The Fractured Landscape of Late Tang and Five Dynasties

The 10th century witnessed one of China’s most turbulent periods—the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms era—where warlords carved empires from the ashes of the Tang dynasty. At the heart of this instability lay institutional innovations gone awry, particularly the evolution of the Shumishi (枢密使, Bureau of Military Affairs) position. Originally a mid-Tang communication channel between emperors and chief ministers, this role transformed under eunuch control into a shadow government, culminating in the notorious “Four Nobles” system where eunuch commanders dictated policy.

Zhu Wen’s destruction of the Tang in 907 nominally ended eunuch dominance, but the institutional memory of concentrated power persisted. The Later Liang’s Chongzhen Academy and Later Tang’s revived Shumishi became crucibles where military and civil authority fused dangerously. As historian Wang Gungwu observed, “The Five Dynasties saw not the collapse of institutions, but their weaponization.”

The Making of a Power Broker: An Chonghui’s Ascent

An Chonghui’s trajectory epitomized the era’s volatile career paths. Born to a Shatuo Turk general who died serving Li Keyong, his early appointment as Zhongmenshi (中门使, Central Gate Commissioner) under Li Siyuan placed him at the nerve center of military communications. This role, essentially a provincial version of the Shumishi, schooled him in the dark arts of wartime decision-making.

His defining moment came during the 926 Weibo Mutiny, where An and Huo Yanwei masterminded Li Siyuan’s rebellion against Li Cunxu. The coup’s success catapulted An into the Shumishi position, inheriting both the institutional power accumulated by predecessors like Guo Chongtao and the deadly rivalries they spawned. The New History of the Five Dynasties notes with irony: “These commissioners began resembling Tang chief ministers in authority, yet bore the scars of their military origins.”

The Anatomy of Overreach: Three Fatal Missteps

An’s governance revealed the contradictions of military men administering civil systems:

1. The Ren Huan Affair (928): His extrajudicial execution of the Finance Commissioner exposed contempt for due process. By forging edicts to eliminate a bureaucratic rival, An violated the fragile post-rebellion consensus on power-sharing.

2. The Imperial Princes Purge (929-930): His vendetta against Li Congke—including orchestrating a fake rebellion via Yang Yanwen—crossed Li Siyuan’s red lines. The emperor’s protection of his adopted son signaled growing distrust, encapsulated in his rebuke: “Must I prove I can protect my own children?”

3. The Sichuan Debacle (930): His heavy-handed policies (garrisoning troops, demanding exorbitant tributes) forced arch-rivals Meng Zhixiang and Dong Zhang into alliance. The subsequent rebellion wasted 30,000 elite troops, becoming Later Shu’s founding myth.

The Mechanics of Downfall: Institutional vs. Personal Power

An’s 931 ouster followed a classic pattern seen in Tang eunuch politics:

1. Geographical Isolation: His inspection tour to Sichuan allowed opponents like Zhu Hongzhao to whisper of rebellion.

2. Bureaucratic Entrapment: The manufactured “plot” involving palace eunuch An Xilun created legal pretext for dismissal.

3. Kinetic Elimination: Li Congzhang’s brutal execution (stripped naked, hammered to death) mirrored Tang-era purges, its savagery underscoring the stakes.

As the Zizhi Tongjian notes: “He died less for crimes than for embodying the Shumishi’s inherent threat.”

The Butterfly Effect: An Chonghui’s Unintended Legacies

Paradoxically, An’s failures shaped the next generation:

– Meng Zhixiang: His oppressive policies forged Sichuanese unity, enabling Later Shu’s independence until 965.
– Li Congke: The persecution created a martyr figure whose 934 coup briefly revived the Shatuo regime.
– Shi Jingtang: The Sichuan quagmire preserved his forces, positioning him to found the Later Jin with Khitan help.

The Five Dynasties’ Institutional Paradox

Li Siyuan’s lament—”I pray Heaven sends a true sage to govern”—reveals the era’s central dilemma. The Shumishi system, designed to streamline military-civil coordination, became what sociologist Max Weber would call an “iron cage” of destructive competition. Song founders later solved this by:

1. Civilianizing the Shumishi
2. Separating military and financial authority
3. Implementing rotation systems

Yet as Ouyang Xiu observed in the New History, the true lesson lay in recognizing institutional designs’ unintended consequences—a warning echoing Hegel’s dictum about history’s repetitions. The tragedy of An Chonghui wasn’t personal villainy, but how structures transformed capable administrators into liabilities. In this turbulent interregnum between Tang and Song, we see China’s eternal governance challenge: how to balance efficiency against concentration of power. The Five Dynasties’ answer—through trial and catastrophic error—paved the way for the Song bureaucratic revolution.