A Bold Plan to Strike at Japan’s Heart

In the first month of 1598 (the 26th year of the Wanli Emperor’s reign), the Ming Dynasty’s Grand Secretariat convened a pivotal meeting. The discussion did not revolve around the recent Battle of Ulsan but instead focused on a pressing naval crisis. The previous year, the Korean navy had suffered a devastating defeat at the Battle of Chilcheollyang, leaving the peninsula vulnerable to Japanese naval dominance. Amidst these deliberations, Censor Xu Zhaokui proposed an audacious strategy—a direct assault on Japan itself.

The Ministry of War, after careful consideration, endorsed Xu’s proposal. Their plan was ambitious:

> “The rebel leader Toyotomi Hideyoshi has defied the natural order and abused his people. Rumors of discontent among the Japanese islands have long circulated. To exploit this, we must strike decisively. Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong are the most suitable provinces to lead this campaign, as they have strong connections with Japanese dissidents, coastal allies, and merchants who can serve as informants. These provinces must be granted full autonomy to act swiftly without bureaucratic interference.”

Emperor Wanli approved the plan and swiftly ordered adjustments. Guangxi’s seasoned commander, Tong Yuanzhen, was to be transferred to Zhejiang, while Zhejiang’s commander, Li Yingzhao, would take over in Guangxi. However, fate intervened. A rebellion by the Yao people erupted in Guangxi, forcing Tong to delay his departure. With Zhejiang’s coastal defenses deemed too critical to leave unattended, the proposed invasion of Japan collapsed before it could begin.

The Aftermath of Ulsan and the Ming-Korean Alliance

Following the Battle of Ulsan in early 1598, Ming commander Xing Jie reported a “great victory” to the court, claiming heavy Japanese casualties. However, harsh weather, exhaustion, and Japanese reinforcements had forced a tactical withdrawal. Meanwhile, an intriguing offer arrived from an unexpected quarter—Nurhaci, the chieftain of the Jianzhou Jurchens, volunteered 20,000 troops to aid Korea. Though initially considered, Ming officials feared revealing military weaknesses to the Jurchens and rejected his proposal.

By mid-1598, Ming reinforcements poured into Korea, swelling their forces to nearly 98,000 troops. Yet internal strife between northern and southern Ming soldiers undermined cohesion. Accusations of corruption and incompetence led to the dismissal of commander Yang Hao, despite Korean admiration for his leadership.

The Second Battle of Ulsan: A Stalemate Revisited

In September 1598, the Ming launched a renewed offensive, dividing their forces into four routes. The eastern army, led by Ma Gui, targeted Ulsan once more, hoping to dislodge the entrenched Japanese under Katō Kiyomasa.

The battle unfolded with mixed results. Ming cavalry achieved minor successes, but the Japanese, fortified within Ulsan’s inner citadel, repelled repeated assaults. Frustrated, Ma Gui attempted feigned retreats to lure the enemy out, but Katō refused to engage. When news arrived of setbacks in the central front, Ma withdrew, leaving Ulsan unconquered.

The Legacy of a Forgotten Campaign

The Ming’s aborted invasion of Japan and the inconclusive Second Battle of Ulsan underscored the challenges of waging war across the sea. While the plan to strike Japan directly was bold, logistical and political hurdles proved insurmountable. In Korea, the Ming-Korean alliance held firm, but internal divisions and resilient Japanese defenses prolonged the conflict.

Historically, these events marked a turning point. Hideyoshi’s death later in 1598 led to Japan’s withdrawal, ending the Imjin War. Yet the Ming’s struggles foreshadowed their eventual decline, as overextension and internal strife weakened the dynasty. Today, this episode remains a testament to the complexities of East Asian geopolitics—a blend of ambition, strategy, and the unpredictable tides of war.

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