A Fateful Meeting in Tokyo

On the night of February 4, 1904 (January 22 by the old Julian calendar), Japan’s military leaders gathered in Tokyo for a secret council that would alter the course of Asian history. Top officials from the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy convened to finalize a strategy for war against Russia—a conflict that had been brewing for years over rival ambitions in Manchuria and Korea. The meeting’s decisions, made behind closed doors, set in motion a surprise attack that would stun the world and redefine modern warfare.

Admiral Yamamoto Gonnohyōe, Japan’s Naval Minister, emerged as the driving force behind the plan. The strategy was audacious: Japan would sever diplomatic relations and launch a preemptive strike on Russia’s Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur (modern Lüshun, China) before formally declaring war. This move, calculated to neutralize Russia’s naval power in a single blow, reflected Japan’s determination to seize the initiative against a larger but slower-moving imperial rival.

The Emperor’s Approval and Naval Mobilization

At dawn on February 5, Admiral Yamamoto and senior naval officers hurried to the Imperial Palace to seek Emperor Meiji’s sanction. Yamamoto reportedly declared, “Today is the most opportune moment to commence hostilities.” The emperor approved the orders, and by that afternoon, sealed directives were dispatched to the naval base at Sasebo. Three critical commands shaped Japan’s opening moves:

1. The Combined Fleet was to annihilate Russia’s naval forces in East Asia.
2. The fleet must strike swiftly to cripple Russian squadrons in the Yellow Sea.
3. The Third Fleet would secure Korea’s Chinhae Bay and blockade the Korean Strait.

Historians later noted the irony in Yamamoto’s timing. Russian ships had sortied from Port Arthur on February 3—a move that initially alarmed Japanese commanders—but returned to port by February 4. This retreat, unknown to Tokyo until the following afternoon, inadvertently played into Japan’s hands, allowing their fleets to attack a stationary target.

The Army’s Parallel Gambit in Korea

While the navy prepared its assault, Japan’s army mobilized with equal secrecy. On the same evening, the War Ministry ordered the 23rd Brigade (2,240 troops) to embark for Korea under Colonel Kigoshi Yasutsuna. Their mission: seize Seoul within days of landing at Incheon. This two-pronged strategy—naval dominance and rapid territorial occupation—revealed Japan’s intent to control Korea before Russia could react.

Russian military attachés in Japan detected unusual activity but failed to grasp its significance. Captain Rusin, the naval attaché, reported reserve call-ups on February 5 but remained unaware of Japan’s sealed orders already en route to Sasebo.

The Russian Delusion: “We Do Not Want War”

As Japan acted, Russia’s leadership clung to misconceptions. An editorial by Alexey Suvorin, publisher of Novoye Vremya (New Times), captured the mood in St. Petersburg on February 5:

“In Russia, people repeat hundreds of times that we do not want war… Foreign papers admit Russia has made every concession. If Japan remains unsatisfied, it proves Japan seeks war for war’s sake. Japan is a nation of abnormal psychology.”

Suvorin’s column exposed Russia’s fatal miscalculations. While Russian elites dismissed Japan as a “barbaric” upstart, they ignored Tokyo’s meticulous preparations. British media, particularly The Times, openly cheered Japanese resolve, further blinding Russia to the looming threat.

The Attack That Rewrote the Rules of War

Japan’s February 1904 decisions culminated in the February 8 surprise torpedo attack on Port Arthur—a move that predated Pearl Harbor by 37 years. The assault crippled Russia’s fleet, forced a prolonged siege, and demonstrated that industrialized Asian powers could defeat European empires.

Legacy: The Dawn of Asymmetric Warfare

The Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) became the first modern conflict where an Asian nation decisively defeated a European power. Japan’s February gambits established templates for 20th-century warfare: preemptive strikes, rapid mobilization, and psychological manipulation of enemy perceptions. Today, historians recognize these events as pivotal in eroding European imperial dominance and foreshadowing the Pacific theaters of both World Wars.

From the sealed orders at Sasebo to Suvorin’s misguided editorial, February 1904 stands as a masterclass in how perception, timing, and audacity reshape history. The lessons reverberate in modern geopolitics, where asymmetric strategies continue to upend conventional power balances.