A Thaw in Cold War Tensions

The 1960s and 1970s appeared as an era of relative calm for the Caucasus region after decades of turbulence. A foreign policy emphasizing neighborly relations and transcending ideological differences replaced the militant rhetoric of early Cold War years. This diplomatic shift found fertile ground as Turkey and Iran experienced disagreements with their Western allies.

Iran’s Shah pursued regional balance by warming relations with the Soviet Union, promising Nikita Khrushchev in September 1962 that Iran wouldn’t host foreign missile bases. While this cost Iran nothing (the U.S. had no such plans), it marked Iran’s gradual move toward greater independence – mirroring Charles de Gaulle’s policies, as evidenced by his high-profile September 1963 visit to Iran.

Turkey, despite hosting U.S. missiles, felt betrayed when Washington used Turkish territory as bargaining chips during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, then isolated Turkey over Cyprus issues within NATO. The Soviet Union skillfully exploited these tensions from the mid-1960s onward.

Economic Cooperation as Diplomatic Tool

The Soviet Union revived interwar-era policies through ambitious infrastructure projects that became symbols of 1950s-70s economic modernization. Joint ventures included:

– Border dam projects suspended during Stalin’s era
– Major industrial complexes like Isfahan’s metallurgy plants in Iran
– Turkey’s Seydişehir aluminum factory
– Expanding Black Sea trade networks

This economic courtship saw Moscow cease support for opposition groups in neighboring states, instead cultivating official government ties reminiscent of 1920s-30s modus vivendi arrangements. Soviet recognition of regimes like Iran’s monarchy reached unprecedented levels – a stark contrast to Bolshevik leaders’ mocking attitude at Reza Shah’s 1926 coronation.

The Illusion of Open Borders

Despite neighborly rhetoric, deep mutual distrust persisted. Limited trade measures failed to erase border closures, leaving older generations nostalgic for pre-Soviet mobility. Cultural exchanges became safe diplomatic currency:

– Azerbaijani singer Rashid Behbudov’s 1962-63 Iran tour drew massive crowds
– Scientists and artists regained prominence as non-threatening ambassadors
– Historical traumas resurfaced through de-Stalinization, complicating relations with Turkey

The Soviet Caucasus paradoxically became both more integrated economically with neighbors while remaining politically isolated, creating tensions that would erupt in later decades.

Republican Stability and Transcaucasian Gambits

Khrushchev’s 1957 decentralization reforms increased republic-level autonomy but faced implementation challenges. By 1962, disappointing results led to Communist Party restructuring. The February 1963 creation of the Transcaucasian Office under veteran industrial administrator Bochkarev aimed to:

– Ensure integrated regional development
– Strengthen ideological control in ethnically tense areas
– Oversee industrial diversification as Caucasus lost its Soviet industrial primacy

Azerbaijan’s oil production share plummeted from 75% of Soviet output in the 1930s to just 25% by the 1950s as Siberian fields developed. Despite massive investments in metallurgy, cement, and textiles, logistical bottlenecks hampered progress. Only two railway lines crossed the Caucasus Mountains, severely limiting connections to Soviet heartlands.

Tourism and the Soviet Riviera

The Caucasus’ western coast became central to Soviet leisure policies. Khrushchev’s May 1962 Bulgaria speech contrasted NATO “militarism” with socialist tourism development in subtropical Adjara and Abkhazia. This created:

– A booming resort industry catering to Soviet citizens
– Local economic transformations to serve seasonal tourism
– Relaxed security in border zones like Adjara
– Contrasts with failed tourism projects on Azerbaijan’s Absheron Peninsula

By the 1970s, the region hosted 15% of Soviet tourist capacity, though visitors often preferred “wild” tourism outside official structures.

The Shadow Economy’s Resilience

Official economic plans collided with robust informal networks. By 1973, Georgia’s underground economy accounted for an estimated 25% of commercial activity. French diplomats noted Georgian communism had become “a system where general principles are maintained while everyone improvises.” Characteristics included:

– Thriving private workshops and street markets
– Widespread bribery to avoid police crackdowns
– Seasonal labor migrations across the USSR
– Georgian restaurants like Moscow’s Aragvi popularizing Caucasian culture

While republic authorities received orders to curb these activities, many local elites profited from the informal economy, leading to corruption scandals.

The Brezhnev Era’s Ethnic Elite Consolidation

A distinctive feature of Caucasian republics was the high proportion of ethnic leaders in administrative positions, unlike Slavic-dominated republics. Notable cases included:

– Georgia’s First Secretary Mzhavanadze (1953-72), whose corrupt “Victorian era” ended in disgrace
– Azerbaijan’s Vali Akhundov replaced by KGB chief Heydar Aliyev in 1969
– Armenia’s Anton Kochinyan “retired” in 1974 after complaints

These purges maintained local leadership continuity while installing Russian second secretaries as Moscow’s watchdogs, fueling perceptions of “Russification.”

Reforging Borderland Connections

Energy cooperation drove Soviet-Iranian relations from the mid-1960s:

– The 1966 gas pipeline agreement secured Transcaucasian energy needs
– Joint projects like the 1970 Aras River dam became media spectacles
– Iran’s Empress Farah Pahlavi visited Baku in December 1970

With Turkey, the 1974 Cyprus crisis created openings as Ankara-US relations soured. The 1973 border agreement and Turkey’s removal of US surveillance equipment near Soviet borders marked warming ties.

Environmental Diplomacy Emerges

Shared ecological concerns created unexpected cooperation:

– 1969 Bulgarian-mediated talks on Black Sea pollution
– Iranian expert Eskandar Firouz pushing Caspian conservation
– Soviet concessions on Volga River pollution by late 1970s

These technical collaborations gained international visibility while addressing critical regional issues like coastal erosion (260 hectares lost near Georgia’s Poti).

Submerged Nationalist Currents

Beneath surface stability, ethnic tensions simmered:

– Meskhetian Turks’ attempts to return to Georgia after Stalin-era deportations
– The 1963 Nagorno-Karabakh transfer petition by Armenian intellectuals
– 1967 Stepanakert violence and border clashes
– The 1965 Armenian Genocide 50th anniversary demonstrations in Yerevan

Soviet authorities balanced these pressures against improving relations with Turkey, creating policy contradictions that would erupt in the 1980s.

1978: Constitutional Crises and Nationalist Resurgence

The 1977 USSR Constitution’s implementation sparked regional tensions:

– Abkhazia’s push to join Russia rather than Georgia
– Massive protests defending Georgian language’s official status
– April 14, 1978 Tbilisi demonstrations forcing concessions

These events revealed how Soviet nationalities policy had failed to erase borderland complexities, setting the stage for future conflicts as the Caucasus entered the turbulent 1980s.

The neighborly policies of the 1960s-70s ultimately proved fragile, unable to reconcile deep historical grievances with the demands of Soviet international diplomacy. What appeared as stability was merely the calm before the storm that would engulf the region in the late Soviet period.