and pivot of Pan-Slavic politics. The kaiser had already scribbled “Now or never!” in the margin of a report from his Vienna ambassador on June 30. By July 6, Berchtold learned that Wilhelm II and Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg agreed: Germany promised unshakable alliance support, giving Austria free rein against Serbia while strongly advocating “immediate intervention” as the most radical and best solution to Balkan problems.

Berlin urged speed to capitalize on Europe’s pro-Austrian sentiment following the Sarajevo murders. A quick Austrian military victory might deter Russian intervention. But if tsarist Russia sided with Belgrade, it must appear as the aggressor – only then could German leaders hope to persuade Social Democrats that supporting Austria was imperative. Should conflict not remain localized, a European war would erupt pitting Germany and Austria against Russia, France, and likely Britain.

The March Toward Catastrophe

Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg didn’t truly believe Britain would remain neutral if war came (despite occasional statements to the contrary). The 1904 and 1907 Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian agreements followed traditional “balance of power” logic. More significantly, German strategy since 1905 – the Schlieffen Plan calling for attacking France through neutral Belgium – made British involvement inevitable if implemented. The plan represented military thinking’s triumph over political considerations.

While Bethmann rejected arguments that Germany needed war to solve domestic problems by sidelining Social Democrats, he accepted military claims that 1914 offered better victory odds than later years, when the Entente powers – especially Russia – would grow stronger through military expansion.

By early July, the chancellor still didn’t consider major war inevitable: Russian backing down would mean a great diplomatic success for the Central Powers. But tsarist capitulation was far from certain. When Bethmann gave Austria a blank check on July 6 while urging quick action, he took a tremendous gamble. Under different circumstances – facing right-wing criticism for indecisiveness – he might have acted differently. But by July 1914, pressure from the kaiser and military, especially Chief of Staff Moltke, left even a stronger chancellor little room to resist.

The Final Countdown

In Vienna, two weeks after the Sarajevo murders, nearly everyone had become part of the “war party,” with only Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza in Budapest expressing doubts. German support proved decisive for those long convinced that war with Serbia offered the only hope of saving the Habsburg monarchy. Avoiding confrontation would confirm Austria-Hungary’s decline as a serious power, making the multi-ethnic empire’s disintegration only a matter of time – the rationale behind Vienna’s July Crisis decisions.

Yet Austria delayed delivering its ultimatum to Belgrade until July 23 – the final day of French President Poincaré and Prime Minister Viviani’s visit to St. Petersburg. One hour after the French delegation departed, Austria’s ambassador presented Vienna’s demands (which Berlin’s leadership had known since July 22). The ultimatum aimed to humiliate Serbia. Based on Austria’s assassination investigation, it demanded Serbia track down and punish the attack’s supporters, dissolve nationalist organizations like Narodna Odbrana, and guarantee future good behavior. Austrian officials would participate in suppressing anti-Habsburg propaganda – a serious infringement on Serbian sovereignty. Belgrade had 48 hours to respond.

“This means European war,” Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov declared on July 24. To buy time, St. Petersburg asked other powers and Vienna to extend Serbia’s deadline as Russia intended. It advised Belgrade to demonstrate extreme compliance, avoiding military resistance if Austria invaded while placing Serbia’s fate in the great powers’ hands. Meanwhile, Russia’s cabinet decided to prepare partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary while making clear this didn’t target Germany. If war came, Austria must bear responsibility – a view shared by French President Poincaré, who during his visit had emphasized France’s loyalty to its ally.

The Point of No Return

Serbia’s July 25 reply to Vienna’s ultimatum was remarkably conciliatory. Belgrade agreed to most Austrian demands provided they didn’t compromise Serbian sovereignty, even accepting possible Austrian involvement in suppressing anti-Habsburg propaganda under international law. Yet Austria’s ambassador broke off relations upon receiving the note. Hours later, Austria-Hungary began mobilizing against Serbia. When Britain’s foreign secretary proposed mediation by four uninvolved powers (Britain, Germany, France, and Russia) the next day, Berlin responded tactically. State Secretary Jagow forwarded the proposal to Vienna while recommending against acceptance, instead advising Austria to create “fait accompli” regarding Serbia to prevent great power interference.

On July 28, Wilhelm II – having returned from his northern cruise – read Serbia’s July 25 reply and was stunned: “A brilliant achievement for a 48-hour deadline! This exceeds all expectations. For Vienna, it’s a great moral victory; but with it, every reason for war drops away.” He elaborated in a note to Jagow: Austria’s wishes had been largely met. Serbia’s few reservations could certainly be negotiated. But this “most humiliating surrender” had been proclaimed “to the world and the city,” eliminating all war justification. To ensure compliance, Austria should occupy Belgrade as security until demands were fully met – on this basis, the kaiser would mediate for “Austrian peace.”

Wilhelm’s change of heart related directly to a telegram from Germany’s London ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, reporting a meeting with British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey. Grey considered Serbia’s concessions beyond anything he’d expected, clearly resulting from St. Petersburg’s pressure. If Austria didn’t accept this as a basis for negotiation, it would prove Vienna merely sought an excuse to crush Serbia. Since Russia couldn’t accept this given its Balkan interests, the result would be “the most terrible war Europe has ever seen,” with unforeseeable consequences. Only German and British influence over their allies could prevent catastrophe.

Lichnowsky stressed it was the first time he’d seen Grey “upset,” speaking gravely as if expecting Germany to take specific action to help mediate. If war came despite this, Germany shouldn’t expect British sympathy or support, as Austria’s behavior would be seen as wholly aggressive – a view already widespread.

Bethmann and Jagow ignored both Lichnowsky’s report and the kaiser’s instructions, fearing reputational damage after consistently urging quick war against Serbia. Wilhelm’s “Belgrade occupation” proposal reached Vienna only in distorted, delayed form. Even swift action couldn’t have prevented Austria’s July 28 declaration of war on Serbia – which didn’t immediately start fighting, as Austria’s general staff said military operations couldn’t begin before August 12.

During this interval, as Bethmann informed Germany’s Vienna ambassador on July 28, Germany would face various mediation proposals. Continued German indifference would make them appear responsible for causing a world war. “However on this basis, a three-front war cannot be successfully launched and waged” (against Serbia, Russia, and France). The inevitable result would be that “responsibility for the possible expansion of the conflict to non-participating powers would in any case fall on Russia.”

Wilhelm’s latest initiative barely featured in Bethmann’s telegram. While noting the danger of “whole European opinion” turning against Austria for its “completely uncompromising attitude,” the chancellor deliberately softened the kaiser’s occupation proposal: Germany’s ambassador should avoid creating the impression “that we want to restrain Austria. This is only about finding a way to make possible the achievement of Austria’s desired goal – cutting the vital nerve of Greater Serbian propaganda – while avoiding a world war. If war still proves unavoidable, we must improve conditions for fighting it as much as possible.”

When Bethmann again claimed Russia had provoked major war on July 28, he surely knew little supported this assumption – that war with Serbia could remain localized. If Russia sided with Serbia, not just France but Britain would likely join Russia. Since July 27, the foreign office knew Grey considered British non-intervention impossible if the Austro-Serbian conflict became “an Austrian-Russian conflict that might develop into a European conflict.” Germany’s July Crisis policy had created a dilemma perfectly summarized by Germany’s London ambassador: “How can I advocate localizing the conflict when no one here doubts that Austria’s action gravely threatens Russian interests, forcing Russia to intervene against its will unless we pressure Austria?”

Only much clearer British warnings might have made Bethmann reconsider. On July 29, Grey told Lichnowsky that if Germany and France became involved in an Austro-Russian conflict, the British government “in certain circumstances would be forced to make rapid decisions.” Britain couldn’t long remain on the sidelines, and if war came, it would be the greatest disaster the world had yet experienced.

The chancellor now felt compelled to warn Austria’s leaders. If Austria rejected all mediation, he wired Germany’s Vienna ambassador on July 29-30, Germany faced “a conflagration with Britain against us, Italy and Romania certainly not on our side according to all indications, meaning two against four great powers.” Any refusal to exchange views with St. Petersburg would be a grave error precisely stimulating Russian intervention. “Although prepared to fulfill our alliance obligations, we must refuse to be drawn by Vienna, recklessly and disregarding our advice, into a world conflagration.”

This warning to Vienna resembled the leadership’s attempt to manufacture an alibi before history: Bethmann condemned the very policy he and his colleagues had strongly recommended to Austria. Moreover, he didn’t advise Austria to genuinely change course, merely to posture as seeking peaceful understanding with Russia. But even this came too late. On July 29, Russia began partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary, while Austria bombarded Serbian territory near Belgrade from the Danube’s left bank. News of Austria’s military action reached St. Petersburg during Foreign Minister Sazonov’s meeting with Austria’s ambassador, who had just assured him Vienna didn’t intend to annex Serbian territory or violate its sovereignty. “You’re only negotiating to gain time,” Sazonov retorted upon hearing of Belgrade’s bombardment, “while your troops advance and bombard an unarmed city.”

Reports of Belgrade’s bombardment reportedly strengthened Russia’s “war party.” Before this shocking news arrived, Sazonov had unusually revealed St. Petersburg’s power dynamics to Austria’s ambassador: he would inform Chief of Staff Nikolai Yanushkevich of his recommendations to the tsar, as the general saw the emperor daily while ministers could only see him at Tuesday audiences. Sazonov felt outmaneuvered: Austria’s military action against Serbia’s capital had undermined his diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis without major war.

The Dominoes Fall

July 29 also saw developments in Paris that would significantly influence subsequent events. After leaving St. Petersburg on July 23, President Poincaré and Prime Minister Viviani went to Stockholm, first stop on a planned Scandinavian tour. The international crisis disrupted these plans: France’s two highest leaders canceled visits to Oslo and Copenhagen, returning to Paris on July 29. A two-week interregnum ended during which no clear signals had come from France’s capital.

Poincaré and Viviani sometimes differed on foreign policy. The left-center prime minister, an independent socialist, favored diplomatic crisis resolution, viewing the Franco-Russian alliance – unpopular on the left – as unavoidable reinsurance against German aggression. In contrast, Poincaré consistently took a hard line against Germany, convinced only this could preserve peace. He particularly emphasized preventing Russian doubts about French loyalty. His confidant Ambassador Maurice Paléologue worked actively in St. Petersburg. Poincaré’s hardline approach, strongly supported by Chief of Staff Joseph Joffre and War Minister Adolphe Messimy, prevailed by late July: convinced Germany sought war, the president focused on preventing the Triple Entente’s disintegration rather than clearly warning Russia against escalating the international crisis.

Further bad news for the Central Powers came via London from Rome on July 29: Ambassador Lichnowsky reported a private secretary’s notification that London didn’t expect the Triple Alliance to survive a world war. Italy wouldn’t join a war over Serbia, matching what Berlin and Vienna had recently heard from Rome. On July 30, Italy’s foreign minister confirmed to Germany’s ambassador that Italy considered Austria’s actions aggressive, feeling no alliance obligation. The German diplomat correctly guessed Austria had one chance to change Italy’s stance: cede Italian-speaking Trentino – something Vienna considered non-negotiable.

July 30 brought a showdown between military and political leaders in Berlin: Chief of Staff Moltke and War Minister Falkenhayn, tired of Vienna’s ineffective “diplomatic notes,” urged immediate German mobilization. Considering public opinion – especially Social Democratic reactions – Bethmann insisted Russia must mobilize first while maintaining Britain’s belief in Germany’s mediating role. Protracted discussions produced a deadline: by July 31 noon, a decision must come on declaring “imminent war danger.” That afternoon, Bethmann – as Prussian prime minister – told the Prussian cabinet his priority was making Russia appear guilty should war come.

Meanwhile in St. Petersburg, matters were decided. Pressured by military leaders led by Yanushkevich and finally Foreign Minister Sazonov, Tsar Nicholas II approved general mobilization around 4 pm local time. Sazonov supported this because Germany was determined “to let things develop into conflict…In this case there’s no choice but to do what’s necessary to fully prepare for war, creating the most favorable conditions for ourselves. Not fearing our preparations might provoke war, it’s better to carefully make all preparations rather than be caught unprepared by war out of fear of providing a pretext.”

French Prime Minister Viviani had still pleaded with Russia on July 30 morning not to give Germany mobilization pretexts. Ambassador Paléologue learned of impending general mobilization from Sazonov but deliberately delayed informing his government. His telegram announcing mobilization’s first measures arrived just before midnight, so Paris learned of this dramatic development only hours before other European governments.

After Russia’s general mobilization, little room remained for advocates of peaceful crisis resolution. Chancellor Bethmann achieved his key aim: not Germany but Russia as the first great power to take the step making war nearly inevitable. This proved decisive for German labor’s attitude. On July 25, the SPD executive had condemned Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia as “the Austro-Hungarian government’s reckless war provocation.” By late July 1914, major German cities saw anti-war rallies, the largest on July 28 in Berlin’s Treptow Park. But meanwhile, the chancellor had begun negotiating through Reichstag deputy Albert Südekum to confirm workers’ loyalty if war came.

On July 29, Südekum informed the chancellor that in case of war, Social Democrats planned no actions. Regarding war with Russia, even the late August Bebel (died 1913) would have taken no different stance. At the 1907 Essen party congress, Bebel had declared he would “shoulder a rifle” against Russia. Like Marx and Engels, Babel viewed tsarist Russia as the enemy of all culture and oppressed peoples. If Social Democrats had previously opposed war, it was war against the democratic West, not despotic East. After Russia’s mobilization, Germany’s leaders could be fairly certain that despite criticisms of official policy, Social Democrats wouldn’t openly oppose war.

In France, the government similarly didn’t fear large-scale worker protests in late July. At a mid-July special congress, the SFIO saw no need to