The Stage Set for Dynastic Collapse

The year 1644 stands as one of the most consequential in Chinese history, marking the violent transition from the Ming Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty. This period witnessed the dramatic convergence of multiple powerful figures whose decisions would reshape China for centuries. The Ming Emperor Zhu Youjian, peasant rebel leader Li Zicheng, Qing regent Dorgon, and Ming general Wu Sangui all played crucial roles in the unfolding drama. Yet historical analysis has often overlooked one silent but devastating actor: the humble rat, carrier of the bubonic plague that weakened Beijing’s defenses at the most critical moment.

The Ming Dynasty, which had ruled China since 1368, found itself in a state of advanced decay by the early 17th century. Rampant corruption, economic distress, and widespread famine had created ideal conditions for rebellion. Meanwhile, the Manchu forces northeast of the Great Wall grew increasingly powerful, waiting for the right moment to strike. Against this backdrop of imperial weakness and external threat, Li Zicheng’s peasant uprising gained momentum, ultimately setting the stage for the dramatic events of 1644.

The Rebel Advance on Beijing

In the third lunar month of 1644, Li Zicheng and his Shun army reached Juyong Pass, the last major defensive barrier north of Beijing. This formidable mountain pass, part of the Great Wall system, should have presented a significant obstacle to any invading force. Surprisingly, the Ming defenders offered no resistance. General Tang Tong surrendered without fighting, delivering the strategic pass to the rebels.

On March 16, the rebel forces arrived at Changping, where the situation repeated itself. The local governor fled while the commanding general took his own life. Emboldened by these bloodless victories, Li’s forces desecrated the Ming imperial tombs, burning the ceremonial halls that honored past emperors. This symbolic act demonstrated their contempt for the ruling dynasty and their confidence in imminent victory.

By March 17, the Shun army reached Beijing’s outskirts, specifically the Fuchengmen gate area, completing their encirclement of the capital. The speed of their advance and the lack of meaningful resistance surprised contemporary observers and continues to intrigue historians today.

The Failed Negotiations

At this critical juncture, Li Zicheng attempted negotiation rather than immediate assault. He dispatched Du Xun, a Ming eunuch who had defected to the rebel cause, to enter Beijing and present terms to Emperor Chongzhen . In a dramatic nighttime operation on March 17, Du Xun shot an arrow carrying a message over the city walls, requesting an audience with the emperor. The eunuch Wang Chengen lowered ropes to haul the messenger into the city.

Du Xun presented Li Zicheng’s demands: recognition as ruler of northwestern China with the title of king, a payment of one million taels of silver for his troops, and autonomy from Ming authority. In exchange, Li promised to withdraw to Henan province. These terms represented a remarkable opportunity for the Ming court to preserve at least part of the empire, but Emperor Chongzhen ultimately rejected them.

This negotiation attempt has puzzled historians for centuries. Given Li’s military advantage and the demonstrated weakness of Ming defenses, why would he offer terms at all? The answer lies in events that had transpired weeks earlier during his march toward the capital.

The Battle of Ningwu and Its Psychological Impact

Several weeks before reaching Beijing, Li Zicheng’s forces had encountered unexpectedly fierce resistance at Ningwu Pass. There, Ming general Zhou Yuji defended the position with merely several thousand troops against Li’s army of hundreds of thousands. The Ming defenders employed clever tactics, including a successful ambush that killed thousands of rebel soldiers.

The battle ultimately ended in rebel victory, but only after Li resorted to human wave tactics that cost tens of thousands of casualties. This Pyrrhic victory shook the rebel leader’s confidence. Faced with the prospect of similarly costly battles at numerous passes between Ningwu and Beijing, Li seriously considered abandoning his campaign and returning to his base in Xi’an.

Only the unexpected surrenders of Ming generals at Datong and Xuanfu changed his mind, convincing him to continue toward the capital. Thus, when Li arrived at Beijing, he anticipated potentially fierce resistance from the emperor’s elite guards, making negotiation seem a reasonable alternative to another bloody battle.

The Overlooked Catastrophe: Beijing’s Great Plague

What Li Zicheng could not have known was that Beijing had been devastated by epidemic disease in the preceding year. While historians have traditionally focused on political and military explanations for the Ming collapse, emerging research has revealed the crucial role played by bubonic plague in weakening the capital’s defenses.

Professor Cao Shuji of Shanghai Jiao Tong University pioneered this reassessment in his 1997 research paper “Plague Epidemics and Social Change in North China,” later expanded in his 2006 book “Plague: War and Peace” co-authored with Li Yushang. His work compellingly argues that rats, or more precisely the fleas they carried, effectively “destroyed” the Ming Dynasty by spreading plague throughout northern China.

Historical records from late Qing local gazetteers throughout North China document a devastating epidemic that raged from 1633 to 1644. The outbreak originated in Xing County, Shanxi province, before spreading to Datong and Lu’an. By 1641, it had reached Hebei province, including the Daming and Shuntian prefectures surrounding Beijing.

Contemporary accounts describe horrific scenes with phrases like “plague, more than half the population dead, people killing and eating each other.” The disease reached Beijing itself in 1643, the year before Li Zicheng’s arrival, where it became known as “geda wen” or “the lump plague” – a clear reference to the swollen lymph nodes characteristic of bubonic plague.

The Social and Military Consequences of Epidemic

The plague’s impact on Beijing’s population was catastrophic. Historical accounts describe streets filled with corpses, households completely wiped out, and insufficient living people to bury the dead. One particularly chilling account describes official Wu Yansheng, who was preparing to take up a post in Wenzhou when one of his servants died of plague. He sent another servant to purchase a coffin, but this man also perished – inside the coffin shop itself. Another story tells of newlyweds who failed to emerge from their wedding chamber; when concerned family members investigated, they found both bride and groom dead on opposite sides of the bed.

The mortality rate suggests that between 20-30% of Beijing’s population perished in the 1643 outbreak. This demographic catastrophe had direct military implications. The capital’s defense forces were devastated by disease, explaining why critical positions like Juyong Pass were undermanned or abandoned. The elite imperial guards who should have defended the city walls were likely at reduced strength due to plague casualties.

When Li Zicheng’s forces arrived in March 1644, they encountered a city already broken by disease, with depleted garrison forces and a traumatized population. This context explains both the ease of Beijing’s capture and the subsequent inability of the Ming loyalists to mount an effective defense.

The Fall of Beijing and Ming Collapse

On March 18, 1644, Li Zicheng’s forces breached Beijing’s defenses. The exact circumstances remain somewhat unclear, but the lack of sustained resistance suggests the city’s defenders were indeed severely compromised. Emperor Chongzhen attempted to flee but found escape impossible. In desperation, he retreated to Prospect Hill behind the Forbidden City and took his own life by hanging from an old locust tree.

This tragic end to the last Ming emperor’s life symbolized the complete collapse of the dynasty. The ease with which Li’s forces captured the capital surprised even the rebel leader himself, who had anticipated much stiffer resistance based on his experience at Ningwu Pass.

The Shun occupation of Beijing proved brief. Li Zicheng’s forces quickly alienated the population through looting and violence, while General Wu Sangui made the fateful decision to ally with the Manchu forces under Dorgon. The combined Manchu-Wu forces defeated Li at the Battle of Shanhai Pass in May 1644, opening the way for Qing domination of China.

Reassessing Historical Causation

The inclusion of epidemiological factors in our understanding of the Ming-Qing transition represents an important evolution in historical methodology. Traditional narratives emphasized political corruption, military decisions, and economic factors as explanations for dynastic collapse. While these elements remain crucial, the plague outbreak provides a necessary piece of the puzzle that explains why Beijing fell so easily despite its formidable defenses.

This approach exemplifies how interdisciplinary research combining historical documentation with scientific understanding of disease patterns can yield richer, more nuanced historical explanations. The case of Ming collapse demonstrates how natural phenomena can interact with human systems to produce unexpected historical outcomes.

The rapid spread of plague through North China was itself facilitated by the social disruption caused by famine and warfare, creating a feedback loop where human suffering and biological catastrophe reinforced each other. This complex interplay between human and environmental factors characterizes what we now call the “Little Ice Age” period in Chinese history.

Legacy and Historical Memory

The events of 1644 established Qing rule over China, which would last until 1912. The Manchu conquest brought significant changes to Chinese society, including the imposition of the queue hairstyle, new administrative systems, and initially tense relations between ethnic Manchus and Han Chinese.

Historical memory of the Ming-Qing transition has evolved over time. Early Qing historiography emphasized the legitimacy of their rule and the corruption of the Ming. Nationalist historians in the 20th century often framed the events as a tragedy of foreign conquest. More recently, scholars have adopted more complex interpretations that consider multiple factors, including the epidemiological perspective explored here.

The story of the 1644 transition reminds us that historical causation is rarely simple. Great events typically result from the intersection of multiple factors: human decisions, economic conditions, military capabilities, and sometimes invisible biological actors. The humble rat and its disease-carrying fleas played an unacknowledged role in reshaping Chinese history, demonstrating how seemingly minor natural phenomena can alter the course of human events.

This reassessment does not diminish the importance of human agency – the decisions of Li Zicheng, Emperor Chongzhen, Wu Sangui, and Dorgon remain crucial to understanding the period. Rather, it adds necessary context that helps explain why these decisions produced the outcomes they did. The plague weakened the Ming state at its critical moment, creating conditions where normally defensible positions became vulnerable, and where desperate choices became inevitable.

The lesson for historians is clear: we must remain open to new perspectives and interdisciplinary approaches that might reveal previously overlooked factors in historical causation. Sometimes the smallest actors – whether rats or fleas or microbes – can have the largest historical impacts.